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The Indo-Tibet Forum
THE NEED FOR A TIBET LOBBY IN INDIA
By
ML Sondhi
Issued by the Tibet Swaraj Committee
January 1992
Tibet is entering upon a new period of history as the final
catastrophe overtakes the Chinese Communist regime in
Beijing. The Chinese lobby is desperate and trying to shape
beliefs, attitudes, prejudices and values in new Delhi in
such a way that Indian decision-makers should act
irrationally even in pursuing their own goals. The Dalai
Lama’s Government-in-Exile has done a commendable job in
creating an international environment for Tibetan human and
political rights, and the summit meetings of H.H. The Dalai
Lama with the British Prime inistr and the President of the
United States are proof of the success of Tibetan
diplomacy. Unfortunately inside India the efforts of the
Tibetan Government and Indians helping the development of
Indo-Tibetan unity have been fragmented and unsystematic.
In Tibetan official circles the importance of Indian support
for Tibet has been somewhat underestimated. Rarely have
Tibetan officials and advisers sat down with Indian
mainstream political leaders for brainstorming sessions on
common Indo-Tibetan issues. The Indian media has also been
tackled in a half-hearted way and no effort has been made to
adopt a bold and creative approach to moulding media opinion
on political issues.
The magnitude, complexity and urgency of the problem became
clear when the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi adopted
“blitzkrieg” methods during Li Peng’s visit and the most
bizarre decision of the Chinese Communist mandarins was to
promote ethnic hatred between Tibetans and Indians. The
Chinese of course overestimated their own capabilities.
Their abject stupidity was evident from the pressure they
brought on the Delhi police to physically assault the
Tibetans. The young girls from Tibet who are studying in
Indian universities were more than a match for the ingrained
mental blockage of the Chinese Embassy-Delhi police nexus.
Thanks to Professor M.L. Sondhi, Mr. P.N. Lekhi, Senior
Advocate, Mr. George Fernandes and the Judges of the Delhi
High Court and the Supreme Court of India, the Chinese
Embassy was badly shaken by the New Delhi episode.
Still one should not dismiss the actions of the Chinese
Embassy and the Chinese Intelligence Agencies so lightly.
They have a mastery of the art of manipulating Indian public
opinion since the day the P.L.A. entered Tibet and sold the
idea of “peaceful liberation”. The diplomatic and
extra-diplomatic methods, instruments and structures of the
Chinese embassy have to be matched and outmanouvered by
Tibetan diplomacy and by the institutionalised cooperation
of Tibetans and Indians with the full sanction of the
Constitution of India. For a start the Bureau of H.H. the
Dalai Lama in New Delhi should be equipped with greater
technical knowledge for tackling the diplomatic issues of
the 1990s. It has not only to establish a network of
international contacts, but also a network of Indian
contacts with a multi-professional focus. It should include
opposition and government, and also the Indian
intelligentsia which can help to relate the cause of Tibetan
freedom to political, economic, military, social and
cultural interests of India.
It is also necessary to develop an Indian lobby for
Indo-Tibetan understanding and education on issues of
contemporary international significance. There is urgent
need to promote free exchange of ideas between Tibetan and
Indians and the participants in this lobby should include
apart from politicians, bankers, lawyers, journalists,
economists and students. If possible there should be daily
briefings to counter Chinese communist propaganda and
lectures should be arranged by high-level visiting faculty
members from all over India.
In general it is necessary for Indians and Tibetans to
develop more and more contacts and follow the example of
H.H. The Dalai Lama who has always paid tributes to Mahatma
Gandhi and other Indian masters and stressed that both
Indians and Tibetans have to come together for the renewal
of world civilisation. Both Indians and Tibetans need to
come down to earth and come to grips with the harsh
realities of the Chinese challenge. Since cultural
exchanges always receive extensive coverage in media, the
first step should be to organise an INDO-TIBETAN FRIENDSHIP
FESTIVAL in New Delhi which should strengthen cross-cultural
communication between Indians and Tibetans. It should
provide an opportunity to Indians and Tibetans in arts,
culture, education, media, and social and historical
sciences to talk to each other and learn from each other.
The Chinese aim was to create hatred and animosity between
Indians and Tibetans and even foment riots in different
parts of India where uptil now the Tibetans have been living
in peace and amity with Indians. To defeat the Chinese evil
designs, we have to work on the ground level in India. We
have to use the message of Dharma given by H.H. The Dalai
Lama for generating overarching ideas to forge a cultural
and social consensus which will strengthen the cause of
Tibetan freedom and Indo-Tibetan unity.
SOME LESSONS FROM THE INDAIN NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR TIBETAN
SWARAJ
It is only natural that the Tibetans, our neighbours and
also our guests for several decades, should examine Indian
institutions for hints as to how to conduct their own
affairs in the process of adapting to the modern world. The
Tibetan Youth Congress is one example, and the same went for
the earlier Tibetan constitution which is now being
redrafted. Politically also, there is a moving testimony
from the late Tsepon Shakabpa, who records that when on a
visit to India in the forties, while Tibet was still a free
country, he had witnessed a political meeting at Chowpatty
beach where Indians had raised the demand for national
independence. He had hoped that Tibet would also absorb
some of these methods of public participation in political
affairs, and indeed today, amongst the exiles at least, his
aspirations appear to be well on the way to fulfilment.
In the context one may, in the present situation, draw
attention to a couple of other interesting and perhaps
relevant factors. The Indian national movement, launched
tentatively in 1885 as a method of demanding more Indian
participation in the governmental process, grew into demands
for swaraj, or self-rule, and finally to ‘purna swaraj’ or
full self-rule i.e. complete independence. In the first
couple of decades of the twentieth century, even to think of
Dominion status within the British Commonwealth was
considered a strong demand, but the incidents of Jallianwala
Bagh and the subsequent Martial Law in Punjab gave a radical
twist to the hitherto gentlemanly Indian approach. Tagore
returned his knighthood, Gandhi understood that he was up
against a ruthless power that would stop at nothing to
maintain its supremacy despite its conciliatory talk, and
finally at Lahore in 1929 the goal of purna swaraj, was
passed by the Congress Party. The Tibetans also need to
consider very seriously, what they desire and what they are
in reality likely to get from the Chinese. There is much
airy talk about ‘autonomy’ within the Chinese ‘motherland’,
with foreign affairs and defence remaining twith Beijing:
but the atrocious and brutal behaviour of the Chinese within
Tibet raises many questions as to whether they could
actually contemplate any genuine level of self-rule. They
reneged on their promises given at the time of the so-called
17-pt ‘Agreement’: given their paranoia, racial arrogance,
and security perceptions, their total lack of comprehension
of a Tibetan way of life, democracy, human rights etc., one
would be less than naïve to take them seriously now, if at
all they mean anything when they reiterate-as they have done
for the last twelve years without any signs of meaning it –
that they will talk with the Dalai Lama about anything short
of independence. The British had more credibility than
that.
If conceding to the limited demand of autonomy, the Tibetans
throw away all their cards – the most important and
irretrievable being that of H.H. the Dalai Lama himself,
then they will have taken a giant step backwards, and lost
much of the hard won position which prevails today as a
result of years of patient diplomacy. Purna swaraj is both
tactically and strategically a safer procedure.
The second point relates to the influence of Western
friends, those both well-intentioned and those making
instrumental use of the situation. (The Indian surveillance
agencies of course have deeply penetrated the Tibetan
establishment), So far as the foreign policies of various
governments are concerned, the Tibetans have developed
enough sophistication and expertise to understand the
international power game. However there is one aspect which
is a more subtle, and ultimately a more powerful disruptive
influence, and that is the one of language. The Americans
have been known to say to their Indian strategic counter –
parts – ‘we don’t mind if you disagree with us but just use
our terminology’. In other words, so long as we accept
their overarching paradigm of thought, minor adjustments
within it are tolerable. Gandhi, in the course of his
opposition to British rule, was clever enough to coin his
own vocabulary, so it was the other side that had to scratch
its head and decipher the meaning of satyagraha, swadeshi,
swaraj, brahmacharya etc. The word is father to the event:
not for nothing has the philosophical heritage of this
country emphasised the reality of sabdabrahman: and in a
related vein, Europe is also today discovering the
importance of language, signs and symbols. One notices
however, a regrettable tendency on the part of the Tibetan
decision-makers to borrow their vocabulary from western
discourse. Sovereignty, suzerainty, autonomy are as foreign
to the Tibetan situation as being called members of the
Chinese ‘motherland’. The Tibetans should enumerate certain
key concepts, which describe crucial and essential elements
in their socio-political reality or its new aspirations. By
evolving their own discourse, theTibetans will keep a basic
control over their own movement: they have understood the
need to maintain their cultural identity (though one notices
several unnecessary concessions to superficial westernisms
and language in their international conduct): equally
important is it to develop (for obviously a tailor-made
modern political vocabulary did not previously exist on the
roof of the world) a socio-political identity. In this
exercise, some selective borrowing from Indian procedures
could be helpful: not completely for we are not exemplars.
B ut with Mahatma Gandhi, already an acceptable figure to
the Dalai Lama through his non-violence, there is much scope
for further study: not simply of his declared goals of
rectitude and morality, but of his actual praxis, the
methodologies he used to create one of the most remarkable
cultural cum social cum political movements for national
independence. Not least because thanks to the winds of
freedom and democracy which are sweeping the globe, Tibetan
freedom is nearer than most imagine. And it’s expression
and character will be swaraj, not ‘autonomy’.
SCRUTINISING THE INDIAN PRESS
THE STATESMAN (January 2, 199) A.G. Noorani in “Talking
about Tibet” tilts at western windmills and augments the
Chinese Ambassador’s effort to practice the art of “divide
and rule”, and to sow doubt and discord between Tibetans and
Indians. He wants to move our minds away from the public
outcry in India against Li Peng and urges a “Sonnenfteldt”
doctrine for Communist Asia. Noorani is frightened to see
the building up of international pressure in favour of
Tibet. 1992 may well be a nightmare for the likes of him,
since Indian public pressure will most likely build up in
favour of Tibet. The Dalai Lama can wait for 3 to 5 years
for the liberal elements in China to win. He should now be
in no hurry to negotiate with the Chinese. Is withdrawal of
the Strasbourg Declaration was a masterly diplomatic
manoeuvre. He can now widen his options withIndia (the BJP
President Murli Manohar Joshi is a strong supporter of
Tibet, while all that the Chinese can bank on are a few
political pilgrims who have been taken to Beijing, support
within the Congtress Party is increasing for the Dalai Lama
the old Socialists are rallying round the Dalai Lama while
the CPM is losing ground as a credible political force in
Indian politics). Noorani wants to bridge the gap between
the Dalai Lama and Li Peng. We are not aware whether he
tried to bridge the gap between Brezhnev and Havel. It might
be worthwhile for Noorani to wait for a Chinese Gorbachev to
come along and then start his bridge building activity.
Noorani says that Tibet has never really been a matter of
“serious” concern for the West. More relevant, Tibet never
was or will be a serious concern for the likes of Noorani.
The fundamental reason why Indians are friends of the Dalai
Lama is because of our old Hindu-Buddhistic heritage and the
fact that the Tibetan people have been victims of the
greatest crime of genocide and colonial occupation in the
post-Western era in Asia. The Indian-Tibetan relationship
is unique and Indians can be proud of it, and arm-twisting
the Dalai Lama (which Noorani suggests in so many words) can
never be part of our fraternal relationship.
SUNDAY MAIL (January 5-11, 1992). Ashok K. Mehta who is
described as a retired Major General and founder member of
the Defence Planning Staff of the Chiefs of Staff Committee,
systematically undermines the Indian negotiating positions
under the pretext of “Time to act boldly o border dispute”.
Like the Chinese propagandists he banks on cognitive inertia
in New Delhi. He is blissfully ignorant of the need to
answer external pressures and demands. India has all to
gain from a stable and balanced international system; China
all to lose from such a development. Time is on India’s
side if we can achieve an autonomous identification of
interests and priorities in Sino-Indian relations. In the
security field, China now faces Yeltsin, who is a
nationalist, more pro-Tibet and less inclined to offer
concessions to China like Gorbachev was. The role of the
Chinese intelligence apparatus in India has not been
systematically examined. There are some clear pointers of
the way in which ISI (Pakistan) and Chinese intelligence
have spread their tentacles in India, even reaching out to
Indian military and para-military forces. The highest
priority should be to adopt steps to curb Pakistani and
Chinese intelligence activity in India. To begin with India
should remind China that we find their stand on Arunachal
Pradesh and Sikkim unacceptable. The time has come for a
more demanding Indian position: There is no place for the
Munich Spirit in the Eastern Sector. In sum, now is the
time to act boldly and rid the country of the ISI – Chinese
intelligence network |
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