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THE FALSE LINKAGE BETWEEN KASHMIR AND TIBET
By
M.L. Sondhi
Twenty years after the accomplishment of the mission of
Indian forces in Bangladesh, some observations about Indian
foreign policy can be made. The first is that Indian policy
makers failed to capitalise on the collapse of Pakistani
colonial rule in East Bengal. India could have emerged as a
challenger to hegemonial motivations in order to build a new
peace order in Asia. Bangladesh should have been followed
up with an Indian challenge to Chinese power-political
interests in Tibet. The future of Asian security should
have been seen as a systemic process to remove hegemonial
pressures in order to create peaceful international
conditions in Asia. Bangladesh and Tibet would have served
as the two foundation stones of a democratic and resurgent
order and made a dent in the ideological structures of both
Islamic and Communist fundamentalisms.
A second observation is that Indian policy after the
liberation of Bangladesh should have taken into account the
factor of “revanchism” in Pakistani policy and that it was
essential for New Delhi to pre-empt Islamabad’s efforts to
aggravate Islamic fundamentalist trends in one or other part
of India. In the post-Bangladesh period all the cards were
in India’s favour. If we had held a war-crimes trial of
Pakistani soldiers and officers in our custody, we would
have helped to shape the Islamic religious and social
outlook in the Subcontinent in a humane direction. Pakistan
which now encourages talk of jihad in Kashmir and promotes
destabilisation of Indian territorial integrity with the
rallying cry of conquest for Islam would have been accused
at the bar of world public opinion of the grossest and
harshest violation of human rights of Bengali Muslims. Mrs.
Gandhi’s growing preoccupation with political-power
addiction in her own backyard resulting ultimately in the
nefarious Emergency made her sacrifice the potential for
bringing Pakistan’s illegal actions under judicial scrutiny
in accordance with international law.
A third observation is that immediately after Bangladesh’s
establishment when New Delhi was perceived as the liberator
of Bengali Muslims from the clutches of Pakistani monsters,
Mrs. Gandhi missed an opportunity to revoke Article 370.
The whole logic of India’s action in East Pakistan against
the Yahya regime could have been easily extended in the
interests of Indian unity by utilising significant social
and psychological elements in the Kashmir valley to help
workers, farmers, shepards, businessmen, lawyers, government
servants and academics to a growing involvement in an
All-India outlook. The contrast between Indian democracy
and Pakistani totalitarianism was glaringly evident when the
Pakistani forces were routed. In the period that followed
the Congress Party and Government tried petty-minded
policies and experiments of divide-and-rule in the name of
“national integration”. All these resulted in dismal
failure giving rise to contempt and hostility throughout the
country.
A fourth point is that after Bangladesh India became “soft
on the Soviet Union” and the K.G.B. was allowed the run of
the place and the ill-fated rupee-rouble trade started
making India’s economy non-competitive and isolated from the
dynamism of the world economy. While Japan, Korea,
Singapore and Hongkong raced ahead towards economic
viability India which in 1947 had a head start began to lag
behind and has now ended up by being only a little less
bankrupt than the Soviet mentor’s economic system. The
economic crisis of the 1990s illustrates the high price
India has paid for emulating the Soviet model. The main
point is that an economically resurgent India would be a
natural magnet for all political and economic communities in
Asia and there would be hardly any incentive for
separatism. We have only to blame ourselves for giving
primacy to Soviet ideology over Indian nationalism. We and
our Soviet “comrades” are both facing the same disease:
economic collapse and separatism.
A final point can be made about the counter-productiveness
of Indian policy in the Middle East (West Asia) which was
shown in our inability to win any diplomatic or material
support from any of the countries which have been the
objective of Indian appeasement. The only country which
supported our action in East Pakistan, although covertly,
was Israel. The costs of our anti-Jewish policy and our
endorsement of the various varieties of Arab and Islamic
terrorism should also not be underestimated. There has been
a persistent influence of this factor in our national style
and has made our policy to check terrorism non-functional.
We cannot say that we have not had early warning, but our
policy makers ignored requests by our intelligence agencies
to upgrade our relations with Israel so that both countries
could effectively check the different manifestations of
Islamic Jehad. Last year a book was published by the
Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad which helps us
understand how Pakistan can act with impunity against Indian
interests. We owe it to Brigadier Gulzar Ahmed, the author
of Kashmir Problem: Challenge and Response that
Pakistani incitement to the chain of violence in Kashmir has
been spelt out clearly. The Brigadier’s prescriptions are
itemised as follows:
1.
The whole population of Kashmir should participate in Jehad
2.
Even old people and particularly women folk must be mobilised
3.
Hand grenades and explosives should be provided which can be
operated taking advantage of the mountainous terrain
4.
Islamic literature should be disseminated extensively
5.
Objective, political and tactical reasons for anti-Indian
activities should all be expressed as obligations of the
Islamic faith
The principal thrust of Indian foreign policy if it had been
guided by national interest after Bangladesh liberation
should have been to maintain a balance of power between
Israel and the Arabs. This would have involved a close
study of the Islamic Jihad movement in West Asia and a close
analysis of both the tension and cooperation between
nationalists and fundamentalists in Islamic countries. In
order to defend the pluralistic nature of Indian society we
should have perceived that our own security would be
involved in the triumphalism of the Khomeinist Iranian
model. We went out of our way to support the racist and
anti-Jewish allusions of resolutions at the UN like the one
against Zionism. It is well to remind ourselves our
misguided actions have hurt our credibility in the past and
we will not be able to end the unending cycle of violence,
terrorism and immobility in Kashmir unless we stop the
erosion of India’s diplomatic position in the Middle East.
We have lost the initiative by adopting a viscerally
anti-Israel policy and the clumsy manner in which we deal
with the terrorist challenge.
The Bangladesh victory was our finest hour because we
checked the deteriorating status quo by a bold initiative.
Since then the prospect for Indian foreign policy has been
bleak because we have been trying to gain short run
bargaining leverage as a Big Brother in South Asia without
having the vision to implement a wider range of choices.
We have now reached a major turning point in 1991. In this
writer’s view, Indian policy on Afghanistan, Tibet,
Mongolia, Cambodia and Kashmir is both flawed and
unrealistic. We should exploit the new opportunities
provided by the large scale consequence of the collapse of
Communism:
Our policy in Afghanistan can no longer rest on the
discredited regime in Kabul. We must indicate our readiness
to offer cooperation to the genuine representatives of the
Afghan people. We must make a fundamental reassessment o
the Pashtun identity and adopt a flexible response to the
popular Pashtunistan demand.
Chinese imperialism in Tibet cannot be maintained in
the context of a new world order. In the multipolar
international system of the 1990s, the world community can
secure the withdrawal of Chinese military power from Tibet
and restore the independent status which existed in Lhasa
before the PLA moved in. It is strange to find South Block
concerned with reassuring Beijing that India does not
support the Dalai Lama’s struggle for Tibetan Freedom in
exchange for China’s assurance that Kashmir is an integral
part of India. Given the different assumptions about the
Chinese and Indian roles in Tibet and Kashmir respectively,
the question has to be asked whether South Block has any
understanding whatsoever in the systemic context of the
requirements of political stability in South Asia and the
predictability of change in the imperial domain of Chinese
Communism. If the Brezhnev doctrine failed it is unlikely
that the new peace order in Asia will be determined by
socialist internationalism of Teng or Li Peng. The political
logic is just the opposite. An independent Tibet will
eliminate antagonistic power interests between India and
Pakistan which were aggravated by the Karakoram Highway and
the Chinese intrusion into South Asia. It is very probable
that after the collapse of the Chinese imperium in Tibet,
Beijing will discover an new interpretation of her
geopolitical interests in South Asia. As a result India
will find it easier to create more benign institutionalised
behaviour patterns with Pakistan. The future of Kashmir as
an integral part of India should be seen as a systemic
process by which India achieves results at the smallest
possible cost. Our focus should not be on gaining
legitimacy of our position in Kashmir through the support of
a regime which committed mass murder in Tiananmen Square and
which has committee genocide in Tibet. We can gain
international support and legitimacy in Kashmir by
explaining our democratic imperatives as a bastion against
Islamic and communist fundamentalism. We should join
wholeheartedly in the world wide effort to end terrorism and
we should create agreements with other democracies which are
stable and beneficial. We can envisage agreement on a
package which can create the newest of opportunities for
Kashmiris (both Muslim and Pandits), Ladakhis and the people
of Jammu. While we have to be willing to explore pragmatic
responses we must leave the democratic world in no doubt
that we will not give in to violence and terrorism.
The current social and diplomatic realities of Mongolia
should be understood if new ideas are to be given a trial by
India. The changes that swept over Eastern Europe and
Russia have had remarkable consequences in this Central
Asian country which can have great geopolitical consequences
for the future. There is resurgence in Buddhist values and
a popular demand for India to play a meaningful cultural and
economic role in Mongolia. The emergence of serious
internal challenges to Chinese stability will emerge in time
as the demonstration effect of Soviet instability becomes
operative. India should have well defined concepts for
dealing with the emerging situation in Central Asia.
Although it may be a speculative scenario, yet it would be
instructive to examine a new Asian political order in which
Mongolia and Tibet play the same role as Sweden, Switzerland
and Austria play in stabilising the political order in
Europe.
India has lacked an operation rationale for its policy
of supporting Soviet backed forces in Indo-China. This
writer had urged the Government of India at the time of the
Non-aligned Conference in New Delhi to welcome Prince Nordom
Sihanouk to India and a letter to the Non-aligned countries
and to India’s Prime Minister was sent by Prince Sihanouk
through the writer. India unfortunately was so caught up in
the Soviet game that it refused to play its proper role for
conflict resolution in the country where the famous Angkor
Wat is located and which has the closest symbiosis of
Hinduism and Buddhism. The return of Prince Sihanouk now
provides an opportunity that should not be missed. There is
an intricate web of national and international relations.
The unifying powers of Indian culture have been constantly
underrated by Indian policy makers. In the name of Third
Worldism New Delhi has wittingly or unwittingly supported
Islamic fundamentalism, Communist genocide and Secular
totalitarianism. We find ourselves completely stymied on
all fronts. The example of the Soviet vote at the United
Nations speaks for itself. Our determination to express the
vitality of Hindu-Buddhistic weltanschaaung will help
us to stand the challenge in not only Cambodia, Fiji or
Mongolia, it will help in advancing the peace process in
Kashmir and be a starting point for establishing a consensus
on internal issues. India is a state but it is above all a
civilisation and it is only by recognising this at a policy
level that we can evolve into an open and pluralistic
society which can revitalise itself when the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the political morass of Communist China,
and the confusion and division in the Islamic world are
posing threats to human welfare and dignity.
The changes in the world situation and in domestic
perspectives require a new strategic and political agenda.
India should cope with the realignment of power and ideology
with courage and conviction. Our policy thinking should
however not be based on ungrounded illusions. As this
article has tried to show there is no interconnectedness
between Kashmir and Tibet. The prevalent political
realities can be favourable to us if wisely exploited. We
can protect democratic values in both Kashmir and Tibet and
we can ensure that the new international milieu works to our
benefit both at home and abroad. |