INFA Column
CHINA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
By
Prof. M.L.
Sondhi
September 3, 1975
(Mr. M.L. Sondhi, who is
Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, reads in
China’s latest international stance signs of a new coercive
policy but he thinks India can meet it successfully)
Peking’s activation of its newly built nuclear missile testing range in
Tibet can hardly be regarded as a gesture of reconciliation
to India. The proposed experimental launching of
intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 9,600
k.m. from Tibet over our national territory will, in fact,
reveal Peking rulers as obsessed by an egoism which is a
stumbling block in the way of international détente. A
definitive assessment of the new situation which will be
created by the experimental launching and the conditions of
physical danger and psychological stress which it will
involve must await systematic analysis of more detailed
information. There is no reasons, however, why there should
be conceptual fuzziness about the pattern which Chinese
behaviour suggests seen from the vantage point of Indian
national security.
Peking’s policy makers view the structure of their own political
authority and their “influence” on the affairs of their
neighbours with the help not so much of Marx’s theories as
those of Clausewitz. Bearing this in mind, one can see that
most of the Chinese advocacy of the rights of the Third
World is part of a political strategy which accepts
Clausewitz’s philosophy of war. Specifically, China claims
a right to impose its will on India by making verbose
statements putting forward propositions amounting to
interference in India’s domestic affairs.
The Chinese
leadership is using a language of ideas which makes
political settlements of trouble spots a matter of perilous
chance. Peking’s specific political acts become
opportunities for precipitation of conflicts and for
demonstrating its psychological advantages in using its
power to coerce other states. This hostile and war-like
attitude towards India partakes of the Clausewitzian
injunction about the “continuation of politics by other
means”, and has led China to adopt an offensive posture
towards India which is characterized by an effort to sow the
seeds of violence through Indian extremists and to sow the
seeds of disruption and dismemberment by supporting
so-called Naga and Mizo separatist demands. This “coercive”
conception of international relations militates against
practical diplomacy which could help to extend détente to
the Asian continent.
The missile
base in Tibet makes nonsense of the over-optimistic
assessments of China’s foreign policy orientation. One has
to recall the unparalleled violence inflicted on the Tibetan
people and the high likelihood of nuclear disaster which a
nuclear missile testing range implies for the peaceful
community of Tibetans, to realize that, in spite of their
Third World vocabulary, the Chinese practice is not on the
lines of deepening of détente but constitutes a paradigm of
coercion, violence and inter-societal tensions. Chinese
diplomacy is making inroads in Asian countries by projecting
Mao Tse-tung as the prophet of Asian unity and an apostle of
anti-hegemonism. The history of Chinese foreign policy
shows, however, that Peking’s rulers do not accept the wider
and deeper community of Asian countries which could bargain
as equals.
The grandeur of Maoism is not so impressive
when one opens one’s eyes to the injustice and racial
persecution through which the Han chauvinists have sought to
obliterate the cultural identity of Tibet. If peaceful and
constructive relations are to be set up between China and
India, the need for a political détente in Asia must be
accepted as part of a long-term cooperation between all
Asian peoples. An important aspect of improving bilateral
relations between India and China would be to ease tensions
in Tibet. This cannot be achieved by using Tibetan
territory to accumulate lethal weaponry and to fire an ICBM
over Indian territory into the Indian Ocean. The failure of
the US intervention in South-east Asia has produced a
perverse effect on Peking’s policy-making. China is seeking
a re-definition of goals and objectives through which it can
use its politico-military power to generate pressures in its
immediate geographical environment. It is not adopting a
strategy of conflict resolution but is seeking inter-locking
arrangements as a so-called champion of the Third World
which will actually enable it to maximize Chinese coercive
power and exploit the vulnerability of political societies
whose problems of national integration are particularly
intractable. |