TIME FOR INDO-SRI LANKAN SUMMIT DIPLOMACY
By
M.L. Sondhi
The Pioneer, March 27, 1992
It is heartening to note that both Prime Minister Narasimha
Rao and President Premadasa have heightened pragmatism in
their policy-making and both are pursuing unambiguously
non-provocative postures. I the political arenas of New
Delhi and in Colombo there are today parallel interests
which can help defuse existing tensions and promote
political understanding which can help redress minority
grievances in Sri Lanka, reduce and contain separatist
violence and enhance economic cooperation between India and
Sri Lanka.
A recent visit to Colombo during which this
author had the opportunity to interact with academicians,
diplomats and media persons, provided indications of deep
changes in expectations and attitudes which if recognised in
New Delhi, could help Mr. Narasimha Rao show the way forward
through a change-oriented process in foreign policy and
security issues. Careful consideration should be given to
personal diplomacy at the summit level which can enhance the
image of Indian pragmatism, and provide a stimulus to the
development of genuine interdependence in South Asia in
general and in Indo-Sri Lanka relations in particulars.
The Premadasa government has started
thinking of significant changes which can be described as a
humanitarian breakthrough to a peace process. It is
worthwhile to recall a specific commitment by the Sri Lankan
President in which he reiterated the need to consolidate the
growing ethnic harmony in Sri Lanka and described any
obstruct6ions to this process as an “unpardonable
treachery”. Colombo has also affected improvements in its
procedural techniques to advance dialogue among the Tamils
and the Sinhalese and Mr. Premadasa himself has in his tours
throughout the countryside tried to drive the message home
that functional cooperation in economic and social areas is
the key to the process of rapprochement.
In the new context, Indian diplomacy cannot
be the same as during the Rajiv period. New Delhi has a
begun a fundamental re-evaluation of what is required to
check militant groups which have in the past been able to
operate from Indian soil with liberal supply of arms and
funds. The trauma of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi has
de-legitimised the infrastructure of the militants and has
made it possible for New Delhi and Colombo to avoid both
accidents and inadvertent escalation through careful
diplomatic signalling. All the current indications are that
the cooperation between the governments of India and Sri
Lanka on the return of displaced Sri Lankan Tamils to the
areas which have been freed of the LTTE has created a
business-like sense of common security, albeit as a
minimalist policy.
What are the possibilities and the limits for India-Sri
Lanka security cooperation to expand? There are several
constraints. The first is the inertia of existing Indian
policies which have been evolved by paramilitary and
intelligence organisations. These can only be seriously
modified on personal directions from the Prime Minister.
The second and possibly the most important is the influence
of Tamil Nadu politics on the India-Sri Lanka agenda.
In an atmosphere of consensus and
centre-state stability, Chief Minister Jayalalitha and Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao could avoid views which are
short-sighted and ensure that old categories which were
dominant before the Rajiv assassination now become
irrelevant. Third, there are also difficulties at the
centre in New Delhi which would arise from certain
Opposition parties which would express disagreement over the
appropriate diplomatic strategy.
How is it possible to create an appropriate
psychological climate for building a close relationship with
Sri Lanka? A single gesture by Mr. Narasimha Rao like the
donation of a relic of Lord Buddha to Sri Lanka would be an
important element in building South Asian architecture on
the principle of consensus and expansion of people to people
contacts. India should encourage a planned exchange of
specialists both at the official and non-official level on
the subject of terrorism. The time is also ripe for creating
a India-Sri Lankan fabric of confidential relations on
tackling the linkage between drugs and terrorism.
Another significant aspect of the Premadasa
government’s programme is the policy of openness to human
rights bodies and its encouragement to offers of mediation.
If Mr. Narasimha Rao were to avoid certain characteristics
of the big brother attitude fostered by previous Indian
governments, h is summit diplomacy could serve as an
instrument in the search for new elements of political
culture in achieving peaceful change and common security in
our region. India should encourage all Tamil groups to
engage in dialogue with Colombo and also stress the
objective factors in favour of redressal of the grievances
of the Tamil community on the basis of the neighbourly
coexistence of the two countries.
While supporting the All Party Conference
and the Special parliamentary Select Committee in their
problem-solving efforts, India could refer to the example of
the CSCE process in Europe which achieved a benign quality
on account of the verification mechanism in the sphere of
human dimensions.
The time is ripe to dismantle threat images
in Indo-Sri Lankan relations and Mr. Rao who has adopted
cooperative norms and expectations in domestic politics
would do well to accept the primacy of the common good in
India’s relations with its southern neighbour. By starting
an early dialogue both Mr. Rao and President Premadasa can
win a lot of political credit for themselves and also show
South Asia the way to combat the scourge of terrorism. |