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REGIONAL PRESPECTIVE ON BANGLA DESH

By
ML Sondhi

The growing manifestation of Pakistani militarism and the sharpness of conflict in Bangla Desh lead the conclusion that the safeguarding of peace in our region will not be achieved through further procrastination.

Pakistani militarism is ensured continued vitality on account of the deliberate political line chosen by both the Super Power. Viewed against the background of the events of the last 30 days, contradictory elements in both the Soviet and the United States attitudes have served the interests of the revanchism Islamabad region.

The “wait and see” policy of the Government of India, it turns out, has not been based on a realistic evaluation of the “international equilibrium” strategies of the two Super Powers.

Public opinion in India should, therefore, now be urgently concerned with the specific conceptions which have a bearing on the problem of security which is being endangered by the revenge-seeking policy of Islamabad.

We are concerned with the analysis of a major step which the Government of India should take to strengthen the ability of the Bangla Desh Government and people to defend themselves from the hostile activities of the revenge-seeking Pakistani Army. Our thesis is that in the framework of a Doctrine outlining principles of security in the bay of Bangla, India can in the naval sphere integrate the powerful influence of the Asian community for a consistent policy of pacification in Bangla Desh. It is a characteristic of the foreign policies of both the super Powers that they do not ignore a regional initiative in peace-keeping efforts. The main objective of the Bay of Bengal Doctrine would be to safeguard the security of the countries which are interconnected in the circumscribing area of the Bay of Bengal. The United Nations Charter grants under Article 51 the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. The right of the Bay of Bengal countries to set up an arrangement to resist the aggressive actions of the Islamabad regime is consistent with international law. Indian initiatives and those of the other bay of Bengal countries could be harmonised with the United Nations general system of collective security, but if the objective conditions for the latter must await the transformation of the negative attitudes of the Super Powers towards the Bangla Desh Government, there is scope for affective action by way of “peace keeping operations” to suppress the movement of troops and equipment which threaten regional peace and security.

The international legal basis for Bangla Desh, it is becoming increasingly clear, will be evolved through a process of negotiation and agreement with the Bangla Desh Government. India must soberly and realistically dispel the demagogy of Pakistan which focuses on the alleged “expansionism” of India, India must uphold the out look of Hindu-Muslim unity, but at the same time our foreign policy must postulate full confidence on the part of Bangla Desh to define its function in the comity of nations. India and other neighbours of Bangla Desh must be prepared to approve of a perspective of Neutrality if Bangla Desh like Austria or Switzerland should choice to develop a political structure appropriate to its search for peace and stability. Our chief effort should be to keep the big powers out and whatever guarantees are required by Bangla Desh should be furnished on a regional basis by India ad other neighbouring countries.

Indian policy so far failed to focus on the achievement of our prime objectives of regional peace and economic development. The problem of Bangla Desh should not be subordinated to Super Power ideological conflicts or to the dramatic variations is Communist China’s postures. The emergence of Bangla Desh and the attempt of Pakistani militarism to deny it a role within tie framework of international life, raises fundamental questions of regional security of specific interests to India and other south and southeast Asian countries. Different countries may adopt different attitudes, but the key question for the government of India is whether it will set an example to others by giving a complete formulation of its own policy to counter the “position of strength” which Islamabad is claiming. India and Asian effort, owing to specific geographical conditions, can bring pressure to bear upon Islamabad to give up the plan for annexation of Bangla Desh, much in the same way as an Asian coalition frustrated Netherlands aggression against Indonesia. Some of the Asian countries may not envisage measures against Islamabad and may prefer to safeguard certain narrow interests through short-sightedness. It would be the task of Indian and Bangla Desh diplomacy to overcome these deficiencies. The effort to relate regional security needs and the setting of rational priorities for an Asian strategy would constitute real progress in expanding the power and influence of Bangla Desh for furthering and strengthening its defensive aims.