By
M. L. Sondhi*
International
Studies Journal
Vol. 9, No. 2, October 1967
The need to discuss and clarify the many-sided
implications of nuclear weapons for the foreign policies of
nations is now more urgent than ever before. The Seminar on
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy held during 6-12 November
1966 by the Indian School of International Studies, New
Delhi, was in fulfilment of this urgent need. The
significance of the Seminar lies in the fact that for the
first time in India about forty-five experts from various
fields of specialization like the physical sciences,
administration, and other social disciplines met together,
undertook a detailed examination of the available data, and
attempted an assessment of national, regional, and global
perspectives of the problem of nuclear weapons. It was
attended by members of Parliament, specialists in military
science and the physical sciences, prominent journalists,
and scholars from the School, the Indian Council of World
Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, and the Bombay,
Delhi, and i, and i, and Jadavpur universities. Professor M.S. Rajan,
Director of the Seminar, and Mr. M.L. Sondhi, Head of the
Department of International Politics and Organization at the
School, functioned as its Secretary. The Seminar was
conducted on an academic and research level. Its main aim
was not so much to prescribe definite policies as to provide
knowledge, understanding, and insight into the political
requirements of different nations and of the world community
in the face of new developments in mankind’s experience with
nuclear energy. The discussion in the Seminar was primarily
focussed on three broad subjects selected for this purpose:
(i) World Nuclear Situation; (ii) Asian Military Balance and
Stability; and (iii) Nuclear Policy for India. The Seminar
also devoted its attention to the co-ordination of research
in Government research institutions and universities.
In his inaugural address, Dr. Zakir Hussain, then
Vice-President of India, referred to the background and
objectives of India’s thinking in the field of foreign
policy and particularly on the question of disarmament, with
special reference to the problems of the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons. He stressed that the issue of India’s
nuclear policy, a question of fundamental national
importance,
should be the
subject of enlightened and considered discussion if only to
ensure that public opinion in this country was developed on
an informed basis. He reminded the Seminar that as far back
as 1957 Jawaharlal Nehru had declared on behalf of the
Government of India that nuclear energy would be utilized
exclusively for peaceful purposes. He pointed out at the
outset that successive Prime Ministers, in spite of
increasing pressure upon them to revise this policy in view
of the growing Chinese nuclear threat, had reiterated their
determination to adhere to a peaceful nuclear programme
although we had the ability to put nuclear energy to
military use. The national decision, i.e. whether to make
nuclear weapons or not, should be decided by the touchstone
of national interest. The debate should not be confused
with an international commitment to abstain from the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, under the provisions of a
non-proliferation treaty. He regarded non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons as the most urgent problem in the field of
disarmament today. He recalled that after nine years of
patient and persistent negotiations the efforts initiated by
Nehru in 1954 bore fruit when, in 1963, the Moscow Partial
Test Ban Treaty was concluded. He expressed India’s earnest
hope that the nuclear Powers would display a sense of
statesmanship and responsibility and would agree to the
immediate suspension of all nuclear tests. However, he
regretted the tendency of the Great Powers to view the
problem of non-proliferation as being exclusively concerned
with the prevention of horizontal proliferation by freezing
the existing number of nuclear Powers and to over look
vertical proliferation so that there was an ever-increasing
stockpile of nuclear weapons with “over-kill” capacity in
the arsenals of the super Powers. He explained that world
public opinion was firmly of the view that a
non-proliferation treaty was not an end in itself but only a
means to the achievement of general and complete disarmament
and more particularly of nuclear disarmament. He cited the
historic resolution1
adopted by an overwhelming majority in the Twentieth Session
of the General Assembly of the United Nations which clearly
laid down that a non-proliferation treaty should embody an
acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities of nuclear and
non-nuclear Powers. He pointed out that by implication this
resolution declared that the international community had
recognized that the nuclear Powers must undertake certain
responsibilities to halt and reverse the arms race if they
expected non-nuclear Powers to deny themselves nuclear
weapons for all time. He stated that the Government of
India was making strenuous efforts to secure universal
acceptance of this thesis. He underlined the consensus
among the non-nuclear Powers that their security could never
be assured by any form of nuclear guarantee or protection
except by the elimination of the threat itself through
nuclear disarmament. He paid glowing tributes to scientists
like the late Dr. H.J. Bhabha and Dr. Vikram A. Sarabhai,
who, through their participation in the Pugwash conferences
and other international meetings, contributed to the efforts
all over the world to evolve an intellectual consensus among
scientists and thinkers. He wished that the discussions in
the Seminar would be carried out in the true academic spirit
and as an educational effort in the widest sense of the
term.
WORLD
NUCLDEAR SITUATION
The three
sessions on “World Nuclear Situation” were presided over by
Professor M.S. Rajan. The working papers for these sessions
were prepared by Mr. M.L. Sondhi (on “World Nuclear
Situation”), Dr. R. Vaidyanath (on “Problems and Prospects
of a Soviet Nuclear Guarantee”), Dr. R.P. Anand (on
“Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Powers”), Mr. Gonsalves (on
“Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Powers”), Dr. Mahendra Kumar
(on “Certain Scientific Aspects of Monitoring for a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”), and Mr. V.C. Trivedi (on
“Negotiations for Nuclear Disarmament”). Dr. B.R.C. Babu
and Dr. Mahendra Kumar worked as rapporteurs.
Some of the participants felt that the US nuclear programme
had been developing at a very fast rate especially since
1963 and that the Americans were convinced of their nuclear
superiority over the Soviet Union which permitted them to
adopt a posture of confidence. They also pointed out that
with the emphasis on small but sophisticated nuclear
weapons, the whole nuclear programme of the Americans was
governed by considerations of survivability, reliability,
and ability of penetration. The belief of American
superiority was found to be overoptimistic, especially in
views of the absence of accurate and reliable figures on the
Soviet side.
It
was noted that the Chinese nuclear programme had been in
progress for more than a decade and that each new test
launched by the Chinese had been an advance over the earlier
test. It was stated that the United States could not be
unaware of the fact that China was bound to emerge as a
first-rate nuclear Power within the next five years in view
of its determined pursuit of its nuclear development
programme.
There was considerable discussion on the French nuclear
strength, and it was generally recognized that both France
and China were soon going to be mighty nuclear Powers. Some
scientists participating in the Seminar observed that the
“cleanliness” of the Chinese bomb was much higher than that
of the French bomb and that, therefore, China was
technically ahead of France.
There was some effort in the Seminar to understand the
nature of the triangular nuclear balance that was likely to
emerge in future between the United States, the Soviet
Union, and China.
It
was felt that the basic objective of China was to obtain
Great-Power status and that the fulfilment of this objective
made it necessary for it to upset the existing nuclear
status quo. It was also felt that the Chinese proposals
for a world disarmament conference and for an undertaking by
the super Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons
were insincere because it was patent even to the Chinese
that their proposals would not be accepted and the proposals
in effect helped China to go ahead with its nuclear
development programme and to maintain at the same time a
posture of support for disarmament and arms control.
The
consensus in the Seminar was that the French nuclear power
was developing as definitely as the Chinese nuclear power.
While the French nuclear programme was considered on the
whole to have contributed to the economic prosperity of
France, the question was raised whether nuclear development
led to economic prosperity in the case of any and every
country that decided to embark upon a nuclear programme.
However, there was no agreed opinion in the Seminar on this
matter.
As
to the likely impact of the Chinese and the French nuclear
power on the non-nuclear Powers, it was felt that some
countries which had the potentialities to manufacture
nuclear weapons might follow the example of France and China
in developing their own nuclear weapons. West Germany,
India, Israel, the United Arab Republic, Sweden, and Japan
were mentioned in this context.
Then the Seminar turned to the question whether there was a
need for a new terminology to describe the present world
nuclear situation, and a lively discussion took place.
While some members of the Seminar pointed out that concepts
like “balance of power” “balance of terror”, and “nth
country problem” were becoming obsolete in the changed
setting of international politics, other members argued
vigorously that what was becoming obsolete was the existing
balance of power, but not the concept of balance of power
which was valid as the basis of world politics even in the
present nuclear age.
As
for the nature of the nuclear guarantee it was generally
felt that theoretically the guarantee could be given either
by the United States or by the Soviet Union individually, or
by both of them jointly. Neither the single-nation
guarantee nor the two-nation guarantee was considered to be
sufficiently credible, though the latter was regarded as
relatively credible. The nuclear guarantee could not be
credible to the non-aligned countries, at least to the
extent to which it could be to the members of the military
alliances. A note of warning was struck that a joint
nuclear guarantee might as well lead to the establishment of
some sort of a condominium of the super Powers over the rest
of the world. It was generally admitted that self-reliance
in matters of security would be preferable to any nuclear
guarantee, however reliable and effective it might be.
The
attitude of the Government of India to the question of
non-proliferation was also discussed at some length. It was
explained that non-proliferation was viewed by India as a
step towards disarmament and not as an end in itself. The
draft treaty of non-proliferation sponsored jointly by the
United States and the Soviet Union was not found to be
acceptable to India since the draft treaty took
non-proliferation as the ultimate goal. This treaty was
described as a calculated effort to prevent potential
nuclear Powers from developing nuclear weapons and did not
purport to put any check on the existing nuclear stockpiles
of the super Powers. From India’s point of view even a
treaty providing against both horizontal and vertical
proliferations of nuclear weapons should be time-bound.
The
opinion that non-proliferation had nothing to do with
disarmament was expressed, and some members of the Seminar
refuted the argument advanced by others that the emergence
of more nuclear Powers would upset world stability. The
assumption that the existing nuclear Powers alone were
“responsible” in their international conduct was described
as the most insulting aspect of the premises of
non-proliferation. A plea was made that each nation should
exercise its nuclear choice in accordance with the demands
of its national interest and considerations of security,
without being influenced by the Great Powers.
While the single-nation guarantee was thought to be
absolutely non-credible except in the case of aligned
countries, a multilateral guarantee was considered to be not
sufficiently acceptable to non-aligned countries since, it
was felt, such a guarantee would not become operative for
non-aligned countries without prior staff consultations and
without targets being determined well in advance. A
multilateral guarantee under the United Nations was
generally found to be acceptable, but doubts were expressed
as to its feasibility in the near future.
The
idea of “nuclear brinkmanship” – a state of permanent
readiness to manufacture nuclear weapons – was suggested as
a possible alternative for potential non-aligned nuclear
Powers unwilling to accept nuclear guarantee offered by the
super Powers, and the view was expressed that a discussion
on the problem of non-proliferation could not be divorced
from the problem of security.
A
section of the Seminar expressed concern that the Government
of India might allow others to decide for it in a crucial
matter like security by agreeing to sign the
non-proliferation treaty after certain conditions were
fulfilled. While India’s view that a non-proliferation
treaty should also provide for a cut in the nuclear
stockpiles of the Great Powers was highly appreciated, the
ability of the potential nuclear Powers to resist the
pressure of the Great Powers and refuse to sign the
non-proliferation treaty in its present form was found to be
doubtful. It was observed in this context that India’s
bargaining position in the matter of non-proliferation was
growing weaker in view of its increasing dependence on the
super Powers for economic aid and that it would not be able
to sustain its opposition to the non-proliferation treaty
for long.
The
Seminar was of the view that general and complete
disarmament – a goal set by the United Nations – was
unattainable, and that in the present setting of the world,
nuclear disarmament alone was attainable, however formidable
the difficulties in its way might be. The Seminar was
reminded of the fact that non-aligned countries had pleaded
at Geneva that scientific knowledge and information should
be made available to all countries. Brief references were
also made to the Swedish proposal for international
co-operation in nuclear energy. The Seminar also broached
the idea of nuclear-free zones as a first step towards
nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Rapacki Plan came
in for special mention.
Greater attention was paid by the Seminar to the prospects
of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It was felt that the
super Powers would agree to a comprehensive test ban treaty
only when it suited their interests. The partial test ban
treaty of 1963 was a means to postpone the spread of nuclear
weapons to new countries, and if the Great Powers agreed to
this treaty, it was only because they had finished all their
projected tests and further testing would be a futile
exercise. At that stage, they only needed underground
tests.
A
senior scientist participating in the Seminar described the
various methods of test detection for the benefit of other
participants.
He
explained that correct detection depended upon the size of
the bomb exploded and that a country which exploded atomic
bombs was likely to develop a more reliable detection system
than a country which did not. Although the existence of a
large number of recording stations was thought to be
necessary for successful detection, it was also explained
that no fool-proof detection system had yet been invented
and that an atomic test might be concealed if it was
conducted in outer space, or in artificially built cavities
deep below the surface of the earth. Though frightfully
expensive, tests in these cavities could be so arranged as
to bluff the world into mistaking them for earthquakes.
ASIAN
MILITARY BALANCE AND STABILITY
Four sessions
were held on “Asian Military Balance and Stability” and were
presided over by Major General Y.S. Paranjpe (Retd.),
Director, Department of Military Studies, University of
Poona. The working papers for these sessions were prepared
by Mr. B.M. Chakravarty (on “Political and Strategic
Consequences of Chinese Nuclear Power”), Dr. Harish Kapur
(on “Strategic Interests of the USSR in the Context of
Asia’s Military Balance and Stability”), Dr. B.R.C. Babu (on
“Nuclear Proliferation and Military Stability in Asia”), and
Dr. P.A.N.Murthy (on “Asian Military Balance and Stability –
Potential Nuclear Powers in Asia : Japan”). Dr. R.P. Anand
and Mr. K.R. Singh worked as rapporteurs.
There was a general consensus in the Seminar that the recent
Chinese explosions of nuclear weapons had created great
imbalance of power in this part of the world and a threat to
the security of Asian countries. Although the overall
balance of power between the super Powers was not seriously
affected by the rise of minor nuclear Powers like China and
France, it had considerably disturbed the regional balance.
Some of the Great Powers were found to be eager to develop
closer relations with China though they seemed to condemn
the Chinese possession of the nuclear bomb.
It
was felt by several participants that the Chinese bomb had
already made its impact on several countries in Asia. North
Korea, North Vietnam, and Cambodia were already within the
Chinese sphere of influence. Japan, Thailand, Philippines,
Australia, and Malaysia had expressed concern over the
Chinese nuclear threat. A great admiration for the Chinese
nuclear explosions was noticed in Pakistan since it regarded
that the Chinese nuclear bomb would be to its advantage in
its rivalry with India. There was, however, no such
obsession with India in Nepal, Burma, or Ceylon.
The
West Asian countries were observed to be less affected by
the Chinese bomb and there was no serious criticism of the
Chinese explosions in the Arab countries. On the other
hand, the Arab countries seemed to welcome the Chinese bomb
as a protection against a possible threat from Israel.
Several participants of the Seminar expressed the view that
India must strengthen its position both economically and
militarily in order to counter effectively the growing
danger posed by the Chinese nuclear threat. It was
suggested that India should not hesitate to enter into
alliances with like-minded neighbouring states for common
defence against China, and it was regretted that no serious
effort had so far been made by India to come to an
understanding with other Asian countries.
There was general agreement that China’s power was inhibited
to a great extent by the American commitments and Soviet
interests in Asia. It was observed that relaxation of
tension in Europe permitted the super Powers to play a more
active role in Asia, at least for a few years to come. The
West European countries too welcomed the emergence of China
as a nuclear Power, since it would keep the Soviet Union
busy on its own Asian border in its dispute with China.
Even the United States was found to favour the Chinese
nuclear bomb, though in a limited way, since it might result
in some thaw in the Cold-War confrontation.
The
strategic position of the United States was assessed to be
stronger in Asia today, thanks to Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian,
and Sino-Indonesian rifts. Though there was some criticism
of the American involvement in the conflict in Vietnam,
American prestige and interests in South-East Asia were
found to be unaffected. The Manila Conference and the
enthusiastic welcome given to President Lyndon B. Johnson
during his recent visit to some of the capitals of
south-East Asia convinced the Americans that they could ward
off the aggressive designs of China so long as they
demonstrated their willingness to use their tremendous power
to honour their commitments.
It
was felt that US interest in India was limited and that the
United States did not relish the idea of India becoming an
independent, strong force. It was pointed out that the
United States had not even accepted India’s border with
China as final (except in a limited area), and had refused
to admit China as an aggressor in the recent Sino-Indian
border dispute. It was also noted with surprise that some
informed circles in the United States had felt that the
Chinese nuclear bomb was really no danger to India and had
put tremendous pressure on India not to go nuclear.
Some members of the Seminar considered the strategic
interest of the Soviet Union in Asia as that of a central
land Power towards “rimland states” and its desire to keep
them free from the political and military influences of a
hostile naval Power such as the United States. Not only did
the United States successfully organize these rimland states
in its own military bloc, but another land Power, China,
emerged in this area challenging Soviet supremacy. On the
one hand the Soviet Union seemed to be interested in keeping
as many countries as possible out of the American bloc and
on the other hand it might like the rise of numerous small
Powers to counter the growing Chinese menace. It would,
therefore, be in its own interest to help India become a
stable and strong state and act as a counter force against
China. The view was generally expressed in the Seminar that
India must depend upon itself, muster its own resources, and
develop its economic and military potential, so that it
could play a significant role in world affairs.
NUCLEAR
POLICY FOR INDIA
The three
sessions on “Nuclear Policy for India” were presided over by
Professor M.S. Rajan. The working papers for these sessions
were prepared by Captain A.F. Colaco (on “The Nuclear
Maritime Threat”), Dr. P.S. Gill (on “Organization and
Development of Nuclear Science in India”), Mr. Sisir Gupta
(on “India and Nuclear Weapons: Some Relevant Political
Considerations”), Major General Y.S. Paranjpe (on “Nuclear
Policy for India : Chinese Nuclear Threat to India and
India’s Nuclear Policy”), Dr. B.D. Nag Chaudhuri (on
“Dilemma of Enlightened Self-Interest”), Mr. K.R. Malkani
(on “Asian Military Balance and Stability”), and Dr. V.P.
Dutt (on “China, India, and the Atom Bomb”). Professor
Bimla Prasad and Dr. P.A.N. Murty worked as rapporteurs.
Though China’s possession of the nuclear bomb did not give
it any decisive advantage in its strategic position, it was
felt that it had definitely helped it to secure immunity
from aggression. In its effort to expand into neighbouring
areas, China would resort to skirmishes through conventional
means—one of those “frontless” wars—and not use nuclear
weapons. It was explained that India’s strategy being
basically defensive, it had to rely mainly on conventional
weapons. It was also pointed out that our defence strategy
would depend upon the nature of attack—conventional or
nuclear—to be resisted.
The
“power gap” between India and China was noted, and the
difficulties involved in bridging this gap and attaining
parity were discussed in detail. Some kind of deterrence
was favoured since it would discourage an enemy from
attacking India and at the same time, lessen the
possibilities of India’s involvement in small wars.
Then the political considerations involved in an Indian
nuclear policy were taken up for discussion. Acceptance of a
guarantee and alignment with one of the Power blocs were
considered to be the likely consequences of India’s deciding
not to go nuclear. However, inasmuch as a guarantee was
one-sided and its credibility doubtful, it would be suicidal
for India to accept a guarantee from any Power. Alignment
was out of the question since no super Power was willing to
let us align ourselves with it.
It
was felt that if India decided to make the bomb, it would
not merely heighten the morale of the nation but also
transform the attitude of its hostile neighbours. It was
asserted that there would be no economic breakdown. It was
conceded that the Great Powers might feel displeased, but it
was felt that they might not, in the present circumstances,
choose to show it.
While India’s decision to make the bomb might annoy the
Great Powers, it would certainly find support among medium
countries like West Germany, Japan, and Israel, which were
dissatisfied with the status quo, and the view was
expressed that India had not exploited well the split in the
Communist world. It was suggested that India should enter
into a dialogue with those East European countries which had
begun to look away from Moscow and derive some advantage
from the growing diversity within the Communist bloc. Then
even some Communist countries might support India. As a
concrete solution, a joint resistance by India and other
medium Powers to the non-proliferation pact was proposed.
The very proclamation of India’s intention to become a
nuclear Power would lead other countries to take India more
seriously and contribute significantly to its internal
stability.
It
was asserted that development and defence were not
contradictory and that resources could be simultaneously
devoted to both. It was also contended that the fundamental
defect of our economy was that it was consumption-oriented
and that what was needed now was a greater emphasis on
technology, automation, and computers. A change in the
outlook of Indian trade unions was regarded as highly
helpful in this regard.
It
was suggested that instead of finding fault with America, we
must play up the Chinese threat, go in for the bomb, and
prepare the ground for American acquiescence in India’s
making the bomb as a fait accompli. It was felt that
the Soviet Union would most probably be restrained in its
reaction to our making the bomb because it had important
trade connexions with India which could not be snapped
simply because India had decided to make the bomb.
India’s influence in the countries of South-East Asia as a
great maritime Power in ancient times was explained, and it
was suggested that India should strengthen these links by
developing its maritime activities further. There was also
the need to safeguard a coastline of about 3,500 miles which
required a fairly strong navy. Till recently there had been
no appreciation of the threat to India’s coastline.
It
was pointed out that the naval stations, depots, and
shipyards of India were all open and that without a strong
naval force they could not be adequately protected. India’s
communication lines also could not be secure. In this
context the British decision to leave Aden in the West and
its possible evacuation of Singapore in the East came in for
mention. This would mean that the western and eastern gates
of the Indian Ocean would go out of the hands of a strong
naval Power. China might seriously compete with India for
the control of Aden and Singapore. A canal in the Palk
Strait was considered very useful for the quick movement of
ships belonging to the Indian navy from Bombay to the
Andamans. Since a naval base in the Andamans was coming up,
this canal project would be extremely beneficial in linking
that base with other bases in the peninsula. It would also
make it easy for Indian ships to patrol this area
effectively.
The
Seminar was assured that the detection system of the Indian
Navy was quite efficient to prevent any Chinese submarine
from sneaking into our coastal waters. However, it was
admitted that there was no way of checking any sneak nuclear
attack from Chinese submarines since they could be carried
out even from the high seas. Such an attack could be
carried out even by a surface ship and not necessarily by a
submarine.
The
deficiency in India’s defence against naval or naval-air
attack was underlined, and it was pointed out that the
peninsula was wide open to intrusion from sea and
particularly by submarine. Though the United States had
assured India against mischief-making submarines in the
Indian Ocean, it wanted to leave the primary responsibility
in this area to Britain.
It
was again stressed that for a country like India which
relied on defensive strategy it was conventional armament
that was more important. This view was further strengthened
by the observation that since a nuclear attack against India
was improbable, priority should be given to conventional
armament. It was stated that at the moment China did not
have tactical weapons and there was no information as to how
far it had progressed in miniaturing nuclear weapons.
It
was estimated that China might not actually use nuclear
weapons against India, but the very possession of these
weapons would give it an advantage with which it could
always create border skirmishes and leave India permanently
on the defensive unless India also developed capacity for
nuclear retaliation. It was wrong to assume that our
possessing nuclear weapons would eat into conventional
armament. India, on the other hand, would definitely
improve its position to deter a hostile Power like China
from escalating any skirmish into a larger conflict or
creating endless trouble on the border.
It
was pointed out that a defensive strategy had the great
disadvantage of leaving the initiative permanently in the
hands of the enemy and that our possessing nuclear weapons
could infuse a certain degree of self-confidence in the
nation. A minor nuclear Power was considered more dangerous
than a major one. Nuclear weapons could rightly be
described as “political” weapons since by merely possessing
them one could achieve one’s purpose. There was no need to
use them at all.
A
smaller capability was found to be as useful as a bigger
capability in preventing a nuclear attack. India should be
able not only to sustain small defeats but also to achieve
small victories for which the possession of nuclear weapons
would be a prerequisite. It was suggested that India’s
nuclear energy programme may be accelerated without
neglecting the development of its conventional forces, and a
balanced growth of both nuclear and conventional weapons was
considered as the most profitable objective for the defence
of India. In the ultimate analysis, India’s political and
military strength would depend upon its technological
progress.
The
proceedings of the Seminar ended with an address by Mr.
Swaran Singh, then Minister for External Affairs. He
characterized as outmoded the conception that disarmament
was the exclusive concern of the Great Powers. He strongly
advocated the view that non-nuclear Powers had a vested
interest in disarmament in view of their growing
determination to rid the world of arms and wars and to
ensure that the vast resources released by disarmament were
diverted to their economic advancement. He highlighted the
growing importance of the problem of nuclear weapons in the
purely national context since China first demonstrated its
determination to develop an offensive nuclear weapons
capability. He centred his argument on the recognition of
India’s technological capacity to manufacture nuclear
weapons and the understandable concern in the public mind
for the adoption of effective measures to safeguard the
security of the country.
He
pointed out that India had extensive uranium deposits and
the largest deposits of thorium-rich minerals in the world
and that its reactor, which became critical in 1954, was the
first to be constructed in Asia. He declared that India’s
technical expertise for advanced nuclear research was
acknowledged all over the world, but that India had decided
from the very outset to use nuclear energy exclusively for
peaceful purposes as a matter of deliberate policy. He
stated that although there was an increasing demand for a
revision or at least a review of that policy following
China’s demonstration of its developing nuclear capability,
successive Prime Ministers had reiterated their
determination to adhere to the policy of a peaceful nuclear
programme and that India’s sense of disciplined
self-restraint had greatly contributed to the decision by
other potential nuclear Powers not to exercise their nuclear
option.
He
explained that the problem of non-proliferation had two
aspects which were organically linked each to the other and
which must, therefore, be considered simultaneously. The
dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons would
arise not only from further proliferation created by the
emergence of a larger number of nuclear Powers, but even
more so by the further proliferation of nuclear weapons by
the nuclear Powers, which continued to increase their
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.
He felt that as
long as superior status and prestige were associated with
the possession of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear Powers
and more particularly the potential nuclear Powers would
find it difficult, in spite of all their disciplined
self-restraint, to resign themselves to what was believed to
be an inferior status for all time. He regretted the
reluctance of the nuclear Powers to disarm themselves and
expressed the view that most non-nuclear Powers considered
the elimination of the threat itself as the only lasting and
effective guarantee for their security.
He strongly recommended the implementation of the resolution
adopted by the General Assembly in 1965, which stipulated
that a non-proliferation treaty should embody an acceptable
balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the
nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. He reiterated that the
international community could not endorse a plan which,
while dealing with proliferation in relation to non-nuclear
Powers, permitted and sanctified continued vertical
proliferation by the nuclear Powers to augment their nuclear
stockpiles. He assured that India would resist all efforts
to blind non-nuclear Powers unilaterally in a simple
non-proliferation treaty leaving the nuclear Powers free to
increase their stockpiles and perfect their delivery
systems.
March 1967
