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INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

 By
M.L. Sondhi

The enormous impact of India’s nuclear tests in 1998 is comparable to the manner in which the international environment was significantly influenced by the advent of India as an independent country in 1947.  The revolt of India against the imperial order was the first milestone in the journey of the world to the post-colonial era, initiating one of the major trends in political thinking for the second half of the twentieth century.  The political culture developed during the Indian freedom movement deeply influenced the world’s political elites, but over the next decade as a free country, India contributed more to political schizophrenia than to peace, stability and economic and technical progress.  After establishing a basis for democracy and civil society within her own shores, the Government of India refused to speak up for the political and social rights of the Hungarian people against Soviet repression.  The weaknesses of the post-colonial economy were aggravated by introducing a license-permit raj in the name of economic planning, which inexorably led the economy into a tailspin.  Similarly the Indian ruling class habitually turned anti-colonialism into a fetish and failed to develop a global overview on democracy.

This second time around, when we have again acted as a catalyst on the “real world” issues arising out of the evolving nuclear situation, we need to show that we can act sensibly and not perversely snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.  To this end academics and policy makers must needs join together to discuss new ideas and developments in a free and open atmosphere.  It will be tragic if India’s nuclear stance remains conditioned by the foreign and defence policies of the past half-century which have become antiquated as the world moves into a qualitatively different and dynamic new era.

We are now compelled to see our foreign policy and strategic problems in startling new terms and there is also need for politically correct rhetoric.  Indian nuclear policy should be relevant to the contemporary globalised world and India should progress towards a fuller understanding of the new nuclear regime formation in international society and relate itself to the actors, principles and norms with a clearly articulated theoretical framework.

The Causes of India’s Revolt

After having led the international campaign for delegitimation of nuclear weapons, India has been compelled to come to terms with the interaction effects of nuclear decisions of other states:

1.             India’s test for peaceful use in 1974 did not mention China publicly, but policy analysts around the world were in no doubt that India’s primary strategic problems were with Beijing.  The prevailing official opacity in nuclear matters went unchallenged although successive Prime Ministers in India were advised to adopt an Indian nuclear posture.  Mr. Vajpayee decided that he would not be politically constrained thanks to the changed strategic position of China vis-à-vis the United States.

2.             Since the 1980s a nuclear Pakistan also affected Indian nuclear options since its actions fed back into the Sino-Indian nuclear relationship. India now had a choice between arming China’s enemies or targeting China itself.  Since Pakistan’s services were needed by the US in Afghanistan and elsewhere the US connived at the ‘game of opacity’ played by Pakistan.

3.             The Indian mode of thinking was also influenced by an overall unwillingness to accept Five-powerdom, as India has the size, ability and motivation for challenging this structure.  Any other state similarly situated would do the same, as indeed Japan might if the threat from China grows.  Big powers intimidate by simply being big, e.g. even though the US had no nuclear action in mind, sending the nuclear armed Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal at the time of Bangladesh’s liberation did little for NPT and (may) have subsequently encouraged Indian thinking towards Pokharan I.

4.             India also shares the dilemma of how to respond to the possibility of rogue states acquiring weapons of mass destruction and directly or indirectly sponsoring terrorism within Indian borders, or to nuclear weapons acquisition by terrorist groups already operating on Indian soil.

Nuclear Doctrine and Force Structure

India should seek to put its nuclear doctrine into the broader context of thinking about world nuclear order and the maintenance of the global balance of power.  It will be necessary to maintain the focus on three tasks, the first of which refers to the utilization of central ideas of the nuclear thought of countries like France, which will help to resist the dominance of conventional nuclear thinking which is losing relevance in the fast moving arena into which India has entered as an overt nuclear power.  The second task is one of analysis, in categories which explain the defensive capabilities of India in the SAARC region, to answer the apprehension that the introduction of nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to nuclear doomsday.  The third task is to adjust Indian priorities and the institutional and organizational framework as a stable libertarian democracy to counter-balance an increasingly potent China which is on its way to challenging the United States’ status as the leading world power.

Pierre Gallois who played a vital role in articulating French Nuclear policy helped Indian strategists (see Appendix) in the early 1970s to develop a more realistic approach in the proliferation areas, and to consider measures which could become real policy options.  The United States embarked on a confrontational course with de Gaulle’s nuclear policy much in the same way that Clinton’s non-proliferation policy has failed to coordinate and cooperate with a democratic and like-minded state like India, while pursuing a multilateral policy of export controls and sanctions and outmoded rhetoric about non-proliferation.  French precedents have important implications for India decision-making since New Delhi wants to end up somewhat like Paris, with a ‘minimum deterrence’ posture, but may be stop with a range of missiles that goes as far as Beijing (as opposed to the “all horizons” capability which would be able to reach anywhere).

France did not want to fall a victim to the US McMahon Act which created incentives for American policy harmonization with Britain but discriminated against France achieving a nuclear status.  De Gaulle with his focus on French grandeur mooted the creation of a force de frappe.  General Gallois convincingly demonstrated that with even a small nuclear force France could enhance its security.  He propounded the theory of proportional deterrence in opposition to the views of General Andre Beaufre who advocated the theory of multilateral deterrence. Gallois’ views ultimately prevailed with de Gaulle and the force de frappe was successful in shaping the expectations of those who wanted an independent French nuclear policy.  France exploded her first nuclear bomb on 13 February 1960 and carried out the second and third tests later in the same year.  Within a relatively short period of time the new nuclear doctrine added diplomatic strength to France and De Gaulle was able to play a key role in the Movement for European Unity and to effectively break the US and British monopoly over nuclear weapons in the Western alliance.  He was also able to play a balancing role in Super Power competition and advance independent French peace proposals.  The major consideration for France was of course that it was not taken in as a member of the Military Planning Group of NATO.  De Gaulle found it unacceptable that NATO should change its strategy from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response and he forcefully advocated the strategy of Tous Azimuths which was opposed by both the US and Britain.  France was against the type of close association which US and Britain were developing which resulted in the Nassau Agreement.  After withdrawal from NATO France began a new phase in its foreign policy by turning to the USSR with which it tried to develop a common ground over nuclear proliferation and other nuclear related matters.  From a pragmatic point of view although French and Indian nuclear policy are answers to different basic questions, there are undoubtedly perceptions from the French experience which can enhance the strategic debate among Indian policy analysts.

The Chinese are far from developing an effective policy to control proliferation.  They have made pious noises to assure the US that no one should worry about their growing missile force.  At times they have talked of “minimum deterrence” and at other times of “limited deterrence” which starts to call for being able to “fight a nuclear war”.  The challenge for India here is to stay within the range of the Chinese if they keep modernising their nuclear forces while not alarming Pakistan.  Politically it would be very good if India announces this as her goal – then the onus is on India every time Pakistan cries foul.

It is necessary to look at the advantages and disadvantages of the following aspects of an Indian nuclear doctrine more explicitly and thematically:

1.             Calibrated retaliation:  If attacked by any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a state, India’s response would be “controlled” and would be within an institutional frame of reference.    

2.             India should be in favour of “no first use” against SAARC nations, but it should be wary of eschewing preemptive actions under all circumstances.  BPI (Boost Phase Intercept) technologies would have to be vigorously explored as these could produce much the same effect as preemptive strike but come essentially under the category of defensive capabilities.  India clearly accepts Pakistan’s deterrent capacity and would operationalise all prescriptions for avoidance of accidental actions.

3.             India would contemplate first use against other nations only if national geographical survival is threatened (may be not even then?).  At a time when the international system is in a great flux, India should not be in haste to formulate a rigid doctrine.  There may come a time when the US will warm considerably to the idea of a nuclear India with changed perceptions about the Chinese foreign policy elite and Chinese security policy.  The frame of reference appears even now to be quite different on Capitol Hill and the (present) White House.  The perception of a growing threat from “a nuclear Islamic world” in Washington will also affect the degree of reciprocity between US and India.

4.             The idea of submarine-borne capabilities is very interesting for India.  Since the arsenal India needs is small and she is essential seeking second strike capabilities, India has to invest in “clever” delivery means e.g. dummy missiles with very long ranges that would be no good for hitting Pakistan.  But even here India should be careful not to alarm others.  India may wish to keep weapons separate from delivery systems except in defined crises.  India should proceed consciously keeping in mind the lessons of US history which ended up spending a lot more on delivery systems as opposed to building weapons. India must use its resources in a flexible way and enhance its influence to prevent further proliferation.

A Proposed Nuclear Posture for India

There is an understandable tendency among specialists who have been working on choices before India as a power which had nuclear weapons capabilities and issues “in the closet” to concentrate on formulating hypotheses that still focus on relationships essentially in the dark.  It is necessary to state in a clear and precise manner that India’s nuclear posture can only be an openly weaponised one.  This way India can at long last negotiate nuclear matters and related security concerns through a more systematic analysis of contextual factors and make an important contribution to the new nuclear regime.  This is also important for domestic reasons and to enable the democratic process to choose between several conflicting visions of India’s future.

India’s nuclear weapons programme has everything to do with China and little to do with Pakistan.  Although it is the CTBT pressure which forced the issue now, it is the great Chinese Military Renewal which has directed and controlled Indian cognitive processes.  It is good to remember that for a long time due to the Cultural Revolution and then Deng’s early postponement of military modernisation India could allow past nuclear choices to constrain future possibilities.  The Indian learning process has been fairly comprehensive since the emergence of new linkages between the Clinton Administration and China and the acceleration of Chinese support for Pakistan’s missile development programme culminating in the Ghauri demonstration.  But if Pakistan were India’s only therat, India would have every incentive to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons, leaving it free to use its conventional dominance to secure its interests vis-à-vis Pakistan.  Indeed the Indian nuclear weapons programme began as a response to the defeat in the 1962 Sino-India war being followed by the 1964 testing of a nuclear weapon by China; the 1974 test by India took place after the formation of Bangladesh when Pakistan had ceased to be a credible threat to Indian interests.  Again in 1998 India tested because of the technical requirements of weapons design.  The entire point of the CTBT summarized for instance in Richard Garwin’s 1997 article in Arms Control Today is to prevent vertical proliferation i.e. development of plutonium  based implosion devices, boosted fission devices and hydrogen bombs (in the Indian case) by casting doubt on their reliability in the absence of testing.  To the extent that India is unwilling to give up on a nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis China, it simply had to test before the political costs of testing were made prohibitive by the incipient CTBT regime.  The non-proliferation regime was fatally wounded the day China transferred a nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, thereby undermining the basic presumption that the existing weapons states were responsible powers.  India’s action fulfils stringent requirements and is not in the same class of irresponsibility as China’s.  Now that it is an overt nuclear weapons power India can be expected to take further steps to improve accountability.  

Foreign Policy Concomitants

In the final analysis India has to leave behind the ambiguity and imprecision of the era of nonalignment, and address itself to some issues involving challenges and choices for the 21^st century:

a)            India has to behave responsibly in the subcontinent.  We do not want accidental nuclear exchanges with Pakistan nor would we like Bangla Desh to go nuclear (which it could with Pakistani assistance).  Our commitment to a credo of ‘nuclear sanity’ will require a combination of power and responsibility.  We cannot be a major power vis-à-vis China, for example, if we remain tied down to conflictual situations in the subcontinent.  We need cooperation from SAARC countries if we have to maintain Indian political values and interests in the changing international framework. 

b)            We have to engage China, the US and Japan in a Helsinki-type process in Asia inevitably we will have to coordinate with the latter two if Chinese behaviour proves obstreperous.  It makes no sense for Indian politicians to any longer ignore Asian realities if India is to be taken seriously as a world power.

c)             India as a nuclear weapons power is thus now deep into a process which goes beyond the narrow confines of South Asia.  India would have to think about deepening and widening its relations with the Middle East where Iran, Iraq and Israel are likely to be important actors for shaping international regime patterns.

d)            As the world moves to the next century, India cannot but take serious steps to rejoin the world trading system, and in particular build economic ties with our neighbours to shore up their confidence that India is a status quo power.  All the major political parties in India can help the country develop economic and political clout by perceiving a distinctive Indian role in the world in terms which assures success in a highly competitive global economy.  A nuclear weapons power cannot turn its back to the global marketplace.

Nuclear Regime Building

India has a unique opportunity to fill the lacunae of both theory and practice of the existing non-proliferation regime.  To advance theory building, Indian international relations scholars have to leave behind the doctrinaire thinking developed during years of India’s opaque nuclear posture.  It is counterproductive to dwell on issues which were conceptualised as part of the processes of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM).  The ‘open’ nuclear posture adopted by India after 11 May 1998 opens up a promising path for theory development to strengthen the normative dimension of international nuclear relations.  On the empirical side, India’s nuclear status and policies must enable New Delhi to address itself to the progress in various peace processes in both regional and global contexts.  It is useful to remember that the moral issue before Indian policy makers is of outlawing the use of WMDs in general, and nuclear weapons in particular, also of minimising the number of weapons on ‘active duty’ so that accidental catastrophes do not take place.  Here it is crucial to make a distinction between rogue states that are seeking to acquire MWDs in spite of having signed various international treaties, and India which honours its obligations but has security concerns that have impelled it to go nuclear.  The point here is that with the rogue states, it is hard to see what would be different if India did sign on - the word of the rogue states carries little weight anyway.  With India, as with the other nuclear states, the non-proliferation regime is likely to be more effective if a decrease in threat perception would lead to a substantially reduced nuclear posture.  Security could be traded for weapons.  A focus on the concept of ‘Look before You Leap’ nuclear weapons build down outlined by Clifford E. Singer would enable India to press for a more comprehensive non-proliferation regime which would reflect its own policy preferences relating to limitation on possession of nuclear devices.  (See Appendix)

With rogue states a new approach may be needed which India could support under the notion of strengthening the rule of international law.  It is important that India should state its objectives in fighting international terrorism explicitly and with a clearly articulated theoretical framework.  India should play a leading role in institutionalizing an International Conference on Terrorism which should be directed principally against states and groups from whom threats of terrorism and terrorism-related designs emanate.  The difficulty involved in the project should not be minimised particularly since some of these states and groups have had strong influence on the Non-aligned Movement (NAM).  However, given the centrality of the nuclear status gained by India, it would be preferable to try and articulate a conscious effort to construct an anti-terrorism regime with principles, norms and institutional support.

The central issues with regard to the CTBT for India are: (i) that signing it should not freeze India into an intolerable position of strategic inferiority and (ii) that being the case, it should advance our generalized interest in containing the spread of nuclear weapons.

With regard to the first point, the CTBT is an obstacle to designing and perfecting weapons, the latter being as much an issue of ensuring their safety and reliability as of maximizing yields.  Much depends on the current state of knowledge in this field, and on the kind of agenda planned for the future.

Next on the non-proliferation agenda after CTBT is the FMCT (fissile materials cut-off treaty) which will freeze the raw material for nuclear weapons, effectively putting a limit on the number of weapons we could make in the future.  It will also entail levels of inspection by international agencies which we might find offensive.  If we wish to have the capacity to build a credible force de frappe vis a vis China’s nuclear armoury, then a series of immediate decisions will need to be taken with regard to the requisite mix of sophistication in technology and raw materials that these will necessitate.

It is important therefore, not to close options, and at the same time to build a stronger scientific and technological constituency, outside the circle of defence scientists, for underlying security concerns.

My recommendation here would be that the government appoint a high-level Commission with a majority of scientific and strategic expertise from outside the current DAE/MOD setup to evaluate these questions in a very short period of time, and reach a conclusion on whether more tests are essential.  Part of the model here would be the American JASON programme that uses the expertise of non-defence scientists (who are given access to classified information for their work) to make a realistic assessment of the weapons labs.  An unclassified summary of their conclusions could later be made public.

 With regard to the second point, the answer is likely in the direction of a qualified yes, even if it is likely to have little impact on such likely sources of threat as China, Pakistan and Iran (which recently test-fired an 800 km missile, declaring that for the present its military and security concerns are only with Israel.)  For one thing, it will still constrain the process of proliferation in which we have no great stake beyond ourselves.  Otherwise the world may be heading for a dangerous confrontation between the US and the “rogue” states, so we should not position ourselves in a manner that invites comparison with the latter.  In this regard, the greater transparency implicit in the constitution of the above suggested Commission would go a long way in projecting a more responsible profile.

Should the technical answer of the Commission be that further testing is not really necessary, there should be no further objection to signing the CTBT.  There remains the question of conditionalities under which the signature is given.  Ideally the decision should emerge through a consensus which would obviate the need for conditions, but if that is not possible, then it is better to ask for an engagement by the US at the level of security concerns rather than demand high technology transfers.  A better understanding on strategic issues should take care of the high tech problem anyway.

The real frontier over the next decade is going to be the spread of ballistic missiles and the impact of high technology on warfare (the so-called revolution in military affairs, RMA).  The recent Rumsfeld Report to the US Congress notes that several countries deeply hostile to the US (Iran, North Korea, Iraq and maybe even Libya and Syria, although that portion of the report is classified) may in as little as five years possess the capacity to aim an ICBM armed with weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) at the US directly.  Needless to say, the US will respond in two ways: by strengthening its anti-missile defenses (perhaps on the scale of Star Wars) and by directly preventing the deployment of such weapons on the part of the “rogues”.  Israel will react similarly.  Both may also evolve doctrines that call for massive retaliation against the “rogues”.  The theological figleaf of the NPT will thus be dropped to expose the very real security anxieties of the remaining superpower.  In the midst of all this are India and Pakistan, countries not hostile to the US as the report notes, but nevertheless contributing to this expanding and dangerous nuclear pluralism for their own reasons.  The Report also notes that China, Russia and the US itself have made the problem much worse through their short-sighted policies of arming other states through both conventional and nuclear means.

The CTBT area of concern is focused on the manufacture of weapons, but it is over delivery systems that the next round of battles is going to be fought.  Hence instead of rear-mirror driving and concentration on the last war, we could instead usefully think how to safeguard our security in the midst of this growing capacity of a large number of stats to threaten each other.  Certainly an important feature behind the present developments has been the unravelling of an inequitable international regime dominated by the US, but it is all the more imperative to think about what might come next, and whether it will be to our benefit.

Therefore the current stalemate with the United States over the CTBT should not be an excuse not to find time to rethink the need for India and the USA to work together in broad strategic concerns.  For the present, the mutual interests of the US and China seem to hold centre stage, and India has every reason to feel that both countries are cooperating to impose a hegemony on the subcontinent.  But there are many aspects of China’s behaviour that are worrisome for Washington, and its inadequate dialogue with India is coming under increasing criticism within the United States.  Two years ago in a prophetic piece of writing Selig Harrison,the noted South Asian expert said: “If we try to preserve the nuclear status quo, first India and then Japan will, in my view, become overt nuclear weapons powers.  Not only because they face the Chinese nuclear arsenals, but also because they won’t accept second class status.  Both of them are capable of making ICBMs that can reach the US.  Non-proliferation will simply not work unless the world is moving towards denuclearisation.”

India has never been in the kind of adversary relation with the United States that would warrant even thinking of aiming ICBMs at that country, but it is clear that as a nuclear weapons power it is necessary for Indian policy makers to investigate causal relations between regional and international factors, and sharpen the awareness of issues involved which can produce a new strategic bargain.  This bargain must take into account India’s long-term goals and their compatibility with America’s long-term interests.  It must recognise both India’s geopolitical importance and her rootedness as a democracy in the moral-political sphere.

To make a smooth transition to a new non-proliferation regime it is essential to translate some of the approaches and hypotheses developed in the Helsinki Process and apply them with suitable modifications to Asia.  On its part India could link its nuclear restraint to its role in the Helsinki Process in Asia.  As a major player India along with China, Japan, Russia and the United Stats would start with an initiative for ‘transparency, predictability and limitation’ of armed forces applicable to all of Asia.  With India’s emergence as an overt nuclear power, the efforts of the United States to cultivate China as a regional hegemon have been negatived by Indian resilience and the exposure of the weaknesses of the existing non-proliferation regime, which has turned out to be quite ineffective as an instrument of problem-solving.

India can provide great help in shoring up the new non-proliferation regime only if there is acceptance by the five NWS a minimum credible Indian nuclear deterrent, and  also of the necessity of keeping the existing NPT non-universal, so that India need not be pressed into signing it ever.  For success in the new Regime Formation, pressure in nuclear matters should apply to countries from whom threats and dangers emanate, and not on India which has legitimate security needs which the international community has not seriously addressed so far.  

Paris, December 18, 1970

Professor M.L. Sondhi
6, Lodi Gardens
New Delhi
INDIA

Dear Professor Sondhi,

Your letter reached Paris while I was away and this is why you have not my answer earlier.  I am very pleased to see you in the Indian Parliament, representing the New Delhi constituency and I am delighted by your approach to the problem of India nuclear policy.

Hereunder, and because you told me to do so, you will find my comments on your article on “The Nuclearisation of Indian Foreign and Defence Policy”.

a)            It seems to me, from western Europe, that up to now, the policy of New Delhi was, in this matter, to accept the views expressed by the powerful “having nations” : they only had the knowledge, the skill, the sense of responsibility and the moral rectitude to master the corresponding technology and to possess nuclear weapons.  The other nations, including the near-nuclear ones (I should say specially these ones) were not capable to understand the technique and the related strategy of the new weaponry.  For this reason, and as if the brainwashing was efficient at the highest level, many nations have “postponed a pivotal decision” as you write in your article.

b)            It is obvious that the risks involved in the perspective of a nuclear exchange are such that, against a nuclear guarantee (that is no deterrence) can be given by an “ally”, and this, independently of its strength, stockpile, etc… compared to the strength of the would-be aggressor.  No military alliance can be trusted if new weapons may be used.  This is, for me, evident in western Europe where the deployment and type of forces of NATO are such that “A” and “H” weapons could not be used without incapaciting the whole system in few minutes.  Against a nuclear power, Soviet and/or American support have little meaning for me.  (And very little when China will have few long-range weapons)

c)             False protection by an (or two) atomic Powers has always to be paid very heavily.  Against what cannot be “protection”, the “protected” country has to give up a part of its independence, politically, diplomatically and economically.  But what it gives is patent while the “protect it is supposed to obtain is theoretical and probably vain.  You are right to say that the “so-called guarantees are of theoretical value and, in practice, would place India defence in serious jeopardy”.  But you could add reduce the freedom of action of your country and impose upon her a policy which may be contrary to her interests.

d)            The near Nuclear Conference may be less conclusive than you think in account of the pressure of the great Powers.  To your own people, you should explain that, by their very nature, the new weapons have no other signification than the defence of the national territory against a direct and total menace.  They are defensive weapons.  On the contrary, it is with conventional ones that the nuclear nations, already secured at home because they possess the new arsenal, are fighting “local” wars outside their territory, to increase their influence, acquire new interests or protect what they have already obtained.  If they want to carry on their hegemonistic designs, they must keep the “A” and “H” weapons for themselves, prevent proliferation in such a way that they can always use their conventional forces in the rest of the world.  These forces are the instruments of “continuation of policy by force” and without risks for they know that no local conflict can degenerate and reach their soil for they are atomic and they are, each one, a “sanctuary”.

e)            The idea of a peaceful explosion is a good one.  You could as well make in secrecy your own weapons for, with the “A” category, no tests are necessary.  Then, if politically necessary, you could make a “ploughshare” test, showing that the technical problem is solved.  If not, the uncertainty is almost as decisive than certitude in atomic matters and deterrence may begin with hints only.  On the other side, if the Indian government cannot resist very long to outside pressure, it may be necessary to accomplish openly, as soon as possible, the first steps which generally are such that one cannot return to the situation “ante”.

f)              Of the three ways “in which the concept of nuclearisation can be discussed in the context of Indian defence policy” the two firsts seem to me almost complementary.  On the second is the by-product of the first, and a very useful one for your country.  I am not so sure that the third one is as valid as the two others.  You have more to think in terms of security of India than Southeast Asian region.  But politically it may be necessary to add this third point.

g)            Technical “fall out” from “A” weapon is scientifically and industrially very important in spite of what the two “Greats” are saying.  Today, knocking at the Six door’s, England emphasized her atomic and electron knowledge due to armament efforts.  It is more rewarding to work on atomic and ballistic matters than to produce machine guns, lorries and uniforms.  If you have, in any case, to spend 3 or 4 percent of your GNP in armaments, it seems more useful to use that money in advanced technology than in manpower and in turning out by thousands weapons of the past. 

h)            The new weapons are so important as a strategic factor that they stabilize a whole area.  In that respect, India becoming a real nuclear power may help increasing stability, not only as far as India is concerned, but also around her.  (In spite of what I said para f, with “A” bombs, security is for India only, but the area around India may benefit of a certain uncertainty which is a stabilizing factor for the countries involved.)

If you think that it may be useful for your combat that I come to India for a few days, I may try to arrange such a trip.  I would bring with me charts and diapositives in English to be able to talk to large audiences such as military schools, as I am doing here.

But for the time being, I send you again, for you all and also for your political action, my very best wishes.

Sd/-
Pierre M. Gallois