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COUNTER
POINT
Rao must break free from Nehru’s legacy
By
M.L. Sondhi
The Pioneer,
January 31, 1992
The adage that a stitch in time saves nine
seems to be lost on Indian foreign policy decision-makers.
India was not able to react promptly and properly to the
Middle East peace process started at Madrid last October
which resulted from the new political balance created by the
Gulf War. The kidnapping of the Israeli tourists in Kashmir
had brought Dr. Moshe Yegar, the Deputy Director of the
Israeli Foreign Office, to New Delhi in July 1991. This was
an opportunity for the South Block to initiate a positive
trend towards achieving the much needed adjustment in
India’s West Asian policy.
But, instead, New Delhi reverted to moral
posturing about Palestinian rights. This month it was the
same Dr. Yegar who accompanied his Foreign Minister to
Beijing as the man chiefly instrumental in opening up
China-Israel relations to full Ambassadorial level. India
was put in a quandary and our credibility was not enhanced
by giving a carte blanche to Yasser Arafat to dictate
the configuration of Indian policy on diplomatic
recognition. To be almost the last in the queue to give
full recognition is hardly an example of any new pragmatism
that the government may claim for itself.
That this decision-making pathology is not
radically different from what obtained when the landscape of
Indian foreign policy was dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru
himself is clear from the circumstantial evidence provided
by Gideon Rafael in his book Destination Peace.
Rafael’s summary of his conversation with Nehru has the
merit of a persuasive exposition of the drift in Indian
diplomacy which prevents us from charting a strategic course
and deserves to be quoted at some length:
“India had recognized Israel in 1950, Nehru
said, and indeed should have at that time established
diplomatic relations. The sentiments in India towards
Israel were good. Many people were keenly interested in its
achievements… The trouble was that there was a strong Arab
reaction to the establishment of diplomatic relations
between our two countries… Nehru commented that he had
noticed our remarkable success with the new countries, and
was somewhat astonished that it included Cyprus. I told him
how the little island, Israel’s geographically closest
friendly neighbour, had stood up to the threat of Arab
diplomatic boycott of the “either or” sort, with the result
that Cyprus could pride itself in offering hospitality to
the embassies of all states of the Middle East – Arab and
Israeli alike. At this point Nehru with undisguised
indignation exclaimed “What right have the Arabs to threaten
an independent country with diplomatic boycott? I was
startled by this manifestation of righteous anger and
commented in an aside: “Indeed what right do they have to
threaten any state?” Nehru’s remark was certainly amazing
to anyone used to thinking in terms of logical sequence.
Here I encountered for the first time that kind of stark
ambivalence which, according to knowledgeable people was the
key to the understanding of Nehru’s mind and policies. It
seemed to be a kind of two-tier structure with no connecting
staircase. When it came to far-distant Cyprus, a mini state
with a population of 450,000, Nehru was a fearless admirer
of its courage and a defender of international fortitude.
But where India was concerned, a subcontinent with a
population more than a hundred times as large, Nehru
preferred evasion to valour and expediency to principles.”
These are harsh words for Indian ears, but
even those who respect Nehru’s memory may turn to them to
find out why there is contemporaneously speaking such a wide
disparity between New Delhi’s rational policy options and
the constricted agenda that has been legitimized in the name
of adhering to the Nehruvian model. I wrote an article as
early as September 1988, in which I called attention to the
new Soviet initiatives under Gorbachev, and speculated that
Washington would reach out to the PLO. I also focused on
the political debate within Israel as it sought to reduce
the risks of intifada and concluded that “a feeling
that Israel has bitten off more that it can chew in Lebanon,
the West Bank, or Gaza, colours the sensitivity of an
increasing number of Israelis.” I, prophesised that “the
time may come when the PLO may play its ‘Israel card’ and
find a way out of the prolonged political crisis”. It was
clear that the Arab summit at Fez was a turning point moving
the Arabs to the path of negotiation in place of the
application of force. The first desideratum, therefore, for
Indian policy was to free itself from its earlier rhetoric
and use its experience and diplomatic skill in conference
diplomacy which would bring together the two sides.
Regrettably, there was no further debate in the national
press during the following three years, no proposals
advanced for sound judgements about how to change our policy
posture without offending the Arabs.
The dilemmas that beset Mr. Narsimha Rao are
the same as those confronted by national leaders who have to
overcome the decision-making pathologies of their
predecessors. Mr. Rao needs a different and wider focus
which is not compatible with an obdurate insistence upon
adhering to Nehru’s legacy. Hopefully, the decision to
normalize relations with Israel will mark the beginning of a
new epoch of India’s foreign policy. |
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