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Role for India
ENDING THE KOREAN CRISIS
By
M.L. Sondhi
For a variety of reasons India does not
receive the attention and consultation which the People’s
Republic of China does in the settlement of issues which are
on the agenda of the international community after the end
of the cold war. Part of the reason lies in our failure to
secure for ourselves a permanent seat in the Security
Council of the United Nations and our continued inability to
craft a policy that addresses this goal. Another important
reason is that Indian policy makers tend to justify
decisions on the basis of surface similarities between
different crisis situations instead of making a serious
intellectual effort to comprehend the complexities of the
regional contexts in which international conflicts arise.
Some political commentators who are reputed
to be close to South Block have recently orchestrated the
view that India can use the arguments advanced by the late
Kim Il Sung’s regime for strengthening its nuclear
capability to balance out American pressure on India’s
nuclear programme. This approach on the part of New Delhi
works against the substance of security and peace-building
in the regional context of north-east Asia. Talks between
Washington and Pyongyang and later those between Pyongyang
and Seoul will be structured around the denuclearization
commitment of both the Koreas and the specific need to
ensure the transparency of North Korea’s nuclear programme.
Support
The aim of
Indian policy should be to lend support to the evolution of
a regional peace structure on the Korean peninsula while
retaining our political strategic manoeurvability vis-à-vis
the United States in relation for the global aspects of the
NPT. By using the Korean nuclear issue to justify India’s
resistance to Washington’s assertive postures New Delhi will
only undermine the legitimizing factors in India’s nuclear
activities.
The Ministry of External Affairs will have
to alter its mindset if it is to comprehend the complexity
and breadth of issues which will figure in the negotiations
both at Geneva and at Pyongyang.
We can identify the following assumptions in
Indian official thinking about the evolution of the crisis
over the North Korean nuclear programme and the impasse in
inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges which need rethinking.
First, there is a tendency in South Block to
develop a negative image of the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s role in the escalating conflict with Pyongyang. It
would be perfectly legitimate to be unwilling to risk
imperiling Indian security and therefore to firmly reject
any false charges against Indian nuclear activities but it
is quite another matter to demonise the IAEA as certain
articles in the media have done.
Co-operation
If India is
to address all problems in context, it should not hesitate
to underline the fact that North Korea as a signatory to the
NPT and the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA is
obliged to demonstrate the transparency of its nuclear
programme by full cooperation with IAEA inspections. India
should also highlight the importance of the 1992 Declaration
of the Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in terms of
which both North and South Koreas are committed to
developing nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. It is
a sign of strength rather than weakness if New Delhi
clarifies the points of reference in evaluating the
performance of the IAEA. The lack of cognitive clarity as
evidenced by alleged pro-US tilt only distorts the orderly
conduct of our foreign policy.
Second, several influential voices have
suggested that North Korea is only employing the nuclear
card to win some diplomatic favours from the United States
but it is not serious in its intention to possess nuclear
arms. As a practical matter India should make up its own
mind while assessing a particular country’s character and
conduct and provide itself with guidelines on the modas
operandi of states which are committed to serious
engagement in confidence-building measures as part of a
peace process. Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions certainly do
not contribute to a more congenial regional atmosphere and
New Delhi cannot endorse Pyongyang’s wish to gain military
edge over Seoul by nuclearising its arsenal.
Third, there is a tendency in certain
quarters in New Delhi to look upon former President Jimmy
Carter’s “diplomatic masterstroke” as justifying the neglect
of South Korean apprehensions about the nuclear enterprise
of North Korea. It should be abundantly clear that while
the Carter intervention created a unique opportunity for a
reassessment of the overall situation in Korea, it would be
a tall order to speak of any imminent end of the
precariousness of the North Korean situation.
Indian policy makers would do well to bear
in mind that Kim Il Sung in his talks with Carter committed
himself to freezing North Korea’s nuclear programme and
undertook to refrain from reprocessing nuclear fuel taken
from the Yongbyon reactor and to keep in place the IAEA
inspectors and monitoring equipment. This reflects a
weakened and not a strengthened position in Pyongyang.
India should not, therefore, hesitate to share its concern
regarding clandestine proliferation in the Korean peninsula
and should welcome the full-scale reactivation of the Joint
Nuclear Control Commission of the two Koreas.
Agreements
A review of
the current situation and trends in armaments in Asia will
make it abundantly clear that the two agreements concluded
in 1992 i.e., the agreement on reconciliation,
non-aggression and Exchange and Cooperation and the joint
Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula,
still remain the most significant landmarks in constructive
dialogue between North and South Koreas. New Delhi would do
well to emphasise to both sides that the old lines of
military confrontation should be given up but if an
atmosphere appropriate to peace talks is to be created the
North Korea infringement of the Declaration for the
Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula cannot be pushed
under the carpet on the pretext of being even-handed. India
cannot play a legitimate or positive role in the Korean
peace process if it continues to ignore the salient fact
that South Korea would be the direct target of the North
Korean nuclear threat.
Last, India’s diplomatic relations with the
two Koreas cannot but be affected by the trade and
investment flows between India and South Korea. Hitherto
India has been extraordinarily sensitive to Pyongyang on
account of the Nonaligned leanings which gave New Delhi a
certain skeptical outlook on US-South Korean relations.
Brinkmanship
If North
Korea continues its isolationist policies and also indulges
in nuclear brinkmanship there is little that New Delhi can
do to change the perception of North Korea as a hostile and
aggressive polity in the comity of nations. On a more
optimistic view the forthcoming talks might show that the
moment is ripe for both negotiation and settlement of
inter-Korean relations. Indian policy makers could play a
major role in the background of the process by broadening
their perspectives to focus on the basic needs of all
Koreans – the 45 millions in South Korea and 27 millions in
North Korea, and by helping both sides to overcome negative
stereotypes and enemy images.
It is sometimes suggested that the 1995 NPT
Review Conference will be the occasion for mounting pressure
on India to subscribe to the NPT, and therefore New Delhi
should be wary of precedents established in the case of
countries like North Korea. India’s refusal to sign the NPT
is related to basic principles of our defence and strategic
policy and is in the overall context of our view on
international security in a Nuclear Weapons Free World.
India’s nuclear stance is consistent with the view that
nuclear weapons should not fall into the hands of
irresponsible decision makers. Our stake in a durable
Korean peace is immense. |