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North Korean Sports Diplomacy
By
M.L. Sondhi
The Hindustan Times, May 17, 1984
India which hosted the 9th Asian Games in 1982
cannot but feel that North Korea is taking the wrong tack in
trying to secure political payoffs by the assumptions for
forming a joint unified sports team of North and south
Koreas for the Los Angeles Olympics. Both empirical
evidence and logical thinking suggest that the vital
interests of the developing countries of the Third World are
deeply hurt when sharp tensions generate disarray and get
translated into crude forms of outside intervention. Just
as the arms race devours resources which could be channelled
into investment for development, the mishandling of conflict
situations for propagandist purposes prevents the
development of rational options for promoting a broad
spectrum of social, economic and cultural cooperation in the
Third World. Indian public opinion has consistently
favoured an international sports milieu which would always
generate a consensus on positive and creative initiatives to
support the vital interests of sportsmen and to eliminate
social tensions in both the domestic and external
environments. Indian leadership in international sports
affairs has consistently favoured a pluralistic order which
would be beneficial for all nations and India has often
played the silent role of a mediator and peacemaker when
some other countries openly abandoned the Olympic spirit and
indulged in pernicious confrontations.
Considerable Sympathy
There is considerable sympathy in Indian official and
non-official circles for the hazards which South Korea faces
in dealing with some of the compulsively confrontationist
ethos of North Korean sports diplomacy. If the spirit of
the New Delhi Asian Games is to be carried forward to the
1988 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games to be hosted by
South Korea, Seoul will have to guard against the failure of
its northern neighbour to avoid deviant behaviour. The
human and social values which India cherishes were deeply
offended when the Rangoon outrage took place and the Indian
Prime Minister and other leaders strongly condemned
political terrorism on both legal and moral grounds. The
risk of sabotage and blackmail which South Korea faces is
directly influenced by the belief system which North Korean
leadership has developed, but India’s stance of
non-alignment often prevents it from calling a spade a
spade. India is however favourably disposed to the new
foreign policy directions of South-South Cooperation which
Seoul has promoted and in turn has offered new perceptions
of cultural and economic cooperation. A question arises as
to why Pyongyang has failed to alter its perceptions and
continues to define the situation with the dominant
yardstick of political coercion. Indian observations
suggest that some elitist regimes even though they have
joined the non-aligned movement have not yet adjusted
themselves to the new priorities of the international
community.
In the transitional period the consensual
perceptions are opposed by the various outmoded devices by
which violence is used for political ends. Thus as early as
February 1, 1982 South Korea proposed a 20-point pilot
South-North exchange project which created a very favourable
impression in India. These included the opening of a
highway between the two capitals, reunion of families, free
press coverage of either side and arms control measures.
There were specifically proposals to participate in
international games under joint auspices and also to create
sports facilities inside the Demilitarized Zone. Thus the
South Korean Government offered accommodation on a number of
points, including international sports, through a general
policy of conciliation.
A sober examination of the positions
advanced by Seoul would have led Pyongyang to a concrete
plan for starting a dialogue. Unfortunately the reaction of
the North Korean government was one of rage at the thought
that any agreement would act as a catalyst to create a new
model of democratic and non-violent relations between the
two parts of the Korean nation. Seoul was left in the lurch
by Pyongyang on the concrete dimensions for developing a
joint team for international sports events including the Los
Angeles Olympics which was then three years away in the
future.
Functional approach
In any assessment of North South Korean relations nothing
underscores the impression of Pyongyang’s fear of close
contacts with the South as the half hearted response to the
offer of a genuine sports dialogue from Seoul. By taking a
functional approach both the Governments would develop a
common regional point of view and also reinforce the shared
sense of the Korean people belonging to a single nation.
Pyongyang’s verbal peace overtures have not
been matched by actual policy moves. The Rangoon Bombing
incident has actively contributed to raising new obstacles
to improved relations between North and South Korea for
Pyongyang’s public statements showed that the North is not
interested in dampening the flames of political turbulence
and its ruling elite can only consolidate its power through
secrecy, distrust and political terror. In the aftermath of
the Rangoon tragedy, Seoul has naturally to draw proper
inference and take necessary precautions to safeguard its
legitimate interests. A variety of arguments for critical
evaluation of North Korea’s signals are grounded in the
destabilisation campaign which North Korea launches from
time to time and which prevents concrete results emerging
from an inter-Korean dialogue.
Heart of the Issue
As Chairperson of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) India
believes that the heart of the issue for normalisation of
political relations between governments professing different
ideologies is whether co-operative relations can be
developed which would help towards co-existence of different
political systems. It would make a major contribution to an
optimistic future for the Korean peninsula if North Korea
were to channel its energy into exploring the potential of
south-South cooperation through an imaginative and decisive
leadership and give up the adventurism which is implicit in
its programme of communising the South Korean political
system by the use of covert and overt force. The threat to
peace in the Korean peninsula is controllable if bilateral
talks can develop a framework for peaceful settlement of
disputes while eschewing military confrontation.
For a short time, especially in 1972, it
appeared as if a qualitative leap forward had occurred in
the intra-Korean relations and both states would carry out
actions in confrormity with the jont statement of July 4,
1972 which recognised the potential of North and south Korea
to achieve reunification without external interference.
That there was considerable resistance against such a policy
in Pyongyang became unfortunately clear when a year later
North Korea refused to pursue the realistic content of the
1972 joint statement and again entered the arena of narrow
internecine politics.
India has been trying to remove the causes
of tension which have resulted in the Iraq-Iran war, and it
has declared its willingness to help in the process of
reconciliation in other crisis-5ridden situations. In
India’s view an acceptable solution of the Korean problem
cannot be achieved merely through empty gestures. A détente
policy whether at the global level or at the regional level
must be based on the recognition of mutual interest. A
direct inter-Korean dialogue would not only be welcomed by
India, but New delhi would assuredly provide a non-aligned
forum for reunification talks without external interference.
While rejecting the South Korean proposal
for a second inter-Korean sports meeting last month at
Panmanjom, the North Koreans presented a rather distorted
picture of the true state of affairs. The idea of having a
single team will indeed be fruitless unless the entire
enterprise demonstrates the importance of fair play and
mutual trust. Asian countries would do well to establish a
strong record for the participants in Asian Games on firm
adherence to the highest principles of international
sports. North Korea appears to hold the Clausewitzian view
that Olympics are a continuation of politics by an admixture
of other means. If the tradition of the New Delhi 1982
Asiad is to be strengthened, Asian countries must take a
firm stand against the politicisation of international
sports.
Objective Standard
Indian opinion would be pleased if North
Korea were to give up its hawkish attitude and resume the
inter-Korean Sports Meeting by adhering to objectives
standards for reconciling the different perspectives over a
unified team, and they would do well to take into account
the lessons of the New Delhi Asiad. According to
Pyongyang, their delegation staged a walk-out after the
South Koreans referred to the Rangoon bombing incident and
asked for guarantees for the safety of South Korean
sportsmen. Although this is clearly intended to impress the
outside world of North Korea’s statue, yet on this issue
Pyongyang is fighting a losing battle. South Korea has
established an impressive tradition of supporting the
concept of a unified team since as early as January 1963,
and in fact guiding principles were evolved during meetings
held by the sports officials of the two sides in
Switzerland. South Korea’s attitude was not marked by
excessive expectations when the two sides met on April 9,
1984. All that South Korea did was to dilemma when it
presented its seven-point plan. |
