THE COLD WAR – ITS MANIFESTATIONS

 By
M.L. Sondhi
International Studies1964
Introduction – Origin and Development:

The development of international relations after the end of the World War II has been marked by a general deterioration of relations between the USA and the USSR, their failure to reach agreement on outstanding international issues and a lack of tolerance on both sides which contributed towards raising local issues to the level of world problems which imperil the future of mankind.  The Cold War may be regarded as the outcome of at least three factors:

a)            Natural tendencies in American and Russian foreign policies after the World War II

b)            The influence of allies on the formulation of US and Russian bloc policies

c)             The influence of the mythologies of Capitalism and Communism

Natural tendencies in American and Russian

Foreign policies after the World War II

These may be indicated briefly in the following manner:

1.             The Changing concept of political power:  The end of the War provided both the Soviet and US leaders with a vision which transcended the scope of traditional foreign policy making.  The facts as known to us now appear to lend themselves to the following interpretation.  Stalin, who remained mindful of the memory of hostile relations with the West since the days of the Western Intervention, permitted himself to explore a new dimension in which the Soviet Union was no longer simply the preserver of its “socialist” existence, but could play the role of the mythological hero who could annihilate the present or future constellation of hostile forces in his vicinity by a few simple though terrifying gestures.  In the frightened post-war world Stalin appeared not so much the hero but as fulfilling the very opposite role of the ogre-tyrant.  President Truman who succeeded Roosevelt seems to have received an almost identical initiation and saw the role of his country in terms of an anthropomorphic vision.  The first Atom Bomb not only upset the expected strategic balance of the post-war world, but provided the evidence of a revelation which transcended America’s manifest destiny and became the symbol not of fruitful communication with the rest of mankind but of America’s universal and final apotheosis to which the proper response of all was to be one of adoration.

2.             The decline of international organisation:  The agreement in Moscow in 1943 to set up the UNO reflected an important convergence in major policies of the Soviet Union and the USA.  The Soviet role at the Conference at San Francisco was, in general consistent with the principles of international conduct defined essentially in non-radical terms.  The United States conception of the role of the UN in the Roosevelt era seemed to be founded firmly upon clear assumptions of political restraints in the interests of genuine international cooperation.  It took some time for it to become apparent that the willingness to agree upon the Charter did not provide a control on forces which sought to accomplish national objectives with self-righteousness as the sole guide of conduct. The Soviet abuse of the Veto, the refusal to participate in the social and economic programmes of the UN and America’s by-passing the UN in the formulation of the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan served to condemn the UN as a dream child of political visionaries.

3.             The emphasis on heterogeneity:  The nature of allied cooperation during the War varied from country to country.  But the total effect of the encounter with the common enemy was strikingly similar in USSR and the USA.  There was a certain endemic suspicion and mistrust of each other, but of greater importance was a patient effort to evolve practices which adhered to a gradual approach towards a pattern of responsible international behaviour as befitted the two most advanced nations.  The roots of the schism which rent the short lived unity were found in the soil of theological subtleties.  The theological dispute had always been there, what was new and remarkable was that this dispute, instead of remaining the concern of the priesthood on either side, became now a controversy of alarming magnitude which vitally affected the behaviour of foreign policy makers and diplomats. On the American side it was seriously suggested that the entire force of the Judaeo-Christian tradition pinpointed the responsibility of the conflict among mankind upon the sinful nature of man.  This emphasis on the “substantial corruption of man” was a departure from the hopeful quality of utopian planning which had declared itself in favour of a good society drawing upon Soviet and Western experience. The Cold War period engendered despair which accompanied the obsessive belief that Communism was the embodiment of all evil.

4.             The prophecy of historical conflict:  The effectiveness of Soviet and US propaganda directed to each other may be difficult to assess.  The acceleration of the trends in the post war world was, however, very markedly affected by the efforts of the contestants to study “Marxism” and “Capitalism” to understand the essential articles of the other’s faith.  It was entirely a new experience that instead of developing moderately effective programmes based upon the maintenance of vital interests both sides became fully aware of the teleology of the other side’s political-religion in which the final clash of the two sides was ordained as inevitable.  

5.             National egotism:  A major difficulty in providing the means for an effective dialogue between the Soviet Union and the USA is that their dissension is largely the product of unrelenting mystical faiths whose source of authority is the history of phenomenal achievements of their respective social and political systems, which do not, however, necessarily reflect the problems and difficulties of the rest of the contemporary world.

6.             Competition in a shrinking world:  The revolution in technology and the emergence of new states served to crate new limitations with which US and Russian policy makers never seem to have come to terms fully.  While Americans could applaud the end of their isolationism, the Russians could never understand the spectrum of new American positions overseas.  On the other hand Russian moves with the security of the Soviet Union as a policy objective were interpreted as aggressive and called forth counter-moves which were formulated into doctrine as the Theory of Containment.

7.             Ritualistic behaviour:  A continuous worry of both the Super Powers has been to counteract the pernicious influence from the other side.  To avoid defilement it is considered necessary to undergo purificatory rites and also to utter incantations and make the appropriate gestures.  On the Russian side special attention has been paid to perfecting the techniques by which from time to time to counteract “Capitalist poison” militant campaigns are launched to impart correct education, but which to the outsider appeared as smear campaigns accompanied by extraordinary verbal acrobatics.  The wartime goodwill for the Soviet Union among broad sections of the population of the Western countries was largely lost on account of such compulsive behaviour on its part.  On the American side it took some time to develop a habit because there was resistance to the establishment of a rigid monopoly of any defined creed, but the environment did not prove to be immune to the appeal of ritualism.  Once established it has proved durable.  A good example of American ritualism was the invocation of the formula of military treaty and military aid (pactomania) which was applied in and out of season.

8.             Naivete:  The themes of “decadent West” and “rolling back of communism” and other examples of a distorted way of looking at contemporary history, introduced a habit of attributing the most evil intentions to any move from the other side.  The relations were bad enough but the propagandists on both sides approached their assignments generally in the pattern of horror story writing for school children.

THE INFLUENCE OF ALLIES ON THE FORMULATION OF US AND RUSSIAN BLOC POLICIES

The preceding analysis shows that it is not necessary to attribute wickedness to either the Russian or American leaders, because the loss of goodwill was the result of the development of the controversy from a combination of reasons.  An important reason which worked against attempts to prevent the widening of the breach lay in the fact that both Russia and America had assumed the character-roles of group leaders.  The bilateral relations between USA and USSR were transformed on account of the difficulty entailed in carrying into practice policies whose flexibility could enable a bloc-follower to challenge the bloc-leader for having surrendered to the stubbornness of the other side and imperilling the discipline and unity of the bloc.  In view of the later career of Yugoslav foreign policy it may occasion surprise to remind ourselves that Yugoslavia before the split with the bloc had upheld positions against those who sought to bring about harmony between the two sides.  It was Yugoslavia as a bloc member which protested most vehemently against the Czechoslovaks who had taken up the position that the concept of “peaceful coexistence” sanctioned their participation in the Marshall Plan.  After leaving the bloc Yugoslavia became a fervent champion of synthesis of the two opposing points of view.  On the American side the independence of their foreign policy has been circumscribed at times by allies who could effectively play upon America’s obsession with Russian expansionism.  The role and importance of Western Germany in American policy making not only provides Russia with a propaganda opportunity but shows the internal structure of the American bloc increasing the proportions of the dispute.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYTHOLOGIES OF CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM

Mythology can support both the humanist and the authoritarian elements of religion.  The humanist spirit found its manifestation both in the early beginnings of American capitalism and in the protest against man’s alienation from his own powers which pervades the writings of Marx.  In both the American and Russian societies the ruling elite found the variety of politico-religious experience, which interprets violent authoritarianism of the past as relevant for present-day political discourse, highly attractive for creating a national atmosphere of strength and confidence.  In countries where the traditional mythology did not mirror an outright conquest of good over evil the leadership was the mythology dogmatically interpreted.  The clear sighted vision of India’s Prime Minister on the important issues of East-West conflict is now generally acknowledged even by those who dislike the quality of India’s activity in the field of foreign policy.

ANALYSIS OF THE POST-WAR EXPERIENCE:    

The encounter of the East and West reveals a gradual intensification of policies which were initiated as devices to meet minimum requirements.  The interaction of politics and technological developments visibly affected techniques employed by the both the super powers.

1.             Military alliances:  The United States sought to provide an umbrella of collective security in the form of a series of alliances located geographically near the Soviet Union.  The defence of Western Europe has been commonly described as the heart of the political situation in 1945. The most efficient device in the context of demobilisation of western armies on the one hand and the breach of the Yalta Agreement promises by Stalin on the other, was regarded as one in which the central relation in the system of defence would give the United States enough weight without having to declare that its aims were merely preventive in justification of every move.  Churchill’s Fulton speech and Kennan’s famous Foreign Affairs article indicated why America and her European allies had developed an unusual degree of sensitiveness to Soviet gestures.  This theory became henceforth the standard of accomplishments.  The strength and community of purpose of the NATO persuaded the Americans to develop a unique world-wide system of military alliances.  Unlike Europe, in Africa and Asia post war history was marked by sudden upheavals and a conservative point of view favourable to the status quo was politically untenable except for the very shortest planning periods.  Both SEATO and the BAGHDAD PACT, the former to encircle China and the latter to close the containment ring round the Soviet Union created discords and anxieties in the Asian and North African world and unlike the NATO were never regarded as being in response to political opinions compatible with regional patriotisms.

Three principles seem to have governed the Soviet response to the extension of regional security arrangements by the USA:he USA:

(a)                 The Stalinist policy makers found it easier to stress the dichotomy between the peace-loving states and the hostile American-led Capitalist bloc.  Even if it is argued that there were inevitable internal pressures which contributed to the use of force to uphold a monolithic unity in the Soviet bloc, it would be difficult to underestimate the help unwittingly given by American policies to polarisation around the Soviet Union.  In the post-Stalin era, the creation of the Warsaw Pact was an answer to the inclusion of West Germany in NATO and contributed towards greater legal control of the East European countries by the Soviet Union in the military sphere.

(b)                 In answer to its encirclement Russia went on to obtain the H. Bomb.  Simultaneously it became the initiator of a massive Peace Campaign and seems to have almost hoped for the ostracism of the USA as an untrustworthy warmongering nation.

(c)                 The post-Stalin Soviet policy especially showed wisdom in accepting neutrality and wherever there was tension between the Pact-member-government and the people or where there was actual civil war, the American-led western position easily identified with an imperialist attitude thus enabling the Soviet Union to forge close ties with nationalist forces.

2.                   Military Aid, Foreign Bases, Armaments Race:  The plan for encirclement having been taken for granted as a universally valid political principle, and the rising tensions between the USA and the USSR having engendered situations of perpetual mistrust, principal reliance was placed on military strength.  In terms of the new American foreign policy, the ideal of the American creed as the embodiment of freedom and social opportunity had to be reinforced with a world-wide costly military machine knitted as a single system.  In the situation of fear and insecurity, it was urged that a paramount aspect was the Russian superiority in conventional weapons which made it necessary to refrain from negotiations till positions of strength, interpreted as military strength were reached.  By 1955, it was generally acknowledged that a thermonuclear stalemate had been reached between the two sides, but the power struggle between the USA and the USSR continued after the short Geneva break with major emphasis still on arming themselves and their military-pact allies with newer weapons.  What was the realistic basis for the continued reliance on the methods of military aid and military bases?  One answer given is that with all the talk on the Russian side about disarmament they were determined to retain all their military advantages intact.  They saw the dangers of an atomically armed world but were planning their policy with a view to discovering military flaws in the non-Communist countries of the world.  This answer does not seem to be tenable if we interpret Soviet behaviour in the Middle East as showing their remarkable patience in being prepared to relinquish opportunities from a purely military point of view.

3.             Propaganda:  Whatever hopes there might have been in other methods used by the two sides, both believed it to be important to supplement their cold-war armouries by a network of propaganda organisations.  Both had worked towards tearing down the propaganda edifice built by Goebbels; no sooner had their task been completed than they hastened to erect structures which rivalled the abuses perpetrated by the Nazis in utilising audio-visual techniques of mass communication.  The Russians were the first in the field with the Cominform in  1947.  They found that many notorious devices used by the Germans could be utilised more effectively by them with the help of the various national communist parties.  The USA in the initial stages of the Cold War does not seem to have been aware of the potentialities of organisational methods in encompassing nearly all media of mass communications and engendering almost total indifference to basic principles enshrined in the American Constitution and the democratic way of life.  We are here faced with the crucial problem in which the façade of free expression and search for truth can be retained while the reality is made up largely of bureaucratised thinking concerned only with tactical advantages.

3.                   Economic Aid:  a problem which became increasingly important was the inability of Europe to utilise its resources in the condition in which its devastated economy was found after the end of the wear.  Significantly the American economy could not have continued unimpeded by stagnation or decline of economic activity in Western Europe.  A continuous, expanding and integrated supply and utilisation of economic resources was provided by the Marshall Plan.  The Soviet Union’s contracting out of any possible arrangements may be ascribed to genuine fears of American domination and capitalist exploitation.  Nevertheless there is a good measure which can be explained in terms of ideological muddle which succumbed to the ingrained separatism of the Soviet society.  The manner in which the Czechoslovaks were ordered out of the Marshall Plan conference reveals a saddening glimpse of the Soviet mind and lack of statesmanship in not arresting the trend towards antagonism which had developed in US-Soviet relations after Truman’s taking over.

 Theoretically the world’s most backward areas should provide the field for the manifestation of advanced ideas of international assistance.  The most advanced countries with which the USA was politically allied had, however, an unenviable record of exploitation in relation to the backward countries.  The initiation of any programme of economic aid was seen by Western policy-makers not in terms of principles of international economic organisation but mainly within a framework of resistance to ascendancy of communism or of “immoral” neutralism.  Such a view was ridden with latent danger and as is now generally accepted, an unnecessary intrusion of a political issue into an essentially economic sphere and a major error of American policy making.

4.                   Trade embargos:  Restrictive policies in the cold war context represented essentially a political conception based on the objective of “rolling back” Communism.  It is an open question whether the result of the various embargos was the undermining of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe or actually resulted in strengthening the industrial capacity of the Russian bloc.  In evolving a strategy of economic blockade the major difficulty is the unwillingness of the Afro-Asian countries to ignore the advantages of competitive source of supply from the Soviet bloc and new outlets for their own products.  Moreover economic growth on both sides created unexpected demands which “organisation men” of either side wished to satisfy from the most advantageous source of supply irrespective of the political tensions and thus acted as a pressure to outgrow the restrictions of the phase initiated in the early days of the Cold War.

 5.                   Regional Integration:

6.                                                       a)            Common Market:  In an era in which the possibilities of rapid economic advance through technological developments are phenomenal, the implications for a constructive and hopeful international economic organisation would have been international integration on a world-wide scale to channelise aid to industrially retarded countries.  Such an aim was unrealistic where the end of political action was only to wage a relentless struggle to undermine the other side.

The Common Market, as its critics say, was not related in its fundamental character to the real need of contribution to the international economic landscape.  It’s trend will therefore be to accentuate the differences between the advanced and the backward parts although there may be isolated examples of rapid economic development.  In the short run, the manner in which France and West Germany have worked their economic and defence policies does not provide them with sufficient incentives to take steps to reduce political tensions.  The Russians are not likely to forget that both France and Germany were the chief opponents of summit meetings and against compromise with Russia.  The greater accession of strength to both of them explains the concern in the Soviet bloc with the momentum of the political and economic integration in Western Europe.

(b)                 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance:  The strategy of the cold war induces and accelerates tendencies in one bloc in imitation of the other side.  The stress on economic integration in the Stalin era was to a great extent from the standpoint of benefit to the Soviet Union.  The reactivisation of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid in recent years has revealed serious difficulties in bringing about multilateral cooperation even when the economies in question are planned economies.  The troubles which exist are partly the legacies of the Stalin era in which serious disproportions were created due to the dogmatic application of Soviet economic experience in the bloc countries.  The integration is now based more on principles of economic persuasion rather than outright compulsion.  Soviet credits now flow to the bloc members and with increasing productivity in the bloc countries it is likely that in the future rational economic thinking on the CEMA side may achieve successes which may enhance the availability of consumer goods in the area.  This in turn may promote tendencies aimed at developing links with the other side in order to fulfil rising expectations of consumers in a more diversified manner.  On the other hand tensions may arise if the Russian bloc with its accumulated technical advances, now utilised more rationally, decides on employing devices of economic warfare against the West.

Paradoxically in the “Capitalist” West, the future of cold war polities may largely depend on the economic determinants, whereas on the Russian side irrespective of the Marxian ideology the problem of cold war politics seems to be essentially outside the boundaries of economics.

THE NEW AFRO-ASIAN STATES

Certain general characteristics are ascribed to the policies of most of the new states in their efforts to control their own destinies in a world in which they had hardly recovered their human dignity and self respect when they were confronted with the necessity of understanding the arbitrary acts of the two super powers which changed fundamentally the old conception of the International community:

1.                   The struggle between the two sides is viewed by these states as being essentially one of moves on a chess-board rather than a struggle between two systems of social organisation dedicated primarily to moral and ideological considerations.

2.                   The memory of colonial rule ensures that these states seek protection against the yoke of policies like racial discrimination which are the legacy of an imperialist era and seek initiative to pursue the policy of anti-colonialism with vigour and fortitude.

3.                   These states have sought to extend the scope of activity by the United Nations.  They have helped to evolve new ideas by which international action has been taken to help maintain world peace and to promote economic and technical assistance and scientific and cultural cooperation.

4.                   The new members of the international community have urged the importance and utility of the methods of negotiation in settling international issues.

5.                   Many of the new states have sought to avoid military alliances which they believe do not enhance but reduce real security.

6.                   They have welcomed economic and cultural cooperation with both USA and USSR.  An important assumption they have made is that neither of these powers has the objective of world conquest.  Although the USA and USSR have in their polemical exchanges accused each other of being Hitler’s heir, the new Afro-Asian states believe that even at their worst both of these powers are fundamentally different from the model of Nazi Germany.

7.                   While these states would like to conduct their diplomacy to win and retain the goodwill of both USA and USSR they have reacted sharply whenever any methods have been adopted to convert them to either bloc and reduce the possibilities of independent development.  They resist the idea that they are merely the stage for the enactment of the foreign policy of either Russia or the USA.

EFFECTS OF THE CONTEST

Aims of the Super Powers: Achievements of the Super Powers

Much of the writing on US-USSR relations in the early days of the Cold War was in terms of abstract generalisations and the role of ideology was dominant.  The appraisal of the East-West contest in current literature is based on a much more complete study of the complex inter-relationships which make up the facts of present-day politics.  The situation is sufficiently frightening but it seems to be recognised increasingly on both sides that it, is hardly legitimate to use standard types of generalisation.

The study of concrete cases helps to point out that the much-criticised policies were often the result of unintended effects of actions of those who thought their sources of information were infallible.

KOREA:  Political thinking on both sides seems to have been distorted and confused.  Great care is needed to sort out the facts and even then it is difficult to discover any simple outlines of political behaviour.  It is difficult to solve the puzzle as to which side can be said to have achieved its aim.  The points we can afford to make are that the Korean war was a turning point in American policy in Asia which in the post Korean period tended to abridge the content of “freedom and democracy” in policy formulation and extend the application of the rule of thumb of “anti-Communism.”  It had the effect of making the Chinese more xenophobiac.

INDO-CHINA:  The point here is simply that in the unsettled aftermath of Japanese surrender, extraneous reasons were used to justify an attempted return of colonialism.  We can spell  out a complicated account of moves and countermoves with conclusions which do not educate us on the merits of the rival policies as far as the vital interests of the Super powers are concerned.  A question may be asked in appraising the Laos question as it exists today, whether both Super powers can afford to sit back and relax their efforts. The USA’s attitude towards Souvanna Phouma seems to have been encouraged by myth rather than perception of reality.  Again the appraisal must weigh the evidence of the Chinese-Russian split.

BERLIN:   There is a strong tendency in the West to relapse into the habit of explaining every chess problem as being a repetition of the earlier one if there is the faintest resemblance, in some respect.  It is a mistake to suppose that foreign policy objectives change as a result of the activities of a particular statesman.  Nevertheless intelligent and well informed study may reveal that it is necessary to discard an earlier political scepticism.  A convincing argument has been put forward which assesses Khruschev’s objective as being that of securing a halt to West German rearmament and recognition of East Germany and rejecting evidence of aggressive expansionism on his part.  The revision of the existing situation is complicated enough but the search for a solution can be rendered easier if it is realised that it is unprofitable to hold the past performance of the other side against it.

CUBA:  An effort to fit the facts to the theory of “Russian world conquest” comes up against the difficulty that Russian help has not been one of a commitment to preserve the revolution at any cost.  The trends lend themselves more easily to an interpretation not far from “Nasser’s Egypt” and “Kassem’s Iraq” where also the dreadful role of international communism was over-portrayed.  It is, however, necessary to pursue an inquiry whether Russia is for security reasons genuinely interested in having a base on the American continent.

CONGO:  This is a startling instance of the dangers of using ideological clichés. The behaviour of all the dramatis personae: Lumumba, Kasavubu, the Belgians, Tshombe, the British, Roy Welensky, Gizenga, the Russians, the Czechs and Dag Hammarskjold, cannot be analysed in terms of either “Leninist-Stalinist” strategy or in terms of “Containment.”  Neither the USA nor the USSR has been able to play its favourite role, the former of the Crusader against Communism and the latter of the anti-Colonialist fighter.  There is no easy way out.  The view formulated by Hammarskjold of the role of the UN as being the upholder of the rights of the new states and deriving its strength mainly from them is very persuasive.  Fortunately the rather despairing experience has been followed by attempts which have achieved a fair measure of success and provided lessons of experience.  It seems fair to suggest that both Russia and USA sustained diplomatic defeats in the Congo which may have provided them with important educational experience, although in the process much human suffering was caused and the world organisation nearly came to an end.

STAGES FOR ENDING THE COLD WAR

What is the result of the policies pursued by the two sides?  The process of development and change in the post war world has been so rapid that false impressions about aims and methods have led both sides to self-deception as well as self-righteousness.

The experience of the encounter has provided an insight into the symmetry of fears.  Both USA and USSR are fearful of sudden changes.  The two super powers seem to be moving towards the diagnosis that short of a miracle neither of them can dominate the whole world and the highest miracle can now be achieved not by exporting their own personality masks to other countries but by providing examples of appropriate social, political and economic relationships.

The following measures have been advocated by those who have been concerned to urge the easing to tensions as the only way of safeguarding man’s right to live in the world:

1.                   Universality of UN Membership:  Those who take the view that at present Russian aggressiveness is largely the response to Chinese postures arrive at the conclusion that the admission of China to the United Nations would end her isolation and enable the Russians to surmount the tactical considerations which compel them to use Cold War methods.  One cannot of course suggest that decisions which might have assuaged Chinese aggressiveness if taken several years ago will if taken now lead to a changed foreign policy, which would reject the thesis of inevitability of war. 

2.                   The German problem:  The widespread concern in Russia and Eastern Europe about a reunified Germany need not be explained away as sheer propaganda. The results of any moves towards German reunification without any hope of its having a neutralised status like Austria would arouse the worst fears and suspicions of Russia and the other Slav East European countries.  The process of German Rearmament is being given great attention by the Communist governments who choose to regard West Germany as a country which is preparing to disturb the status quo with American connivance.

3.                   Disarmament:  Whenever the nations have talked about disarmament they have found that they have missed the main subject and got tied up in acrimonious debate.  The urgency of the present concern with the subject is mainly on account of the impact of Nuclear weapons on mankind’s imagination.  The fear that the diffusion of nuclear weapons is inevitable if nothing is done about control has created opportunities for political action which would have been unthinkable in a world where national sovereignty is still the supreme political fact.  The resumption of negotiations is an encouraging factor since the discontinuance of the arms race is not only necessary from the economic point of view but because of the admitted fact that the words invulnerable deterrent do not hide the impending suicide of mankind from war by accident or miscalculation.  The American and Russian position can roughly at present be identified with Arms Control and Complete Disarmament respectively, the former insisting on control and inspection and the latter protesting against the suspected motive of espionage.  It is difficult to summarise the literature dealing with the different possibilities of limitations of armaments, precautions against thermonuclear war, discontinuance of nuclear test explosions, creation of zones of limited armaments, and the general case for universal controlled disarmament.  The issue of disarmament so far as it affects the familiar Cold War activity may perhaps be formulated as requiring a judgement as to whether the present balance of terror is a stable position, or whether a negotiated agreement equating retaliatory forces but retaining the “invulnerable” deterrent can provide a better opportunity for taking steps to reduce tensions.  The third choice whose persuasiveness is being increasingly recognised is the aim of balanced, controlled but complete disarmament which is claimed to be realistic although the difficulties are formidable.  Its advocates urge that the working out of the international system with the participation of the Super powers as well as the non-aligned powers would strengthen “responsible behaviour” in world politics and isolate “adventurist” elements in both the power blocs and in the world as a whole.

4.                   A new Diplomacy:  It is by no means obvious that the Foreign offices in Moscow and Washington are not aware of arguments about the tragic quality of a world in which nuclear annihilation is an ever present possibility and in which the two strongest powers constantly inveigh against each other.  Excellent practical advice has been given to both of them by the so-called neutrals.  When advice is in the form of abstract principles it only excites the holy zeal of the super powers.  Of a different category has been the influence of contacts between statesmen initiated by the Indian Prime Minister.  There is no need to assume, however, that the execution of foreign policy at all levels in the case of a country like India has been aware of the advantages and disadvantages of a “new diplomacy.”  It is necessary to pursue this matter further and examine whether more profit could not have been obtained if devices like Summit meetings, Disarmament conferences, Peace Conferences, and Heads of Government meetings had been approached with the mentality of a genuine search for solutions rather than with a “holier or wiser than thou” attitude which has characterised not only the Super powers but also the non-aligned powers.  The age of miraculous cures is over.