RESHAPING INDIA’S AGENDA IN THE UN SYSTEM
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
By
M.L. Sondhi
Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Reprinted from ‘India Quarterly’, Vol. L111, Nos. 3&4
India is currently accomplishing a major programme of
economic liberalisation and is well on the way to becoming a
vibrant economy like several other growing and powerful
Asian economies which have all come into a new focus in the
post-Cold War World. The significant changes in the
international system that affect peace and security are in
tune with the political-diplomatic approach of India ever
since it became a member of the comity of nations after
achieving independence. When others were advocating the use
of coercive power, India was addressing international
problems in terms of consensual power.
The balance-of-power approach in
international relations did not prove of much avail to the
Soviet Union in the long run and is unlikely to help any
other major power which would like to dominate the
international system. There is little doubt that India
would have to contain the use of offensive power against her
interests, but it must not be deflected from a sustained
diplomatic effort for creating a more stable international
environment in both regional and global terms. It is
therefore, extremely important for Indian policy makers to
understand the significance of the broader United Nations
framework which had developed after 1989 in order to develop
Indian foreign policy in a comprehensive way. India’s role
in the UN system in the post-cold war era is too important
to leave to routine decision-making in South Block. The
existing approach requires conceptual review at the highest
level in the following respects:
First, India’s future agenda at the UN should move out of
the paranoia syndrome into which it entered as a result of
the US – Soviet antagonism which resulted in India having to
grapple with some proxy challenges chiefly because of its
closeness to Moscow’s positions. As a consequence of the
success of democratic forces all over the globe, there is no
significant threat to India’s core values. There may be a
residue of political prejudice against India among
individual cold-warriors who still survive, but on the whole
New Delhi is well positioned for a new international
political consensus for the world view which transcends bloc
interests.
Second, India’s new UN orientation would generate a greater
disposition to articulate humanitarian aims as a way of
circumventing crisis-generated instabilities. There is a
felt need for a decisive leadership on the part of India on
issues relating to the more intense forms of violence, like
for example genocide. There is no need for India to see
these problems through the attitudinal prisms of nations or
groups of nations which eulogise unabashed dictatorship and
totalitarianism and are controlled by powerful and rapacious
regimes. India does not have to adopt an accommodative
strategy towards regimes which violate pluralism and wish to
legitimise spirals of violence.
Thirdly, India’s agenda should shift from general
prescriptions for stabilisation of major power relations at
the various UN fora to a greater use of management
techniques to project its enlightened self-interest within
the entire UN system. A corrective emphasis is urgently
needed which would challenge the conventional wisdom of the
Cold War days under which India would automatically take a
non-aligned stance even where the measures suggested did not
enhance Indian “national interest”. Our policy options
should be developed in the light of new information on the
post-cold war world instead of blindly following official
briefs issued to the Indian delegation at the United Nations
decades earlier.
There is an urgent need for India’s UN
discourse to be henceforth embedded in positive concepts for
the maintenance of international peace and security through
which India’s democracy and internationalism will protect
itself against hegemonial and coercive policies. While
working actively against inequality and dependence, India
does not need to be apologetic about its geo-strategic
salience. Thus there is no need to accept a discourse which
would utilise the felt need to reinterpret the principle of
non-interference enshrined in Art. 2(7) of the Chapter as a
pretext to release destabilising forces in the general
international system or in any regional system. In
projecting its views on the changing role of the UN, there
should be no conceptual ambiguity of New Delhi’s part in
regard to national integration as a precondition for stable
peace and universal harmonization.
With the Cold War over, compatible views can
be shaped among nations of the world by allowing greater
scope for the application of the principles of international
law. In the new international setting, India has a special
advantage because its constitutional system is supportive of
an international legal order which would confront the threat
of terrorism, strengthen economic inter-dependence and deal
effectively with environmentally related problems. Although
in some areas of international law India may take a
sceptical view of traditional concepts and interpretations
and would deplore the slowness in accepting cross-cultural
influences. India has unique record in the Third World of
eschewing militarism and fundamentalism and upholding the
rule of the law. India has never avoided its
responsibilities under international law and it does not
threaten the interests of other countries by arbitrary
actions. When Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made his famous
speech on “international cooperation” in the UN General
Assembly’s Sixteenth Session in 1961, it was difficult to
achieve and sustain cooperative behaviour on account of the
antagonism and confrontation between the two blocs. Today,
however, India can help to create a set of general rules to
develop new roles that different bodies in the UN system can
play in facilitating cooperation and containing conflict.
It is desirable to broaden the Indian contribution to
international peacekeeping by creating purposeful strategies
which go beyond the concept of military security activities
as authorised under Chapter VII of the UN charter. There is
undoubtedly an increased range of choice for India as a
“humanitarian peacekeeper” consistent with a clear vision of
its future interests and role given the new dimensions of
conflict and cooperation. India should seize the
opportunity offered by the new phase into which
international relations have entered to develop policy
activism at the United Nations in the economic, security and
human rights realms and utilise the end of the bipolar
juxtaposition to realise for itself potential gains in the
area of conflict management. There are political and
economic uncertainties facing New Delhi in the new
multi-centric milieu, especially as India had become
over-dependent on the Marxist-globalist model of the Soviet
Union. The strengthening of Indian democracy and the
economic liberalisation programme are clearly positive
developments which are helping the strengthening of
relationships with the most dynamic players in the world
community.
There is, however, a school of thought in
the foreign policy community in India which believes that it
is luxury for the country to think of an active role at the
United Nations especially as indications are that it will be
problematic for India to obtain positive support for its
vital national interests within the UN framework. Those who
subscribe to this view advocate the use of other diplomatic
tools and instruments and use the UN diplomatic techniques
only in low risk areas. This pessimism about India’s role
in the UN is not grounded in any real view of the future and
is based on the fallacy that Indian negotiators do not have
much elbow room in international fora.
While India must exercise caution when
sensitive issues are brought up merely to embarrass it on
central issues of vital importance, New Delhi can create a
new basis for active participatory experience in the UN
system which will yield increasing returns, if it asserts
its interests regionally and internationally through
“non-appeasement” and at the same time enhances its
functionalism in international conflict management.
Five main changes appear to be needed in
order to achieve a “paradigm shift” in the Indian
prospective on the UN system in order to create a
cooperative network for economic, political, cultural and
social tasks:
First, India is now a major player in the global scenario,
and the Indian ethos is not burdened by the legacies of
Stalin, Mao, Hitler or of Japanese militarism, but is
naturally tuned into global citizenship in the best sense of
the term. Both the Indian free market and democracy are
dynamic forces which can help to harmonize state sovereignty
and interdependence in a sui generic manner.
India, therefore, has an indispensable role in setting the
pace for evolving global norms as a member of the UN and
more so if it becomes a permanent member of the Security
Council. Indian diplomacy at the UN should not hesitate in
institutionalising norms by a creative synthesis of
different civilizational and cultural points of view. Every
xenophobiac attitude will be counterproductive at this
juncture which is unfolding dynamics of change in line with
the Indian tradition of holistic thinking.
Second, India should give top priority to the pursuit of
stable peace in Asia, which includes South Asia, West Asia,
Southeast Asia and East Asia, and utilise its full potential
as an Asian power. The most marked political development of
the contemporary world is the rising position of Asia, and
India can play an adequate international role if Indian
diplomacy effectively projects itself as an Asian power.
The great Indian democratic experiment is especially
relevant to conflict and peacemaking in all multiethnic
societies. There is no need for any country to play the
role of world policeman, but the United Nations should deal
with ethnic tensions with the help of new concepts which
lead to consensual agreements by encouraging political and
cultural pluralism without undermining the territorial state
structure. Existing UN conflict-resolution procedures have
only led to subterranean struggles and the peace on the
surface has not lasted very long. India’s capacity to deal
effectively with ethnic violence and secessionist movements
has been demonstrated, and it is in a position to help the
United Nations to deal with many possible contingencies
especially through political change which promotes
management of ethnic conflict. India should help the UN
shift its agenda from just mechanically controlling ethnic
violence to long term processes and institutional capacity
on the lines of the constitutional approaches envisaged by
the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution. In the
past Indian diplomacy was inhibited in attacking
rationalisations of coercive and undemocratic policy like
the Brezhnev Doctrine, but today Indians should use their
diplomatic skills at the United Nations unhesitatingly to
identify and overcome all types of hegemonial
rationalisations which impede stable peace in Asia or
elsewhere in the world.
Third, India has so far not taken advantage of its
“development model” for promoting its diplomacy at the
United Nations. South Block and other Ministries which take
a leading part in India’s external economic relations have
so far been engaged in empirical thinking and have not come
together along with NGOs to develop a new doctrine or
conceptual framework which could take into account: (a)
India’s capacity to extend political democracy into the
sphere of economic democracy; (b) India’s progress despite
problems in linking economic progress and political
stability; and (c) The inadequacies of both communist and
capitalist economic thinking in the twentieth century and
India’s ideological orientation in favour of
demilitarisation and non-violence as pre-conditions for
economic development and human survival.
Indian expertise in industrial,
technological and financial sectors can be employed to open
up a vista for viewing the global economy as an integrated
system and orienting it towards new goals which are not
shackled by the dehumanizing mechanism which we have
inherited from the Cold War days. There is no going back on
the more “open economy” which India has begun to create; at
the same time India has the capacity to avoid social
disruption which centrally controlled economies are facing
elsewhere in the process of shifting their earlier economic
development strategies. There is some truth in the
statement that India is a tiger which has got out of the
cage but still imagines that it is inside and hence refusing
to be a first runner. India will soon begin to realise its
strength in negotiation of global agreements if it frees
itself from old dogmas.
Fourth, India has an opportunity to redefine
the nuclear issue at the UN by boldly asking the world body
to make a fundamental reassessment of the goals and
directions of all nuclear and near-nuclear powers. The fact
that India does not favour the NPT is no reason for thinking
that India is out in the cold. India has an admirable
record and this backed by political creativity should help
it to take advantage of the contradictions in the pious
declarations of the five nuclear weapon powers and their
failure to achieve real global nuclear arms control. It is
not only France and China which are likely to produce
chaotic situations for global security on account of the
power games they are playing; the other nuclear powers also
are not mentally prepared for either a nuclear-free phase of
the post-Cold War system, or for a multidimensional nuclear
world. India which played a leading role in the fifties in
making the world acutely aware of the threat of nuclear
annihilation should take the initiative in developing a new
forum for multilateral nuclear arms reduction talks which
should involve a conceptual departure from the whole NPT
philosophy which is quite outdated since it was developed in
the context of the US-Soviet confrontational parameters.
India could start with low key practical measures like
raising serious questions about Chinese nuclear testing and
Pyongyang’s nuclear threats and go on to bringing the
duplicity about nuclear weapons practiced by other nuclear
powers under UN scrutiny. An Indian blueprint for world
nuclear security is the need of the hour.
Fifth and finally, the reshaping of India’s
agenda in the UN system cannot be a mere bureaucratic
exercise, nor can it only be done by those timid minds which
are obsessed by the so-called insecurity and vulnerability
of India to external pressures. The parochialisation of
Indian foreign policy after 1962 was a desperate attempt to
shore up the control of those forces on the domestic scene
which had lost their momentum. In 1971, India revived its
interest in South Asia but failed in the follow up its
success in the emergence of Bangladesh by developing a
pan-Asian role. This was largely the result of the
“entangling alliance” with the Soviet Union which turned out
to be an “inchoate” Superpower badly encumbered by its
overextension. In the new situation India has some
difficult choices but also a remarkable opportunity to
achieve an optimum global posture. There is an opinion
growing among serious minded observers at the international
level that it is not so much the rise of China as the rise
of India which is the major secular trend for the future.
The challenges ahead are not uni-dimensional but
multi-dimensional. If the domestic and international
sources of Indian foreign policy are considered from the
perspectives together with important thematic issues like
“civilizational harmony”, “gender equality” and “non-violent
social change”, India alone is of relevance to a future
post-industrial world after the replacement of Western
(occidental) domination by a consensual global arrangement.
India must utilise its best minds, scholars, scientists,
business and political leaders and professionals in the
private sector and in government to design the new agenda
for the UN system. |