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IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
By
M.L. Sondhi
Decision-making
An eminent student of India’s foreign policy, after
reviewing Nehru’s role in the making of foreign policy, was
compelled to make the following remarks:
Decision-making is a cumulative process involving a
number of elements and a complex procedure. It is, of
course, difficult to delineate any fixed pattern of the
actual process, because much depends on such variable
factors as individual personalities and the nature of
the situation whose combined effect cannot be precisely
gauged. But in any proper assessment of the factors shaping
foreign policy, none of thee numerous elements can be
ignored. (A. Appadorai, emphasis added.)
The lack of clarity about the decision-making in the
Ministry of External Affairs may be attributed to the
general practice of looking for coherence in foreign policy
by fixing responsibility and authority over all operational
functions, in terms of a one-man show. The appointment of
the Pillai Committee will be justified if it recommends
drastic changes to overcome the defects arising from lack of
well-articulated methods and rational criteria for defining
the structure and relationship of decision-making.
A former Secretary of the Australian Department of External
Affairs (J.W. Burton), who has urged re-thinking on the
practical aspects of foreign office administration in terms
of “role theory” and decision-making models, makes the
following important statement which has relevance to the
matter of increasing the efficiency of our own foreign
office:
For purposes of international relations, the
decision-maker is a process; it is the final outcome of
interaction between a host of domestic influences and
interaction between these and foreign influences of all in
the environment of the State and of the international
structure. The behaviour of particular leaders is part
of a process, their decisions being a reflection of past
policies and future expectations. (emphases added).
If the full implications of the decision-making approach are
accepted the Indian organisation would require radical
modification at least in the following respects:
1. The geographical area and functional
divisions should be drastically altered to reflect the needs
of policy-making. The existing distribution of work where
for example one Under Secretary deals with all the countries
of East Europe does not evidently take into account the
far-reaching diversification under way in that part of the
world. At the levels of the Directors, the Joint
Secretaries, and the Deputy Secretaries, there is at present
overlapping and diffusion of responsibility, although
efforts have been made from time to time to introduce
streamlined procedures. The sharp focus on national units,
which is desirable, is lost, and at the higher echelons the
Foreign Secretary and the two Secretaries have to handle
responsibilities which are not related to programmes which
could be made operational. Criticism of the bureaucratic
apex would seem to be in line with the following judgement:
… organisations usually satisfy their needs for the
appearance of nationality with clearance procedures or some
other form of administrative due process without specifying
standards for appraising the substance or content of
policy. At worst such procedures produce discussions in
which no one reveals his reasons why. At best, these
procedures attack the issues on their merits, but may have
to do so without adequate or agreed-upon supporting data.
(Paul Y. Hammond)
Policy objectives do not appear to have influenced the
present geographical functional divisions at the
Headquarters which stem from the British network taken over
by us two decades ago. It is obviously necessary to push
through far-reaching reform.
The information flow into the Foreign Office from the
Missions abroad is organized in a way which is more than
likely to produce stereotyped thinking. Although public
evaluation has not been made of the reports sent by our
Missions, yet cumulatively the impression has grown that the
flow of information to the Foreign Office is
unsatisfactory. The monthly confidential report suggests
lack of sophistication in clarifying the issues which would
be suggested by the most elementary systemic analysis of
international affairs. One could with some justification
call these reports the mirror-images of the district level
reports which have been integral to our internal management
since the colonial period. It is also fair to conclude that
our “intelligence analysis” is hardly organised on a scale
which can make the policy-maker develop expertise in this
area and make the results available to the Foreign Office.
3.
The Government of India inherited a secretarial practice
based upon the sacredness of “precedents”. The
decision-making ability is considerably narrowed in an
environment where complicated policy manuals and a plethora
of “previous papers” provide the setting for those who have
to implement policy. An unfortunate aspect of this
mentality is the introduction of cumbersome procedures in
our Missions abroad, which face a quickly changing
environment and require rapid responses. The administrative
implications of effective foreign policy in a world of
change call for a final break with the conservatism of the
Indian Secretariat.
4. The importance of research for providing
adequate data to policy-makers has often been acknowledged
and yet the enhancement of knowledge available in the
Ministry has not been a central motivation. The
organisational arrangements of the Historical Division, the
Current Research Division now re-designated as the Policy
Planning and Review Division, and the Legal and Treaties
Division do not indicate that research plays as yet the role
which the recent advances in interdisciplinary studies would
lead one to expect.
Defence and Foreign Policy:
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet brings the
Defence Minister into close relationship with the
decision-making at Cabinet level on foreign affairs.
In the shaping of foreign policy under Jawaharlal Nehru, V.K.
Krishna Menon’s predominant role in India’s foreign policy
planning on international organisations led many observers
to expect that foreign policy and national security problems
were closely co-ordinated. The events of 1962 called for a
re-examination of the actual procedures for co-ordinating
Defence Ministry decisions and foreign policy
implementation. The involvement of the Defence Minister in
segments of foreign policy implementation was evidently an
inadequate answer to the fundamental political-strategical
questions facing the country.
The large-scale Chinese attack led to the creation of
the National Defence Council, but it was provided neither
with specific objectives nor with a supporting organisation
which could have led to the development of a body resembling
the National Security Council in the United States.
The Defence Minister does not have a functional
organisation under him comparable to the International
Security Affairs Office in the United States and evidently
the arrangements made for the fulfilment of foreign arms aid
and purchase programmes have not led to the emergence of
agencies which achieve defence participation in foreign
affairs.
The National Defence College in New Delhi gives senior
offers of the Defence Ministry, the three Services, and the
Ministry of External Affairs an opportunity to get
orientation on defence problems viewed in close relationship
with the political environment. The College does not
provide a source of defence and foreign policy analysis, and
plans are underway to get up an institute which could
conceivably provide research on political and defence
problems.
The UN and Conference Division provides assistance to
the Indian negotiators for disarmament. It has a working
relationship with the Defence Ministry representatives for
the complex problems which are facing India as a country
committed to international disarmament. It is also believed
to handle problems connected with foreign policy
implications of nuclear developments and maintains contact
with the Atomic Energy Department.
The Service Attaches in our Missions abroad function at
a technical level and do not have access to any policy
procedures in the Foreign Ministry. In specific operational
contexts the service attaches are not channels of
co-ordination between the three services and the ministry of
External Affairs.
The newly opened Policy Planning Cell has as one of its
objectives the strengthening of the Foreign Office-Defence
relationship. The results of this effort will mature only
after a lapse of time, but it is clear that the problem of
co-ordination on current policy still awaits a major
re-organisation of procedures to meet the demand for a
National Security Policy commensurate with the grave
challenges facing the country.
Foreign Affairs and Commercial Policies and Economic Policy:
India’s chronic export and foreign exchange problems
underline the importance of commercial diplomacy.
The Commerce Ministry has to rely upon the External Affairs
Ministry and the Commercial Secretaries in the Missions
abroad to access the impact of external developments on
India’s commercial interests. These officers are from the
Indian Foreign Service and seconded from the Commerce
Ministry. They operate on Commerce Ministry budgets but are
under the discipline and control of the Heads of Missions to
which they are attached, but report directly to the Commerce
Ministry.
The administrative rigidity and narrow basis on which the
commercial set-up has functioned has been brought to light
by the public criticism of India’s overseas commercial
activities.
The creation of the separate Ministry of Commerce and the
reorganisation brought about minister Manubhai Shah are
motivated by the objective of making India’s exports more
competitive. The State Trading Corporation focuses its
attention on the particular range of trade which can be
handled most effectively by the nationalized trading
channel.
The Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of
Finance provides the main organisational framework for
considering problems of foreign aid and investment
policies. The Ministry of External Affairs has recognized,
although belatedly, the importance of the economic
operations for Indian foreign policy by establishing an
Economic Division.
The quality of work in the commercial and economic spheres
has been the subject of considerable criticism. With all
the denials that foreign aid is with attached strings it is
evident from recent experience that the political factor is
predominant in all important economic transactions. The
External Affairs Ministry has to develop more activities in
economic and commercial expertise at the higher levels
although the need is acute and is likely to be aggravated in
the future.
Information and Cultural Policies:
A basic problem which affects all aspects of Indian foreign
policy is: how can Indian approach to policy issues be
explained so as to influence public opinion abroad? Both in
Parliament and in the Press, at the time of the hostilities
with Pakistan the Government was criticized for neglecting
the publicity set-up and thereby undermining India’s vital
interests. The External Publicity Division in New Delhi and
the Information Officers in our Missions abroad must think
in broader terms that the diplomatic political side of the
Foreign Office. Bernard C. Cohen shows in Press and
Foreign Policy, that the inter-relationships are highly
complex and the mass media of public opinion require
specialised attention. The Information Service of India is
not rated high for its technical efficiency. News
transmission to Indian Missions abroad uses machinery and
methods which are far behind the latest technology. All
India Radio’s external broadcasting is hopelessly
inadequate.
On the cultural side the main responsibility devolves on the
Bureau of Language, Literature, and Arts and External
Relations Division of the Ministry of Education. Cultural
plans are drawn up on an inter-ministerial basis. The
Indian Council for Cultural Relations meets the requirements
of a formal organisation, but when considered in the context
of India’s potentialities for cultural activities, the whole
effort scarcely seems qualitatively appropriate or
quantitatively adequate.
A close relationship between cultural and information
activities has been fostered in countries like France and
the United States with results which are regarded as highly
satisfactory. In the case of India the broad scope for
utilising men of talent, in cultural diplomacy has been
ignored at home and abroad in a manner which appears truly
amazing to sympathetic observers of the Indian milieu.
Personnel
Recruitment:
The selection procedure for the IFS(A) through the UPSC
examination meets the requirements for fairness in
accordance with the norms of the Indian democracy. The
common orientation with the IAS seems however, to have been
carried to an excess. The provision of an International
Relations course and some incentive for taking Language
courses could strengthen the quality of every year intake.
The provision of lateral entry in most well-organised
Foreign Services testifies to the importance of providing
the foreign office organisation with expertise not available
by the minimum age entry. There is need to recruit at least
from the following:
-
Universities and higher institutes of learning
-
Business
-
Defence Services
The IFS(B), who are manning the subordinate posts and are
also eligible for a small proportion of higher posts, are
more conditioned by the norms of bureaucratic behaviour
which are not particularly relevant to foreign policy
needs. But it should be relatively easy to devise
procedures of recruitment by which the best qualified
subordinate officials would be obtained.
The IFS(A) have views on personnel reform,
some of which were recently aired by the Chief of Protocol.
These do not constitute in fact serious proposals for reform
although the ostensible purpose is to do away with the old
ICS orientation. The Chief of Protocol represents a point
of view which is shared elsewhere in the world and is
hostile to reform. To quote James L. McCamy, an expert on
the US Diplomatic Organisation: ation: ation:
“With the exception of a few who took the
broad view, Foreign Service Officers when threatened with
change thought first how change might damage the security of
the service. They found high principles to justify their
concern. Their group they said in public, maintained the
professional skill and, equally necessary, the professional
attitude towards work abroad. Its members were the only men
in government service who were specialists in foreign
relations and willing to work wherever needed no matter how
unpleasant. They talked among themselves of threats to
their chance of promotion if new numbers were admitted.”
The tendency to deny status as Foreign
Service Officers to specialists is clearly the result of the
Praetorian notions held by the career foreign service
officers.
Training Programme:
The archaic notions of the Western diplomat have
arrived in some of the newly independent countries at a time
when there is growing emphasis on the specialist-functional
role of the diplomat in the West and a playing down of the
sartorial and gastronomic aspects. The practice of sending
IFS probationers to Oxford and Cambridge was a major retreat
from the programme providing an Indian orientation to the
bureaucracy. It is these officers with minimum training in
the specialized aspects of international affairs themselves
who rationalize in favour of a training programme devoid of
intellectually stimulating content under the guise of the
noble purpose of providing the new entrants with well
rounded personalities. To augment the intellectual
resources of the Ministry of External Affairs, the training
programme at the Indian School of International Studies
should be run on the basis of a Foreign Service Institute
with an interdisciplinary emphasis. Intellectually capable
officers of the External Affairs and other Ministries should
be associated on a whole time basis with Indian academic
specialists in foreign affairs. The language requirements
should be stepped up considerably. Training policy should
aim at radically improving the intellectual background of
the service rather than at preserving its present political
service – district official orientation.
Non-service Ambassadors:
Politically appointed Ambassadors are
inevitable if the sphere of foreign affairs is not to be
isolated from the mainstream of Indian politics. Much of
the criticism of this system seems to have been wide of the
mark. The practice of rewarding persons regardless of their
talents with ambassadorial positions must be condemned, but
there is nothing to suggest that rich talent from public
life would be in any way inferior to that it found at the
senior levels of the career foreign service.
POLITICAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIPS:
Jawaharlal Nehru was Foreign Minister of
Free India, continuously from 1947 to 1964. This
combination of the role of Foreign Minister with that of
Prime Minister had far-reaching effects on the organisation
and procedures for implementation of foreign policy. The
issues which confronted Nehru influenced the administration
of foreign affairs in the following manner:
Organisational and Managerial Roles:
The justification for the immediate
expansion of the External Affairs Ministry and the Missions
abroad after India became free, was expressed in terms of
the requirements of an independent foreign policy and our
contribution to world peace. There is room for argument
whether the purposes of the Foreign Office organisation were
adequately expressed in the programme of the chief political
executive which was characterised by a telescopic vision.
The chief criticism in contemporary discussion is that the
Foreign Office organisation is well equipped with its
experience under Nehru to provide the technology for aiding
summit diplomacy but does not provide evidence of holding
its own in providing guidelines for political strategies
which can comprehend the minutes of foreign affairs,
particularly crisis situations where quick responses are
required.
Co-ordination:
In response to considerations of rapid
economic and social progress, the Chief Political Executive
had developed in his own person a remarkable policy
consensus which embraced economic, social, political, and
defence interests. This was perhaps inevitable in the
context of the political demands of consolidating a new
state. The functioning of the Foreign Office was predicated
on the existence of maximum co-ordination at the Foreign
Minister’s level. It is not surprising to discover that
questions about co-ordination of say defence and foreign
policy were rarely raised with the objective of modifying
existing structure and process of the Ministry of External
Affairs and bureaucratic isolation from defence matters has
been the rule generally.
Policy-making:
The importance of the ability and
orientation of the Chief Executive and national pride in his
achievements necessarily reduced to the very minimum
competition in ideas. The literature of public
administration is eloquent on the importance of continuous
internal interrogation of all politics. Even external
criticism should be welcomed if it enhances objectivity of
the organisation. In the absence of internal and external
criticism a conventional wisdom comes into being which
creates impediments in the way of appraisal of long-term
changes and the initiation of corrective action. The
Foreign Office has been criticized for its lack of
policy-planning, but it is clear that it is institutional
lacunae rather than individual aberrations that require to
be mitigated. Special machinery for perspective planning is
required rather than the creation of a new unit sharing
management with other routine work-units.
The Political Element:
The Foreign office has been more isolated
from the mainstream of Indian politics than any of the other
Ministries. The following statement by an American student
of Indian political development (Wayne Wilcox) illustrates
the point:
“One of the perverse effects of Nehru’s
great stature was that he held the confidence of both a
rapidly changing political system and ultra stable
administrative machinery. This had the effect of separating
felt needs from abstract planning, and produced a minimum
social input in Indian development. Representative
institutions were mirroring their constituencies which were
rural, ignorant of English, unevenly schooled, and hungry.
Bureaucratic institutions were mirroring their elitist
backgrounds inherited from the colonial urban setting.”
Even a close study of the workings of the
External Affairs Ministry by Parliament was handicapped by
the inevitable reluctance of parliamentary sentiment to
bring the Prime Minister’s own department under searching
examination. The shortcomings of the Foreign Office
organisation cannot be blamed on the model of the British
Foreign Office for if the activities of the latter are
studied carefully they reveal a remarkable ability to cater
to political requirements interpreted in terms of the
motivations of the party in power and the political
opposition. The Indian Constitution provides for the
healthy interaction of politics and bureaucratic
administration. Under Nehru legislative action on foreign
affairs was neither comprehensive nor challenging, and
executive action was dominated not only in formulating
concrete issues but also in formulating general statements
of goals and values. The Cabinet’s direction of foreign
policy is related to the extent on which foreign policy
agency is able to provide a symbiosis of technical and
political objectives. The office of the Secretary-General
when it was in existence could have been used to examine the
political considerations of technical problems and choices,
but the prescription that this post should be filled by a
senior ICS officer and not by a politician assumed that the
sole motive was accentuate the bureaucratic credo and
confine the “social input” into foreign affairs to that
provided by the integrating role of the Prime Minister cum
Foreign Minister.
In order to evolve a scheme which will
enable the development of an organisation to render the
implementation of foreign policy more effective, I suggest
the following issues for discussion:
1.
Does the present administrative setting of the External
Affairs Ministry provide effective and dynamic leadership at
the higher echelons?
2.
Is area and functional distribution of work calculated to
promote efficient assessment of global and regional
challenges facing India? Does it facilitate foreign policy
response to changing situations? What changes are necessary
to assure successful adaptation of India’s foreign policy to
the needs of the future?
3.
Does the present organisation promote effective diplomacy
through coordination of various activities, e.g. Political,
Economic, Commercial, Information, Cultural, Legal etc.?
4.
What means are provided for co-ordinating political and
military policies? What changes are desirable in view of
the growing threat to Indian national security?
5.
What opportunities exist in the Foreign Office for Research?
Are facilities adequate?
6.
Is the personnel policy geared to the efficient
implementation of India’s foreign policy? Recruitment?
Training? In-service training? Selection for posts?
Promotions? Retirement? Removal?
7.
How does the performance of Service and politically appointed
ambassadors compare? How can government assure that the
most talented and qualified people available in the country
are appointed ambassadors?
8.
Should the External Affairs Ministry utilize outside talent
in the implementation of foreign policy? What is the scope
for agencies and institutions outside government to
co-operate in the implementation of foreign policy?
9.
Do new trends in international affairs suggest the need for
changes in the “elitist” orientation of the foreign office? |
