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Pakistan: Need for a Perspective
By
M.L. Sondhi
Shakti International Review, 1986
There are many who think that India is pursuing a
will-o’-the-wisp in assuming that there are favourable
circumstances for peace diplomacy towards Pakistan. There
are three courses open to the Rajiv Government: India can
place the onus on Pakistan for failure to consolidate the
peace after the Simla Agreement and direct national security
planners to safeguard our vital interests against an enemy
whose national and religious passions militate against a
secure peace. The starting point of this approach would be
to take all realistic measures against Pakistani nuclear
blackmail and to rule out all talk about a new era of
negotiation. India should stand firmly on the soil of
reality and deploy various instruments of statecraft and
coercive action to prevent Pakistan achieving a nuclear
status, Or, India can attempt to concentrate its efforts on
measures which can raise the cost to Islamabad of the
ill-conceived efforts to pursue political vendetta and
revanchism against India, particularly its malicious support
to “Khalistan” irredentist forces. To pursue this approach
New Delhi could engage in a full-fledged confrontationist
role or at least wait and watch hopefully while the
long-term crisis of the Pakistani political system unfolds.
Or, finally New Delhi can make a contribution to regional
détente by avoiding exaggerated polemics but at the same
time developing a more profound knowledge of the factors
leading to tensions, conflict, ethnic violence and arms
races in the sub continent. In this approach, India can
pursue vigorous criticism of Pakistani militarism and
revanchism without raising obstacles to a realistic kind of
cooperation. While fully protecting Indian national
security, India would make a constructive contribution to
economic, cultural and political dialogue on a bilateral
plane with Pakistan and on a multilateral basis with all the
SAARC countries.
The paradox in Indian thinking on Pakistan
consists in the fact that it is precisely our strategic
relationship with the Soviet Union, which although it makes
any Pakistani adventures against India fraught with great
risk, comes nowhere near dealing with the roots of
Indo-Pakistan tensions. In retrospect we can see that the
Tashkent settlement did not provide a propitious regional
environment as a superpower enforced termination of conflict
does not always lead to a stable peace. On the other hand
the Indus-waters Treaty signed at Karachi by Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru and Field Marshal Ayub Khan on 19th
September, 1960 is an excellent example of an alternative
way to alleviate situations of tension and to effectively
safeguard peace and cooperation. India should maintain the
military means to punish Pakistan if it acts dangerously or
imprudently against our country. But launching
psychological warfare against Pakistan on each and every
issue does not provide real answers to our security needs.
If we do not slow down the arms race between India and
Pakistan we will invite even greater Super Power competition
in the subcontinent and lead ourselves ultimately to a fatal
impasse. An over-concern with worst case assumptions can
never produce the conditions for reciprocal security. Also
at issue is whether Indian policy makers have adequately
understood the conditioning factors in the domestic
environment of Pakistan and taken a close look at the
factions, pressure groups and interest groups in the
Pakistani militarised political system. If India can
conduct a more serious strategic discussion with Islamabad,
New Delhi will gain a more intimate knowledge of the
leadership dilemmas in Pakistan. India could convince
important groups in Pakistan of the risks of becoming
embroiled in war by allowing its territory to be used to
prepare terrorist acts or other forms of violence. The
geo-political role of Pakistan in the context of the Soviet
expeditionary forces in Afghanistan calls for an imaginative
response from India with the ultimate objective of
decoupling US and Soviet security from the subcontinent.
While not underestimating the forces of revanchism and
militarism in Pakistan, India has to aim at a comprehensive
peace settlement which ensures a Soviet pullback of their
troops and the return of the Afghan refugees from Pakistan
to live again peacefully under a non-aligned and independent
Afghan government. It would be extremely short-sighted on
the part of India to give a freer hand to Soviet hardliners
in the hope of teaching a lesson to Pakistan. The present
timing appears to be right to build on the desires of the
Soviets, Americans, Pakistanis and Afghans to structure and
carry out a NAM-cum-UN initiative for a peaceful resolution
of the Afghan imbroglio. Fortunately India has enough elbow
room from both the Super Powers, which Pakistan has not, to
modify Soviet and American perceptions of their
self-interest in a regional context. To start with India
should be more forthcoming with relief assistance to Afghan
refugees in Pakistan thus recognising a common humanitarian
responsibility in the subcontinent. India could also work
actively for a stand-still on the use of force by Soviet
troops and the Afghan Mujahideen and utilise our experience
in Sri Lanka to harmonise the rigid positions of the two
antagonists. There is no contradiction in acknowledging the
special relationship between New Delhi and Moscow and at the
same time articulating criticism of the Soviet role in
Afghanistan.
It is to be expected that the peace
diplomacy by India will come up against some obstacles.
There cannot be a radical transformation of the situation
overnight. In the light of the havoc wrought by the
Iraq-Iran war, special priority must be given in Indian
policy-making to the political costs of an Indo-Pakistan war
resulting from confrontationist policies. There are
systemic and technical considerations which weigh decisively
against a lightning six day war between India and Pakistan.
By their fratricidal war, both Iran and Iraq have played
into the hands of the super powers. The failure to secure a
meaningful end to war cannot achieve any political results
even if one side has demonstrated effectively superior
war-fighting capability. In spelling out the perspectives
of our Pakistan policy, Indian decision-makers must
recognise the fact that Pakistan has become progressively
disenchanted with American ability to protect its interests.
It would be, therefore, a complete mistake on the part of
India to refuse to initiate a discussion of substantive
strategic questions on the ground that Pakistan is tied to
the apron strings of Washington. Although like the other
Super Power, the United States will not willing give up its
power position in any Third World country, the development
of a modus vivendi between India and Pakistan will
erode America’s role as the saviour of Pakistan. If
decision-makers in New Delhi and Islamabad realise that
neither of the Super Powers can offer political or military
panaceas to sub-continental problems, both must give up
maximalist claims and arguments, and start working on
confidence-building measures.
The summit session of SAARC was an
opportunity to demonstrate India’s political will and
resolution to attain good neighbourly relations. Even
though the Rajiv Government has inherited a confrontational
pattern with Pakistan, the onus is on India to actively seek
to reduce the level of uncertainty and instability in the
pattern of India’s policy vis-à-vis Islamabad. We must look
beyond the horizons of the 1980s and work for substantial
changes both in the regional and international environment.
Past experience suggests that we should maintain our defence
and deterrence capabilities against Pakistan. But it is
equally important that we should not over-estimate the
dangers with which Pakistan can threaten India. The pursuit
of regional détente with Pakistan should be a principal goal
of Indian foreign policy. India has enough political
strength to cope with Pakistani operations of a sub
rosa nature such as its help to the “Khalistani”
cause. By stabilising the framework of regional relations
and security through a regional détente India can work
towards a more general agreement on the renunciation of
force in South Asia. Constructive diplomatic and military
moves can only result from intensive and serious
negotiations. Unfortunately some members of the Indian
strategic community (and their counterparts in Pakistan) are
insisting on maintaining rigid maximalist positions and
thereby directing all analyses and arguments into the area
of worst-case assumptions. The only way out is to base our
political perceptions and assumptions on an orientation
towards political and strategic equilibrium, which in turn
can be translated through a broad range of treaty
commitments between India and Pakistan building further on
the basis of the Simla Pact. We need not close our eyes to
the differences in the political goals of India and Pakistan
but it is both prudent and realistic for India to regulate
its political and military relationship with Islamabad to
make it profitable and attractive for the latter to overcome
its narrow conceptions and to join India in a community of
thinking appropriate to the structure of world politics in
the next century. |
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