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LEARNING TO KNOW PAKISTAN
Theories, difficulties and models with ulterior motives
By
Vengarai
Shakti, September 1965
L.F.Rushbrook Williams,
The State of Pakistan, Faber and Faber, London, 1962.
A.G. Noorani, The Kashmir Question,
Manaktalas, Bombay, 1964.
Wayne Ayers Wilcox, India Pakistan
and the Rise of China, Walker and Company, New York,
1964.
Do we understand Pakistan? Judging from the
plethora of publications in recent times by experts and
observers apparently we do understand or we should
understand. But a casual glance through some of these books
leaves one more bewildered and they significantly fail to
provide any convincing answers to some of the problems
created by our neighbour. Since its inception Pakistan has
never failed to attract the attention of scholars in India
and abroad but none has really come out with a thorough
analysis of the Pakistani nation at work. Now we are still
faced with the problem of searching into the mysteries of
Pakistan.
Prof. Rushbrook Williams in his book on the
State of Pakistan devotes considerable attention to the
evolution of the state. He begins with a chapter on “Why
Pakistan emerged,” and ends the book with the chapter
interestingly titled “An end and a beginning.” By the time
he reaches the last chapter he is convinced that the basic
democracy is based upon the “practical experience as well as
upon a far-reaching trust in the common sense of the
citizens of Pakistan.” As if to justify what appears to us
as undemocratic dictatorship the professor states,
“Quaid-i-Azam would have approved of it, just as he would
surely have approved of the work of those men, headed by
President Ayub Khan, who saved the country which he founded
from destruction and regained touch with the ideals which
had originally inspired its creation.” The path that
Pakistan had traversed before arriving at this “stability”
is described with a touch of admiration in a series of
chapters some of which are interestingly titled as “fighting
for life,” tragedy in Kashmir,” “chasing a constitution.”
While providing the background which is rather quite well
known the learned professor’s conclusions are surprising.
Thus in a chapter entitled, “Parting of the ways,” which
contrasts largely the foreign policies of India and Pakistan
since independence, the professor writes, “Her (Pakistan’s)
attitude to communism is clear; she holds it to be a godless
philosophy which she cannot tolerate: she regards Communism
in its militant international form as an enemy… she remains
suspicious of their probable aspirations to world
domination, which she is determined to resist, whether these
aspirations are confined to cultural penetration or include
the employment of physical force.” Of course the professor
could not have foreseen the late developments. Yet it is
hard to understand that how within three years of his
sagacious conclusions were published, we find Pakistan
hobnobbing with Communist China so happily. On
Indo-Pakistan relations, the professor describes that
President Ayub Khan “is convinced of the fundamental
identity of interests between Pakistan and India over a wide
range of subjects” and claims that President Ayub Khan made
persistent efforts “to improve his relations with
Delhi.”(p.121.) Three pages later the professor writes that
inspite of Ayub’s well intentioned efforts “the result has
been to confirm the Pakistan Government in its conviction
that Indo-Pakistani relations can never be satisfactory….”
The reason of course is the Kashmir question, according to
the professor.
The book, The Kashmir Question as Mr.
Noorani himself says in his preface is neither a history of
Kashmir nor a definitive study of the question. Mr. Noorani
has studiously accumulated statements by Mr. Jinnah, Mr.
Nehru, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah other
leaders and has attempted to demonstrate how from a hard
position in the beginning Pakistan had moved to a reasonable
position in recent times. Ever since President Ayub Khan
came to power, claims the author, Pakistan had “made many
conciliatory gestures to India and proposed among other
things joint defence of the sub-continent.” This line, says
the author, has been consistently maintained. But the
difficulty of course was that we (India) “have been adopting
so far mainly a technical and legalistic point of view,”
says Mr. V.B. Karnik who has given a long introduction to
the book. The Indian view that Kashmir’s accession to
“India is final and irrevocable as there is in law no such
thing as a provisional accession” has failed to convince
most nations, says Mr. Karnik. “How do we then explain our
failure to win support amongst a large number of Asian and
African countries?” Running through the book one fails to
understand how the sweet reasonableness of President Ayub
Khan evaporated so soon and what factors had contributed to
Pakistan’s aggression in other parts. It is all entirely
due to our “hard line?”
Another recent book is by a well known
professor of Columbia University, Wayne A. Wilcox. The
title of his book (”India, Pakistan and the Rise of China,”)
is rather misleading since almost the whole book is an
indictment of India’s foreign policy. Not that there are no
references about Pakistan. There are. Thus he describes
how the idea of Pakistan arose and how it came “into
existence after the idea ceased to be ridiculed by Britisher
and Hindu alike.” It had early difficult days. But “the
miracle was that the state continued…” It had some
difficulties in evolving her foreign policy. But it solved
it through another “diplomatic miracle.” Writes Mr. Wilcox:
“Originally the Middle East defence organization was to have
been an Arab affair to fill the vacuum left by the departing
colonial authorities. But for many reasons, the focus of the
alliance was shifted to the non-Arab northern tier states of
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The South-east Asia Treaty
Organization, the projected pact which was to exclude
Communist China from further adventures in Southeast Asia,
similarly lost the adherence of India and Indonesia, the
most important powers in the region, and instead focused on
smaller states with dissimilar interests. Pakistan found
itself, for once, favoured by its geographic bifurcation.
West Pakistan fits into a Middle Eastern pattern while East
Pakistan was quite clearly in south East Asia. Karachi
commanded the Persian Gulf and Chittagong the Bay of
Bengal.” Mr. Wilcox explains Pakistan took advantage of
this factor and entered into alliance with United States.
The author earlier had blandly stated that “it is apparent
that India ceased to figure heavily in the world power
balance. The illusion remained for a time but inevitably
decayed.” Yet in the quotation given above SEATO’s weakness
is attributed to its losing adherence of India and
Indonesia, the most important powers in the region. In a
brief reference to the recent closer relations between
Pakistan and China, Mr. Wilcox is content to sum up the
opinions of President Ayub Khan. He states that President
Ayub Khan feels “that since India had ambitions to become a
great power in Asia, China had been forced to humble them.
He said that as any military man knew, the Chinese could not
support a full-scale invasion of India from their base in
Tibet, which was in any case, incomplete, and that from the
beginning theirs had been a limited action. American arms,
he contended, would not strengthen India against China even
if that were desirable, and therefore the arms would only
serve to dim hopes for a plebiscite in Kashmir and for
Pakistan’s security.” As mentioned earlier Mr. Wilcox is
extremely critical of Indian policy. His statements
sometimes are startling. Writing of the Chinese aggression
in 1962 and our attempts to secure military equipments from
abroad, Mr. Wilcox writes: “The hard fact remained, however,
that the Chinese had withdrawn, that there was room for
honest difference of opinion on the precise frontier between
India and China, and that the Indian forward policy may have
been the immediate cause of the Chinese campaign. To more
than one diplomatic observer, Chinese policy appeared to
have aimed at administering a dignified oriental slap in the
face, followed by unchallenged withdrawal.” We are unable
to decide whether to be amused or annoyed at such naïve
conclusions of the experts. |
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