INDIA’S KASHMIR DIPLOMACY
By
M.L. Sondhi
The Pioneer, November 12, 1997
The post-Cold War global environment requires more robust
postures in developing Indian oppositions than the
defensiveness of the Gujral Doctrine seems to allow. On the
Kashmir Issue so far we have had but a sterile semantic
exercise with Pakistan and have failed to achieve a
substantial breakthrough despite Mr. Gujaral’s amicable
gestures and cultivated use of Urdu poetry, and this has
generated a strong sense of disillusionment and frustration.
The considerable vacillation and confusion
in our policy could seriously imperil our interests in
Kashmir unless we strengthen certain key conceptual and
institutional aspects in our foreign policy and security
policy decision-making. A relatively coherent and
consensual policy framework exists thanks to the unanimous
endorsement by the Indian Parliament of a national policy on
Kashmir coupled with the Simla Agreement. A casual scrutiny
of the diplomatic situation with regard to (i) Britain (ii)
the USA and (iii) Iran would suggest that the Gujral
Doctrine provides little guidance for our immediate
interests and core values.
BRITAIN: There are significant structural
differences between Britain’s last Conservative government’s
pursuit of foreign policy, especially with regard to Kashmir
in relation to India and Pakistan, and Labour’s present
agenda, intentions and motivations with regard to the
subcontinent. Conservative Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd’s
statement pointed towards a reasonable avenue which could be
travelled by India and Pakistan for developing new and
promising courses of action for solving Indo-Pakistan
conflicts without any external sponsorship. The Labour
leadership which includes Prime Minister Tony Blair, Foreign
Minister Robin Cook and the Minister of State at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, Derek Fatchett, are not merely
guilty of periodic lapses in diplomatic protocol, but are
pursuing a well thought out policy which amounts to a
gradual erosion of the Conservative government’s strategy.
The Labour Party analysts may have persuaded themselves that
such a line would constrain the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism in Britain and the subcontinent,, but the
ingredients of the new Labour policy regrettably do not meet
India’s basic strategic requirements, and rather suggest a
number of potentially dangerous developments for New Delhi.
For the first time Britain is, in fact,
posing an international challenge to India’s continued
authority in Kashmir at the rhetorical level which if
allowed to pass unchallenged could intensify friction in the
Valley and negatively affect India’s military strategic
setting. It bears emphasis that these new theories
successively espoused by several Labour spokesmen, are not
only prejudiced in favour of Pakistan, but provide the thin
edge of the wedge with which to challenge Indian
sovereignty. If the Labour government should succeed in its
purpose, it would undermine effective deterrence against
terrorism within Kashmir and jeopardise long term security
and stability in India’s external dimension.
Whether this is a Machiavellian manoeuvre or
the result of muddled thinking is beside the point. The
Indian state is facing an unprecedented challenge. At a
time when Dr. Farooq Abdullah has had some success in using
the healing power of reconciliation, and the Indian security
forces have achieved a decisive edge in anti-terrorist
operations, the British Labour Government has initiated an
extensive campaign to morally damage the Indian position.
The seeds of this policy were sown at Labour’s annual
conference at Brighton, and though enough warnings were
relayed by several Indian correspondents based in Britain,
they were largely ignored by Indian policy makers, and those
seeds are now beginning to germinate. Taking their cue from
British Labour, several think tanks in the USA are also
engaged in intimidating New Delhi.
Instead of merely reaching fitfully to
instances of international pressure on the Kashmir issue, it
is high time that India brought together the entire gamut of
issues which bedevil Indo-British relations and initiate
discussions to resolve them at the very highest level. If
no redress is available, the extreme step of withdrawal from
the Commonwealth could be contemplated.
USA: None can any longer doubt that the
United States and India are seriously engaged in sorting out
a number of vexed issues in their relationship, and one can
see the glimmerings of a future strategic partnership
between these two great democracies in the comity of
nations. At the same time here is a wide conceptual divide
between New Delhi and Washington over two important issues.
First with respect to the politics and strategy of nuclear
weaponry, Washington has failed to show adequate
understanding of India’s needs vis-à-vis China and
Pakistan. If Washington has its way it will destabilise
Asian regional politics and entrench Chinese hegemonic
power. Second, the US has strong incentives for not
dispelling Indian fear and suspicions about an American
design for an independent Kashmir until India’s options and
responses are appraised in terms of a new paradigm by the
foreign policy establishment in Washington.
Many promoters of the independent Kashmir
idea in Washington naively assume that such a state will be
under “western” influence, and could be developed into a
kind of Asian Switzerland. The view has been advanced many
times since Adlai Steventions’s visit to the Valley in
Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah’s time. It is important for New
Delhi to highlight for such theorists the potential for an
Islamist independent Kashmir to turn into a rogue state
which will not only be a geo-strategic threat to India and
augment conflict and regional instability, but will be
fraught with incalculable risks for the USA as well. It
would not be too fanciful to imagine that even a
semi-independent Kashmir might turn into a haven for
terrorists of all hues, even of the nuclear-armed variety
with weapons stolen from the CIS. If New Delhi desires that
the Clinton Administration be encouraged to direct its
attention to areas of convergence of Indian and American
regional and global interests, it must reject the
independence option and the philosophy of ceding territory
for peace in a systematic and deliberate way. The wise
course for India does not lie in bringing Iran as a
strategic partner in Kashmir, which will only spur
Washington to adopt a high risk approach to the Kashmir
problem. Kashmir is not the cause but the result of what is
wrong in Indo-Pakistan relations. No less a person than
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan proffered this view in 1967 when I
visited him in Jalalabad. The US understandably desires to
promote a new political dynamic in South Asia, but it is up
to India to clarify that an independent Kashmir is
tangential if not inimical to US foreign policy objectives
in the altered political landscape.
IRAN: There is a school of thought in India
which believes that Iran can be used to help bridge the
divide between Kashmir and the rest of India, while reducing
Pakistan’s credibility as the protector of Islamic interest
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Teheran has also over
the last few years been playing on the theme of Asian unity
and has offered several formulae for stabilising the Asian
peace order through a trilateral combination between India,
Iran and China. In line with this new thinking, the Iranian
ambassador to India, Mr. Ali Raza Sheikh Attar recently
visited the Shia-dominated border town of Kargil where 18
persons died and 35 others were wounded in the recent
shelling from Pakistan. This unusual visit signalled
Teheran’s ambition to provide a constructive regionalist
approach. Even though the Iranian ambassador’s motives may
be entirely honourable and humanitarian, the thesis of
Iran’s or any other country’s role in Kashmir is flawed when
viewed from India’s political standpoint, as well as from
the perspective of regional military and strategic
considerations. A just and equitable settlement of the
Kashmir problem requires India to adopt a prudent and
intelligent diplomatic policy building on the Simla
foundation. Although we may view Iran as a cooperative
partner and take advantage of it in indirect diplomacy, we
have no alternative but to enforce a strict hands off policy
against any and every form of intrusive diplomacy at the
ground level.
All the three countries referred to, USA,
Britain and Iran, appear to taking free rides at India’s
expense and will continue to do so unless we bypass both the
parochial attitude of Pakistan and the patronage of others.
This cannot be achieved through the current approach of
‘small steps’ for confidence building, which is more likely
to lead to our being caught in the appropriately-termed
‘Munich Syndrome’ which recalls the inability of both
President Benes of pre-World War II Czechoslovakia, and of
Chamberlain as representative of the Western powers to cope
with the demands of Hitler. To escape from the cul-de-sac
in which we find ourselves would require a historical cum
philosophical re-evaluation of events since 1947, and a
break from the stereotyped approaches which have governed
our policy-making in the Cold War period. I suggest that
the following merits our close attention.
We should let it be known internationally
that we are willing to find a modus vivendi with Pakistan
but there has been a basic change/shift in Pakistani power
even if it still adopts aggressive and menacing postures.
US analysts have described Pakistan as a “failing state” and
serious geopolitical problems would arise should central
authority collapse in Islamabad.
New Delhi is under no obligation to provide
Islamabad with gains in the foreign policy sphere in order
to prevent a failure of the regime. The historical burden
and experience of Yugoslavia’s disintegration is well known
to the western powers, and it does not lie on them to impose
an even greater burden on India. Reconciliation with
Pakistan is on the cards so far as India is concerned but we
do not want to kindle hopes until a government comes up in
Islamabad which is genuinely dedicated to reform and
achieves humane solutions to her internal problems and
intra-ethnic warfare. |