TIME TO RESTRUCTURE INDIA’S CHINA POLICY
By
M.L. Sondhi
Tibetan Review, July 1991
Our future in the post-Cold War era will depend upon our
serious thinking about Tibet. Circumstances and events have
modified the bipolar world completely. If we continue to
think in a bipolar model we will drift into dangerous
situations. For a dynamic Indian future we need to develop
a positive framework concerning Tibet and the Himalayan
north, and that is provided by the concept of Tibetan swaraj
(self rule). We need to take an objective look at the 1951
framework which developed from the 17-Point Agreement and
culminated in the 1954 treaty. We also need to review the
thinking style of the Indian foreign policy community. This
thinking style is not suited to a changing world. In the
present transition stage of world politics we need a
thinking style which enables us to design ideas and actions
which should enable India to become the cornerstone of a
stable and peaceful world order.
Indians must express their profound grief and anxiety at the
increasing severity of Chinese repression against Tibetans
on the eve of the 40th anniversary of what
Chinese disinformation projects as the “peaceful liberation”
of Tibet. The provocative action of Peking in sending a
delegation headed by Li Tiyeng, the Communist Party
political bureau member and state councillor, to attend the
celebrations of its imperium over Tibet in Lhasa, the
renewed efforts to involve the quisling Ngabo Ngawang Jigme
in propaganda to turn the international attention away from
the catastrophe which China has caused to Tibet and the
aggressive and arrogant statement of Chinese Premier Li Peng,
dismissing the Dalai Lama’s diplomacy of peace and goodwill
as “raising hue and cry over Tibetan independence” are all
negative moves which come at a time when there is a
prevailing mood in the world for ensuring the independence
and integrity of all nations through international
co-operation. The unfortunate memory of 1962 had not been
forgotten by us in India and we cannot forget that the
Chinese military occupation of Tibet has given us a
neighbour who has adverse possession of our territory and
who harassed us when we were engaged in the task of peace
building. The summit level assurance of the Soviet Union
that it will resume the supply of military aircrafts and
other lethal equipment to China attracts our attention
because such an arms agreement reminds us of Soviet help to
Mao Tse-tung’s military expansionism of which India was a
victim.
In recent years although Peking has been proclaiming its
commitment to build a peaceful relationship with India, this
cannot be taken seriously by any competent analyst in India
unless the peace process focuses on Tibet. Conceptually the
main obstacle to a Chinese-Tibetan settlement lies in the
grave distortion in Chinese thinking which denies that Tibet
was a country which exercised its own sovereignty and
independence. To a great extent Britain and India are
responsible for encouraging China in its conceptual error
which could easily be corrected if these two governments put
the records straight by affirming the right of the Dalai
Lama’s government to re-establish an independent national
authority. The paralysis in taking decision on Tibet could
also be removed if the international community could take
steps to recognise the Tibetan identity on the basis of the
undisputed political independence of Tibetan kingdom going
back to the 7th century. India can also help to
shape constructive change in China by providing the
international community with opportunities to study harmful
effects of Chinese rule in Tibet and raise relevant
questions about Chinese occupation practices.
Of course such revelations are bound to damage Chinese self
esteem but this may be the only way to provide promising
opportunities to the Tibetans for developing leverage in
eventual negotiations between Tibet and China. The
compulsive political scenario adopted by Peking is based on
the explicit endorsement by the Chinese elite of the
so-called benefits of the Chinese rule on the Tibetans. The
establishment of a Radio Free Tibet on Indian soil can be a
catalyst to change attitudes and cause public debate inside
both Tibet and China.
Since the Dalai Lama is committed to peaceful negotiation
with China and is recognised as an international personality
who is committed to a moratorium on violence, the government
of India should not come in the way of his playing a leading
role in the peace process in regional and international
politics. The notion held in some official sections that
the right to asylum should not be transgressed by political
activities is quite preposterous when it is remembered that
the Dalai Lama’s political activities are grounded on a
total commitment to build a peaceful relationship with
China. It is therefore necessary for Indian officialdom to
change the lens of the spectacles it has been using during
the Cold War period on Tibet-China relations and not do
anything which would hinder the efforts of the Dalai Lama to
help evolution towards a positive future. There must be
ever closer co-operation between India and the Dalai Lama
for building democracy in tomorrow’s Free Tibet. If and
when the Chinese criticise us for interference in the
internal affairs of China, New Delhi should not hesitate to
provide an affirmative answer of its legitimate position on
the Tibetan question, i.e. the last voice in regard to Tibet
should be the voice of the people of Tibet and nobody else,
and the Chinese must learn that the Dalai Lama is
indispensable for peace and stability in Tibet. The sooner
the Chinese acknowledge this fact the sooner they will be
able to work for the establishment of a viable framework for
the peaceful settlement of the Tibetan question and the
Sino-Indian conflict.
Outstanding questions between India and China cannot be
solved without New Delhi living up to its responsibility for
peace in Tibet, the Roof of the World. Since December 1988,
we have tried to develop a political process for achieving a
settlement by ensuring a tranquil border. The trouble here
is that our bureaucrats have failed to develop adequate
concepts for understanding the complicated situation which
exists in China as its vision of socialist utopia recedes,
and they have discouraged serious debate among specialists
on just what is required to maintain India’s interests as
China tries to cope with the striking new realities in the
Chinese-Tibetan confrontation. Confidence building measures
and dealing at the level of local-military commanders don’t
fully exhaust what is at stake in a serious political move
towards the resolution of conflict between India and China.
Indian security is intertwined with the restoration of
swaraj in Tibet and India simply cannot revert to old
patterns of behaviour which resulted in the fiasco of 1962.
Any premature reduction of troops on the Sino-Indian border
by India or the appeasement of China by agreeing to ignore
the Tibetan dimension of the Sino-Indian conflict will only
hurt India’s long term interests. The Chinese of course
would like to promote discord between Indians and Tibetans
and create instability and insecurity for the whole of the
Himalayan region. The proponents of this line have placed
considerable attention on working out of compromises on the
basis of give-and-take although the harsh reality is that
India has scored no discernible success which would diminish
China’s hold on Indian territory.
It is a strange scenario of confidence building which is
designed by the Chinese to actually enhance fear and
suspicion in Tibet and which offers no commitment to explore
new and benign relationships between them and the Tibetans.
If we have to find a way out of this muddle the Sino-Indian
talks must be widened into Sino-Indian Tibetan discussions
designed to stabilise the strategic and political balance
between India and China. The central issues of the
political rights of the Tibetans must be brought into the
picture and the first and the most important conclusion must
be drawn from history that peace and confidence between
India and China can only be ensured by re-establishing the
Tibetan buffer where the people can exercise their sovereign
rights. It is hardly possible for India and China to build
a new and mutually acceptable relationship by interactions
between well-meaning local military commanders when the
central factor is the need to agree on the vision of an
alternative future for Tibet, through a comprehensive
scenario of innovative political steps. |