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PEACE AND DIPLOMACY BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA
By
M.L. Sondhi
Pacific Community, October 1976
Many political observers were taken by surprise by what
appeared to be a sudden move by India to send an ambassador
to Peking. An examination of the Indian and Chinese
pronouncements indicate a less strained relationship between
the two countries but there is no indication of any
significant advance on the formidable questions which led to
hostilities in 1962 and to a bellicose stalemate
thereafter. The new innovative spirit of Indian diplomacy
and its future course runs the risk of over-generalising
when it is seen as parallel with the “normalisation”
policies of other frozen situations like those in
Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. The first thing
to seize upon the possible diplomatic means of overcoming
the obstacles which have bedevilled Sino-Indian cooperation,
is that even in the situation of acute political frustration
following 1962, both India and China discovered a steady
mutual interest in maintaining diplomatic relations between
themselves. Elsewhere, when mutual relations between two
countries have deteriorated in order to dramatise their
disagreement, the rupture of diplomatic relations is used to
achieve mutual excommunication from the interdependence
envisaged by international society. The machinery for a
direct bilateral dialogue between the two Asian countries
was never dismantled although “trigger” mechanisms on the
Sino-Indian border went off on several occasions, like, for
example, in the 1967 episode when the Chinese in turn
suffered severe loss of human lives in a clash on the Nathu
La. All this adds up to the conclusion that the diplomatic
initiative of India is not so much the reestablishment of
normal relations, since formal diplomatic ties were never
ruptured; it is rather the beginning of an affirmative
relationship in place of “absent-mindedness” towards China
on the diplomatic plane which was created by a combination
of international and domestic pressures.
II
Several factors were of crucial importance in 1970-73 in
shaping inherent limitations on the selection of an optimum
China policy choice by New Delhi:
First, for historical, geographical and political reasons
there was a high degree of political consensus in India that
the country’s armed forces must maintain a high degree of
readiness and equipment all along the Himalayan border. The
debate on the adequacy of national security policy did not
look for hard evidence of the historical legacy of Manchu
Imperialism nor did it make more explicit the framework of
assumptions about what the Chinese side claimed was a
territorial dispute. Indian military planning focussed on a
force structure in the Himalayas which would eliminate the
possibility of embroilment in another 1962 type conflict, by
convincing the Chinese to take more seriously the readiness
of Indian forces to undertake an early and effective
response. Even at the risk of overemphasis India continued
to work for a local equilibrium of strength in the Himalayas
in the short run, while leaving the relationship of its
military planning and general security equilibrium in Asia
to more synoptic assessments of long-term policy planning.
Second, broadly speaking, India was interested in gaining a
clearer perception of the shift in United States diplomatic
and strategic thought as the Americans sought to gain
greater flexibility towards China. From the perspective of
India, a change in United States China policy was not
opposed to her own long-professed goal of acceptance of
Peking by the world community. Indian decision-makers were,
however, highly sensitive to any tacit compromise which
would serve to unite American and Chinese “hegemonial
interests” in Asia. A mood of cautious pragmatism dictated
that New Delhi should wait for the reorganising of
Sino-American relations, since its own bilateralism with
China would be affected by the evolution of Sino-American
relations on a global scale.
Third, an effective and meaningful policy towards China
called for further evaluation of the prima facie
evidence of an immensely complicated situation in East
Bengal. Would the Chinese make the grave mistake of getting
involved in Pakistan’s repressive measures against the
Bengali population of its eastern wing? Some Chinese
actions and statements constituted a foot in the door, but
Indian decision-makers questioned the likelihood of any
serious future intervention by Peking. The political
infeasibility of any massive measure by the Chinese was
conclusively established only when, despite promise of
“all-out support,” Peking gave not even cursory attention to
the maintenance of “territorial integrity” of Pakistan.
This was an important and hopeful change in the situation as
perceived from New Delhi. Any attempt to create a better
relationship between India and China would, however, have
proved abortive till the internal feuding in Pakistan was
resolved one way or the other. India was fully occupied in
gauging the true measure of the importance of the
developments of the Bangla “cause.” If this struggle came
to a favourable climax, it could lead to either an
augmentation or a decrease of the chances of actual conflict
with China. One may doubt whether there was a crying need
for the Indo-Soviet Treaty, but it can hardly be doubted
that it was propitious for encouraging a notably defensive
attitude on the part of China, and thus altered the
political situation to India’s advantage during the Bangla
crisis.
III
The question of a proper Indian posture towards China was
considered in a more realistic vein after the conclusion of
the Indo-Pakistan hostilities and the emergence of Bangla
Desh as an independent state. India was not prepared to
counterpose the Indo-Soviet relationship and a dialogue with
China as doctrinaire alternatives. There was no question of
returning to the euphoria of the “Bandung days” but the task
of innovation was to put Sino-Indian relations on a
bilateral basis in which differences were not glossed over
but would be looked at from the standpoint of availability
and choice of policy options. India thought too much was
being made of random reflections on the Indo-Soviet Treaty.
For the establishment of better relations between India and
China, it should be borne in mind that India’s national
capability in foreign affairs expressed in her political
support for non-alignment was not seriously disturbed by the
treaty relationship with the Soviet Union. The Indian
leaders asserted with increasing frequency in 1973 and 1974
that India was free to deal with China independently and was
not subject to outside dictation. The Chinese relationship
with Pakistan, however, produced profound repercussions in
inhibiting Chinese overtures towards India.
The implosion of a nuclear device by India on May 18, 1974,
had a highly destabilising effect on the bilateral
discussions between India and Pakistan. The same could not
be said about China, because by August the same year the
Indian Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, was not too
sceptical about the chances of a “response” by China to an
Indian initiative at the UN, however, the Chinese reverted
to an offensive against India. Speaking on September 25,
Chinese delegate Lin Fang condemned India in these words:
“The pursuance of a policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear
threat by any country in this region against other countries
and its annexation of a small neighbour cannot but evoke the
concern and anxiety of other countries in the Indian
Ocean.” Looking to the future he affirmed that such a
country “will eventually eat the bitter fruit of its own
making.” On balance, it would seems that India did not
expect any serious consequences from this bitter attack or
from the hostile statement that was issued on the question
of Sikkim by the Chinese Government: in which it was stated
it “absolutely does not recognise India’s illegal annexation
of Sikkim and firmly supports the people of Sikkim in their
just struggle for national independence and sovereignty
against Indian expansionists.”
In the mid-fifties, such a statement challenging the
validity of Sikkim’s closer association with India would
have been a traumatic experience for New Delhi and led to
deep anxieties about the increase of tension between the two
sides. An important strand in the strengthening of India’s
diplomatic “patience” has been the utilisation by New Delhi
of objectively constructive appraisals of China’s India
policy. The Indian press, for example, prominently
displayed an exploration of this issue by the Special Envoy
of the Head of Government of Afghanistan, Mr. Mohd. Naim
after his return from Peking. The members of the Afghan
delegation to China were firmly convinced that the Peking
leadership was seeking a lessening of tension between India
and China. The stabilising source of India’s expectation of
fruitful relations with Peking, inspite of the schizophrenia
manifest in Chinese public statements relevant to
Sino-Indian relations, was most probably an assurance of
rational rethinking of Chinese policies towards India
obtained from an East European country. Apart from being a
useful analysis of the objectives of Chinese foreign policy
towards India, which was helpful for a more explicit
diagnosis of the imponderables facing Indian policy-makers,
the East European initiative provided exploratory soundings
of the procedure for ending the “semi-isolation” between New
Delhi and Peking. That China was keen to avoid “diplomatic
paralysis” was indicated in an important speech by Mr. Chiao
Kuan-hua who did not revive the charge of “nuclear
blackmail” against India. New Delhi had still to read with
care every Chinese statement but it seemed to have become
propitious to do so within the framework of a “peace
diplomacy”.
The Sino-Indian dialogue at the ambassadorial level ended in
1961 when India withdrew its ambassador from Peking although
the Chinese retained an ambassador at New Delhi for some
more months. The presentation of his credentials by Mr. K.R.
Narayanan on July 25, 1976, to the Vice Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Mr. Wu
The, in Peking marks the beginning of a new period of
coexistence and an opportunity on the diplomatic level to
settle outstanding questions between the two countries. Six
years after the famous “smile” from Mao Tse-tung for the
Indian Charge d’Affaires at a May Day reception,
international politics and internal politics provide
contemporary observers with a flow of perceptual
interpretations about new situations to which sterile
conformism cannot provide adequate answers. Several
questions arise as India outlines the tasks for its
prospective diplomacy in Peking:
1.
Does the international climate encourage or inhibit a “peace
diplomacy” between New Delhi and Peking?
2.
What effects will the new phase in China’s internal affairs –
the creeping end of the Mao era – have on relations between
India and China?
3.
What should be India’s responses to Chinese communication and
political and ideological exposure keeping in view the
domestic political dividends of the Indian Emergency and the
concomitant “era of discipline” for the Indian body politic?
4.
Taking into account the developing position of China
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, what is India’s potential for
meaningful negotiations with China?
5.
Could decreased tension in the South Asian area make it less
susceptible to Chinese pressure and ultimately reduce
Chinese competitive ambitions?
IV
Indian policy-makers perceive the new international epoch as
one in which international compromises are practical
diplomatic tasks. Rejection of mutual dependence is no
longer a sustainable thesis in the international political
community. External security cannot be considered as an
argument for snapping all links with a potential adversary
power. On the contrary diplomatic steps have to be
deliberately designed in order to build confidence. The
problem facing India, therefore, is to functionally
interrelate the structures of cooperation and competition
with China. The current evidence is that there is no
intrinsic enmity between India and China in Southeast Asia
where the outcomes are not predictable in the post-Viet Nam
period. India has made special efforts to analyse the
potentialities of a developing situation in which there is
hope of a rapid decline of fear and suspicion between the
Indochinese states and the ASEAN group of countries.
Sino-Indian relations are not, therefore, limited to the
Himalayan context in which the conflict situation
developed. The political activities of the Chinese in the
Himalayan states will continue to produce a profound effect
on Sino-Indian relations. The position, however, is not one
of static stability, which should force India into a state
of artificial isolation vis-à-vis China. Both India and
China can contribute to the processes of adjustment in the
radically changed Asian situation after the American
withdrawal from Viet Nam. Both countries have their own
security dilemmas, but the international and Asian
situations invite the need for fresh evaluations and
judgements through the promotion of diplomatic dialogue.
The uniqueness of the power transition as the Mao era draws
to a close in China lies in the differentiated functions and
role perceptions of the different political groups in the
Communist Party of China and the People’s Liberation Army
who may assert their political-ideological influences either
in an integrated matrix or may allow their partisanship to
produce fatal weakness in the political and socio-cultural
heritage of Maoism. The Indian Ambassador in Peking will
have to watch these developments and formulate ideas about
China’s internal politics and in particular to give early
warning to New Delhi about the likely danger of any
collisions as a result of new military attitudes and fresh
strategic thinking of the winning political groups. Even if
abrupt and violent political change takes place in China,
Indian diplomacy would do well to think less in terms of the
political vulnerability of the new leaders in Peking and to
try to interpret the volatility and confusion of the
succession struggle in terms of deeper underlying processes
of the Chinese style of communism. What Indian
decision-makers need at this time is an objective picture of
the Chinese political and military framework as the
competing factions measure their strength with each other.
Diplomatic means and methods can serve the purpose of
improving communications between the two sides and
reasonable and realistic assessments can check the harmful
effects of emotional rhetoric.
A major change in India’s domestic environment will
certainly figure in China’s attitude towards India, both in
the context of diplomacy and ideological criticism. The
political reconstruction after the declaration of Emergency
in India in 1975 may have checked facile generalisations
about escalation of violent conflict within Indian society
and may have even produced an impression of Indian
impregnability. While the Chinese Communists may not see
tangible signs of the transformation of the class character
of the Indian state, they would not find it difficult to see
the parameters of a social policy which introduced a
mentality of discipline and sought to mobilise and
coordinate efforts in wide strata of Indian society. How
would the Chinese perceive the strife and disunity of the
Indian left? The question is difficult to answer
conclusively. A more realistic stance would provide Peking
with very good reasons to refrain from supporting so-called
Maoist groups in India. The Chinese should also be able to
recognise that if they strike an interim balance of
political forces in India, the pro-Soviet C.P.I. cannot be
identified as an “overwhelming” influence on Sino-Indian
problems. As a manifestation of national self-reliance, the
changes in India should make it that much easier for the
Chinese to exchange views with India, given their
contemporary emphasis on resistance to “Super Power” locus
and distribution of influence.
As long as China is alienated from the Soviet Union, India’s
political prognosis takes into account the stability of
Soviet deterrence during a possible Sino-Indian
crisis-situation. Delicate problems would arise, however,
if relations between China and the Soviet Union become
comparatively more stable in the post-Mao period. Indian
foreign policy, however, in general terms is based on the
rationale of gaining security through reduction of
international tensions. Thus India perceives evolutionary
options with both the Soviet Union and China. Indian
diplomacy has correctly avoided echoing the hypersensitive
and distorted language of Sino-Soviet polemics in its own
diplomatic intercourse. Indian diplomacy should attempt to
achieve greater flexibility in view of the ever-present
possibility of new turns in Sino-Soviet relations, but it is
quite apparent that New Delhi is doing its homework on the
subject in a way which will not jeopardise its long-term
credibility with Moscow.
The arithmetic of power in South Asia after the 1971 events
has encouraged the establishment of an equilibrium of
peace. Among the positive reasons for the moves towards the
creation of economic and political links in the South Asian
region one can point to the position and prestige of the
Shah of Iran, who has made constructive proposals regarding
multilateral relations among the Indian Ocean states and has
tenaciously supported a serious attempt at solving
outstanding problems between India and Pakistan. The
decreased tension in South Asia will put into motion forces
of stability and economic integration and reverse the
tendency towards exaggerated national claims. The Chinese
must reckon with the new prospects of understanding and
cooperation among the South Asian countries, and it is
likely that they will respond with less of tendentious
statements and more with proposals which are based on the
premise of a South Asian détente policy.
V
It is not possible to identify the prophylactic capabilities
of either India or China for coping with serious external
risks, without taking into account visible clues as well as
hidden interlocking relationships. The concrete steps India
may take in the future to avoid diplomatic confrontation
with China would require precise understanding of the extent
to which the policy environment of China is analogous to
that of India. The following schematic explanation conveys
in a very rough way the factors, in order of significance,
which on either side appear to control the options in
foreign policy:
India China
1. Territorial
integrity 1.
Military posture of the Soviet Union
2. Deterrence through the Indo- 2.
Strategic importance of India on
Soviet
Treaty
China’s southern flank
3. Prospects for Indian foreign policy 3. The
effectiveness of India’s political
in Third World/Non-aligned states.
and social model in the context of
the conflict of social systems
4. Changes in relationship between 4.
American interest in Sino-Indian
China and the Soviet Union
détente
5. Improvement of relations with other 5. The
threat of Soviet “hegemony” in
& regional powers in South Asia
Asia
The seriousness and steadiness of Indian diplomacy towards
China lies in its not seeking rapid augmentation of
political and economic contacts but in emphasising the
creative character of small steps. Where problems cannot be
solved immediately, India will work to move away from
ideological disputes to strengthening political procedures
of diplomacy. For establishing these procedures in response
to the new realities of India’s position in the
international polity, the following propositions seem to be
widely accepted:
1.
India sees manifold opportunities to improve its political
influence by having clear priorities in its diplomatic
efforts. Looking at power relations on the global and
regional scale and the accompanying military stalemate
diplomacy is a primary focus of national effort for the
Indian leadership, in the mid-seventies. India’s nuclear
potential together with the restructuring of the Indian
armed forces after 1962 has given India a self-assurance in
the military sphere. The political psyche of India finds
expression not in warlike behaviour but in finding new
avenues for negotiation. Indian Ambassador Narayanan
belongs to the generation of Indian diplomats who have a
sound grasp of the contingent historical circumstances of
Sino-Indian relations and also a sound appreciation of the
reality of social contradictions which have transformed the
social scene in the Third World. If and when China is
prepared for frank talks Indian self-identity and
self-confidence will be expressed in “accepting realities”
in Asia, but India’s conciliatory posture will not be at the
cost of ignoring the territorial and military dimension of
Sino-Indian relations.
2.
The changes that have taken place in Indian perceptions of
strategic interests compel a framework of a common policy
with neighbouring countries. India has good reason to see
the Middle East not as a “faraway area”. The new Indian
security policy is based on a subtle but clear widening of
outlook. It is no longer a case of sporadic recognition of
trouble spots outside the subcontinent. There is a
fundamental shift in national attitude towards Iran and the
Arab states and Indian policy-makers are engaged in an
intensive study of the underlying trends and likely future
developments in what is regarded as the manipulation of the
Indian Ocean powers from outside. Increasingly, New Delhi
is seeking concerted action with the Southeast Asian
countries to strengthen and extend economic and political as
well cultural relations. All these are central factors which
require integration of strategic, technological and economic
elements to create a broader view of foreign policy.
Although China is unlikely to become a major trading partner
of India in the foreseeable future, there are powerful
incentives for generating a positive thrust in Indian
policies in the context of interacting Indian and Chinese
social and political systems. It is clear that there is a
mutual concern about the nature of nuclear developments,
although it is too early to evaluate the Indian nuclear
commitment.
3.
In recent years Indo-Soviet cooperation in one form or the
other has been a source of uncertainty and anxiety to the
Chinese. Their suspicions of the relations between New
Delhi and Moscow extend to matters of defence and
international affairs. It is generally accepted that there
is a resilience in the Indo-Soviet relationship, and there
are at least three aspects which should be taken into
consideration: (a) The Indian Government perceives Soviet
assistance as a support for neutralising economic and
political pressures which would provide a powerful pull in
favour of private capital. In practical terms Soviet
cooperation is viewed as having strengthened economic
sovereignty and galvanised efforts to strengthen the Indian
State. (b) At a time when alternative sources of assistance
for industrial expansion could be tapped only at a serious
disadvantage, Soviet support for Indian industrialisation
marked a definite step forward. There is a common and
enduring interest in the strengthening of this relationship,
although as the Rupee-Rouble rate controversy shows, the
Indians find the Soviets adhering to a dogmatic approach
without studying objectively the specialised role of India
in the world economy. (c) In spite of its limitations, the
Soviet connection has had a significant impact on the Indian
public imagination. Although there are divergent opinions
on the “generosity” of Soviet help, there is general
agreement that a basic characteristic of economic assistance
by the Soviet Union to India is its dependability. The
Soviet Union may not have the capacity to satisfy Indian
demands, but when India has been faced with a genuine
difficulty and turned to Moscow, the Soviets have grappled
with difficult decisions.
It would not be unwise if the Chinese were to reverse their
tendency of drawing immoderate conclusions about the
character of Indo-Soviet relations. There is nothing to
suggest that Indo-Soviet friendship requires inflexible
hostility between India and China. It only obscures
important aspects of India’s foreign policy when Peking
gives extreme interpretations to the agreements reached
between New Delhi and Moscow.
4.
At one time it was widely assumed that the logic of China’s
ideological-strategic action would make peace-keeping in
Asia a difficult undertaking on account of Peking’s
disruptive behaviour. Understandably many in India had
reacted to the Chinese “menace” in Tibet, and that was the
starting point for any discussion of Sino-Indian relations.
It has now become necessary to elaborate on the social and
political phenomena in terms of the repercussions that can
be detected in the recent events in China. It is recognised
in New Delhi that Chinese self-assertiveness will be of a
very different quality as the Mao era recedes into history.
India is prepared to take measure of the efforts of the new
Chinese leadership in extending Chinese influence in Asia.
There are also vague hints that China is no longer adhering
to apocalyptic visions of liberation wars based on the
specific revolutionary experience of the Chinese Communist
Party. There are special problems associated with Chinese
help to Naga and Mizo elements in Northeast India, but New
Delhi is definitely prepared to examine in concrete detail
many of the questions that arise in connection with Chinese
sponsored “subversion.” The willingness and capability of
China to play a “responsible” role in Asian politics is also
an important part of the frame of reference of Indian
decision-makers. To understand the realities of change New
Delhi needs neither pervasive scepticism nor morbid
optimism.
5.
The frictions that arose between India and China are
connected with Chinese military planning after the
occupation of Tibet in 1950. A new dimension which adds to
Indian anxieties is the shifting of the nuclear testing
range from its earlier location at Lop Nor in Sinkiang to
Nagchu in Tibet. The international military environment
facing China in the seventies and eighties calls for closer
attention to the capabilities of the Soviet Union, the
United States and Japan, and by contrast from the Chinese
point of view India would be peripheral. This is not to
ignore the possibility that under certain conditions the
Chinese could indeed precipitate new conflicts in the
Himalayan region. The cognitive orientation of the Chinese
inevitably directs their attention to a pre-emptive attack
from the Soviet Union and therefore, Peking is preoccupied
with the inexorable requirements of the concept of
deterrence in the US-Soviet relations. Seeing it in the
short run the Chinese may well realise that India does not
add significantly to the complexity of their national
security problems. If India is not perceived as a strategic
threat, appropriate foreign policy postures by India will be
taken cautiously into account as “independent” initiatives
by Peking.
6. What had not been fully apprehended in 1971 was that from
India’s point of view Sino-United States “collusion” was not
free of mixed aspirations. New Delhi now appears to have
achieved a mature blend of the factors that tend towards
unity between Washington and Peking and the complications
that beset this relationship, and the contemporary judgement
is that whatever collusion exists is within tolerable
limits.
7.
Chinese statements regarding Soviet policies in the Third
World are a melange of logical arguments, critiques of
ideological innovations, and scattered strands of extraneous
norms. All this appears to be highly exaggerated in Indian
eyes, and New Delhi is in favour of a more lucid diagnosis.
India is not attracted by some of the “empty” universal
formulae through which China expresses its historico-political
analysis of “social imperialism.” By contrast Indo-Soviet
cooperation is embedded in a positive assessment of the
Soviet experience in the Third World.
VI
In most discussions about Sino-Indian relations an archaic
habit of thought seems to dominate, that is to think of
Indian foreign policy in a uni-dimensional manner. A
coherent effort to evaluate the chances for the success of
the new initiatives in diplomacy between India and China
demands an analysis of the adequacy of the adjustments made
by India to ensure viable foreign and defence policies.
Pragmatic considerations of international politics have also
to be related to the domestic policy concepts which are
ultimately endorsed by the Indian parliament.
Undoubtedly there was a debilitating effect
of the 1962 conflict with China. A decade later India had
already tackled a number of military and strategic problems,
and strict bilateralism became a prime guideline to an
internally consistent and coherent diplomacy. What can be
said with certainty is that, inspite of considerable
differences in motivations in signing the Indo-Soviet
Treaty, direct cooperation between New Delhi and Moscow has
matured with an identity of its own. It has nothing of the
monotonisation to which the Soviet-East European relations
bear testimony. As the recent Brezhnev-Indira Gandhi summit
showed both sides posses a diplomatic machinery with “a
built-in dialogue,” however inconsistent their ideological
views. Indian diplomacy has carefully avoided a love-hate
syndrome with the Soviet Union. The deep-seated frustration
that Sadat experienced in Egyptian-Soviet relations has not
much relevance to Indo-Soviet relations. A mono-causal
explanation which sees the improvement of Sino-Indian
relations as having a high potential for undermining
Indo-Soviet relationship would be lacking in both balance
and detail.
In the long run, the politico-military
features of Sino-Indian relations would determine the nature
of the balancing process between the two Asian giants.
Critical discussion of this larger question shows that a
change in emphasis in foreign policy achieves short-term
aims and offers better possibilities for progressive
negotiations which in turn provide reasonable suggestions
for a way out of a long-standing impasse.
A “peace diplomacy” does not mean that
disequilibrium cannot occur. Some controversy is bound to
loom large in Sino-Indian relations and the incompatibility
of Indian and Chinese views on the border are still
visible. There is no point in repeating the old arguments.
A new way of looking at problems has to be found in which
diametrically opposed formulations are avoided. This is not
the place to enter into a detailed discussion on the
disappearance of Tibet as a buffer between two dynamic
nationalisms. To make a rational computation of future
trends it is enough to remember the evolutionary process
through which so-called irrevocable developments have been
put aside by the achievement of a diplomatic breakthrough.
The Austrian problem in Central Europe was solved by
conference diplomacy which produced an agreement for
guaranteeing the country’s neutrality. It may prove useful
for the Chinese to see whether some amelioration and limited
changes in the policy of Sinification may convert Tibet from
a bridge-head of conflict to a symbol of hope of an enduring
and congenial relationship with India.
Clearly in the immediate phase Indian
diplomacy will not raise such long-standing questions; at
this stage it has initiated a movement and the onus is on
the new rulers of China to remove some of their ideological
stumbling blocks in the interest of a new peace order in
Asia.
Mainstream, December 30, 1989
Czechoslovakia 1989
From Husak to Havel
M.L. Sondhi
I was leaving for Oslo to attend the Nobel Peace Prize
Ceremony for His Holiness the Dalai Lama scheduled for
December 10, 1989, when I happened to meet Dr. Miloslav
Jezil, the thoughtful Ambassador of Czechoslovakia. His
response when I asked him for a visa to pay a short visit to
his country was positive. He also promised to inform Dr. M.
Krasa, the expert on India at the Oriental Institute, whom I
had known since the late fifties, when I was a diplomat in
Prague.
After participating in the stately Prize
Awarding Ceremony in Oslo and in the heart-warming
torchlight procession in which the citizens of Norway’s
capital voiced their emotional appeal on behalf of the
people of Tibet, I found myself in Prague after a short
transit through West Germany.
The sun rose in the east in a clear winter
sky as I drove in a Skoda car with an old Czech friend out
of the Hlavni Nadrazi (the Main Railway Station) into
Vaclavske Namesti (Wenceslas Square). I now saw with my own
eyes the Peaceful Revolution initiated by the Civic Forum.
On the roadside groups of young people were lighting candles
wherever on November 17, 1989 the Special Police Unit had
beaten up the peaceful student demonstration.
On Vaclavske Namesti and on Jungmannova
Namesti where the Obcanske Forum (Civic Forum) has its
coordination centre, we entered upon a remarkable scene with
hundreds of citizens standing around video-sets watching
special programmes on the radical and humane movement
supporting Vaclav Havel for the Czechoslovak Presidency and
seeking radical political and economic reform together with
an affirmation of human rights. In Havel – till yesterday
only known as a man of literature and a human rights
activist – Czechoslovakia has produced a leader who is
unequivocal on the question of strict adherence to truth and
non-violence.
Where is one to place Vaclav Havel and his
supporters in the Czechoslovak political developments? What
had changed since I was last in Prague shortly after the
Prague Spring of 1968 was stifled by the Brezhnev doctrine
in 1968? At that time the reform Communists, Alexander
Dubcek, Cernik, Zdenek Mlynar, Smrkovsky, Ota Sik, Radoslav
Selucky and others were singing praises of “socialism with a
humane face”, although the Bilak group by its behaviour in
the Cierna-nad-Tisou talks with the Soviet side had shown
that neo-Stalinism still had its following in the
Czechoslovak Party.
Characteristic of the changed mood in Prague
in 1989 is a widened intellectual horizon which can only be
described as a neo-Gandhism. The remodelling of the
political systems in East Europe along the humanistic values
of non-violence and ecology is no longer regarded as
utopian. The central value of this new political
consciousness is fully endorsed by the Obcanske Forum and by
the welcome extended to the Greenpeace Organisation which
was leading the campaign against both nuclear weapons and
nuclear energy in the very heart of the capital city. A
huge Greenpeace Wagon was parked in Vaclavske Namesti and
was conducting its high-powered publicity campaign for
post-materialist values.
Vaclav Havel’s weltanchauung can be
traced to a few value premises. The first is his human and
moral concern which transcends politics. When he took up
the defence of the non- conformist musicians he had stated
his viewpoint succinctly in these words: “It has nothing to
do with the struggle between two political groups. It is
much worse since it is an attack by the totalitarian system
on life itself and on essential human freedom and human
integrity.”
The second premise is that both Communist
and non-Communists authors have to come together to develop
the principles of equality and pluralism in order to
establish a regime of human rights. Havel alongwith other
cultural personalities like Pavel Kohout, Ludvik Vaculik,
Jiri Kolar, Josep Topol and others has helped to create
understanding, goodwill and friendship across a wide
ideological range in defence of humane values through
samizdat literature. The help given by the late George
Theiner, a Czech exile and editor of Index on Censorship
was crucial, since in his translations he combined
sensitivity and moral responsibility for which all dissident
writers are grateful to him today.
The third premise is expressed in the
Open Letter from Vaclav Havel which was published
in the mid-seventies, and which embodies his total support
to the principle of personal responsibility towards
History. This letter can be compared to some of the famous
letters of Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore, such as his letter
renouncing his knighthood at the time of Jallianwala Bagh.
Like many of Tagore’s political writings, Havel’s Open
Letter has already passed into the great Czech
literature of his epoch. |
