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FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF RAJIV’S BEIJING ODYSSY POLICY
ALTERNATIVES IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
By
M.L. Sondhi
1988
PART – I
Introduction
At the time of writing, there is a lot of speculation about
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s likely visit to China before
the end of 1988. It is difficult to say whether the visit,
at the instance of China, will take place or not. But if it
does, then it is going to be the first by an Indian prime
minister since Jawaharlal Nehru went to China in 1954.
We are aware, Rajiv Gandhi has accepted the Chinese
invitation “in principle” and China is “looking forward” to
the PM’s visit, which in particular is expected to upgrade
the vexed Sino-Indian border question from the official to
the political level. So far eight rounds of official level
border talks, held alternately in New Delhi and Beijing,
have not taken the two countries very far in coming to a
satisfactory solution. And there is no guarantee that a
break through on this can be reached if Rajiv Gandhi, or for
that matter, any future prime minister were to visit China.
It has been suggested by all the right-thinking people that
before making such an important, albeit risky visit, a lot
of home work needs to be done.
The Public Sentiment
A section of the Indian intelligentia and officials at South
Block are in favour of an early visit to China by Rajiv
Gandhi to resolve the border question and further improve
Sino-Indian relations. On the other hand, there are others
who prefer that India move cautiously while dealing with
China and hence would find a visit to China by Rajiv Gandhi
at this stage untimely. But the publics at large in India
and China, it seems, are not certain of what this
“Sino-Indian border dispute” is all about and the
implication of the talks taking place between the world’s
two most populated countries.
In the course of high-level meetings and in the press, both
sides have gone on record pledging to “take into
consideration” the wishes of the people of their respective
countries while resolving the border problem. With reference
to an early settlement of the Sino-Tibetan border dispute,
PTI on April 2, 1988, reporting from Beijing, quoted the
Chinese Communist Party leader, Mr. Zhao Ziyang, as having
told a visiting Communist Party of India (CPI) delegation
that ‘The history and present status, as well as the
national sentiments of the two peoples should be taken into
account and the question should be settled through mutual
understanding and accommodation and friendly consultation.”
The Indian regard for public opinion can be gauged from the
statements made by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The Times
of India on April 20, 1988, reported Rajiv Gandhi, speaking
on the complex border question, as having told the Lok Sabha,
“We need to keep in mind the national sentiments in both
countries while we talk of a long-term settlement”.
Let’s hope that so far as the settlement of the border
dispute between India and China is concerned, both sides
will remain true to their words of respecting the public
sentiment. Ironically, in china, there is no such thing as
public opinion. Everything is decided by the Communist
Party boses.
What
is the Sino-Indian Border all About?
Prior to Communist China’s invasion of Tibet in 1950, there
was no reference to any border problem between India and its
neighbours. India than had a common border with Tibet to
the north, known as the Indo-Tibetan border. The fact is
that the much talked-about Sino-Indian border came into
being only after Tibet was forcibly deprived of its buffer
status between India and China. But for the Chinese
occupation of Tibet, the Indo-Tibetan border for thousands
of years was considered one of the most peaceful and secure
borders in the world. Today, the once peaceful Indo-Tibetan
border is commonly referred to as the “disputed Sino-Indian
border”.
The McMahon Line
The McMohan Line which borders India and Tibet (now China)
to the east is supposedly the main bone of contention
between the two countries. It came into being as a result
of the 1914 tri-partite Conference held in Simla. India,
between the plenipotentiaries of British-India, Tibet and
China. Tibet was then an independent country with whose
plenipotentiaries China agreed to talk and do business.
However, today China maintains the McMahon Line signed
between India and Tibet, is “illegal” and a work of “foreign
imperialists”. In other words, it refuses to acknowledge
the then treaty-making powers of Tibet with other foreign
countries – a fact which makes China extremely
uncomfortable.
India, on the other hand, has straddled herself with an
anomalous position – sticking to the validity of the McMahon
Line while at the same time recognising Tibet as “a part of
China”.
The Border Problem
India faces China in Tibet on several fronts. The
Sino-Indian border, as it now known, can be divided into
three sectors:
1.
The Western Sector, i.e. Ladakh
2.
The Middle Sector, i.e. Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh
3.
The Eastern Sector, i.e. Arunachal Pradesh
On October 6, 1957 in the Western Sector of the Sino-Indian
border, China opened the Sinkiang-Tibet highway which runs
through the Indian territory of Aksai Chin. With this China
is in illegal occupation of 14,500 sq. miles of Indian
territory in Ladakh. The Chinese operation of this road has
great strategic value.
The Chinese intent in the Middle Sector, is however, limited
to 500 sq. Miles of the Indian territory. But what matters
to us here is the location of our holy pilgrimage places of
Kailash and Mansarovar in Tibet.
In the Eastern Sector, China lays claim to 33000 sq. miles
in Arunachal Pradesh. (This is a clever ploy on the part of
China to bargain against its occupation of Aksai Chin).
China bases its claim on the “illegality” of the McMahon
Line.
Keeping the above reality in view, there is no escaping the
fact that in the course of the border negotiations with
China, India is going to be at a disadvantage. Any loss of
face cannot be tolerated by the Indian people. A settlement
of the border issue is not likely to secure the safety of
India from the Chinese military position and missiles in
Tibet. There have been confirmed reports of Chinese
missiles in Tibet targeted at important cities of India and
the Soviet Union. (See Part II for a detailed account)
Settlement of the Border
To come to a settlement of this complex border problem, the
Indian intelligentia and officials at the South Block have
been suggesting a package deal whereby India would surrender
aksai Chin to China, in return for the latter’s recognition
of the McMahon Line. It may be recalled that Aksai Chin is
China’s lifeline in Tibet. Without this road, it would be
difficult for China to maintain her hold over Tibet. Aksai
Chin therefore is too precious for china to barter away
across the table. However, even if it does, China will
surely ask for some changes in her favour, such as, certain
strategic locations and areas in Arunachal Pradesh. From
the Indian side, this would be unacceptable.
To repeat eight rounds of border talks between India and
China since 1981 have so far not achieved anything
substantial. Each side has been trying to insist on its own
approach: India’s that of sector by sector, China’s that of
a package deal. The Indian contention is that the borders
have been well-defined by treaty and custom with McMahon
Line as the established boundary in the east.
The Chinese package deal as earlier announced by Deng
Xiaoping and recently elaborated by the Chinese
vice-Premier, Wu Xueqian to a visiting delegation of the
Press Trust of India to China, means the exchange of areas
on the basis of “mutual understanding and mutual
accommodation”. It indicates China is willing to give up
its claims in the east in return for what is held in the
Western Sector. The other point made by the Chinese
Vice-Premier was that the McMahon Line cannot be the basis
of negotiations i.e. a complete contradiction of the Indian
position. It must be noted that the phrase “mutual
understanding and mutual accommodation” are the usual
Chinese ways of suggesting that only territorial concessions
from India could lead to a solution of the boundary
question.
It is a matter of shame that in India there is no dearth of
publicity for the Chinese point of view on the border
issue. China’s positions are spelt out wittingly or
unwittingly by China lobbyists, and some opportunistic
journalists, who have spent a few days in China feted at the
latter’s expense. More recently, there has been a stream of
propaganda regarding China’s stand on the border, thanks to
statements by the delegations of the Congress (I) CPI(M),
CPI, the Forward Bloc, etc. on their return from Beijing.
Normalisation of the Border Question
Both India and China have been constantly voicing their
desire to live in peace and harmony. But mere recitation of
sweet-sounding words will not help. The Chinese military
build-up in Tibet is a source of great concern to the
stability and security of India. The process of
normalisation of relations between New Delhi and Beijing
must be seen in terms of the future peace and stability of
Asia and not as a measure for achieving short term gains
which will merely permit China to increase its bargaining
the price.
India must adopt a flexible attitude and carry on with the
promotion of Indo-Chinese relations. However, a
rapproachment with China does not mean a surrender on
matters which have a direct bearing on the country’s
long-term interests and security. It must be realised that
India has a lot to gain if Tibet were to be restored to its
earlier status of a buffer state. This done, the
Sino-Indian border problem will automatically cease to
exist.
Demilitarisation of Tibet – a Viable solution
Today’s India is not the India of ’62. We still have to
further gear up our defence preparedness. We cannot
surrender Aksai Chin or any of our territories to China.
The Parliament in 1962 had passed a strongly worded and
unanimous resolution to this effect. Also China must not be
given the liberty to enjoy the fruits of her aggression.
Giving up Aksai Chin to China, as sometimes suggested by a
few so-called policy analysists and strategists, would be
like compromising our position in the Siachen Glacier and
other similar situations in the neighbourhood. Likewise,
Aksai Chin can not be bartered against the McMahon Line –
one does not give away one’s left hand in preference to
one’s right. Instead, China must be made to realise that
its very existence in Tibet is based on India’s goodwill.
If a favourable long-term solution to the border problem
cannot be reached in the near future, there is no need for
India to rush matters. A solution to the border problem
alone cannot reduce the tension from the Chinese military
threat to Indian territories. Nor will a patchwork treaty
help India to reduce her expenditure on defence. The only
viable solution, as suggested by many experts, having
first-hand experience of our frontier regions and China’s
military strategy, is to support the demilitarisation of
Tibet. This must be seen in the light of the imminent
threat India faces from the Chinese armed forces in Tibet.
Demilitarisation of Tibet would not mean a total loss of
Chinese control over Tibet. It would mean withdrawal of
Chinese military forces leading to a corresponding
withdrawal of Indian forces to such a degree as to defuse
tension in the Indian Himalayas. In other words, China can
keep a limited number of its forces in Tibet to maintain its
control over their region, but not so much as to endanger
India. In the light of this, the Dalai Lama’s recent
proposal on the future status of Tibet, as spelt out to
members of the European Parliament at Strasbourg, France,
deserves India’s whole-hearted sympathy and support. In a
nutshell, the Dalai Lama’s declaration of Tibet as a Zone of
Peace and a demilitarised region is I the best interest of
India and its people.
The Indian Psyche and the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
The October 25, 1950 Radio Beijing announcement of Communist
China’s intention of “liberating Tibet” had caused great
concern and alarm to India and other peace-loving nations.
The government of India bearing in the mind its special
obligation and rights in Tibet, had advised the Beijing
government against its decision to forcefully invade Tibet.
Likewise, the people of India at large and the political
parties, both in and out of parliament, strongly condemned
the Chinese aggression. Though China was regarded as a
friend of India, Tibet had a special place in the hearts of
the people of India because of its ancient and intimate
relations with that country. This feeling is also shared by
the Tibetan people who look upon India as the land of Buddha
and the source of their now endangered civilisation and
culture.
The people of India cannot easily forget the 1962 Chinese
assault on India and that too at the height of the
“Hindi-Chini bhai, bhai” period. The lesson which India and
its people learnt was never to trust the Chinese smile.
This single incident was enough to hurt the Indian national
psyche beyond repair. Jawaharlal Nehru never recovered from
the shock, and India lost hr position of eminence in world
affairs. The aggression committed on India by China was a
glaring example of its flagrant violation of international
norms. Still large chunks of our territory are under the
illegal occupation of China.
Cartographical Aggression
The maps officially published by China do not make a secret
of its expansionist policy. They show large parts of India
and other neighbouring countries as belonging to China.
Even Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir are
separately marked off from India in these maps. Coupled
with this, China is spreading disinformation in the world
about India and allied subjects to get legitimacy for its
point of view.
Chinese Intrusion into Arunachal Pradesh
To make matters worse, China has been clandestinely
rendering both moral and practical support to most of the
insurgent and Naxalite groups in different parts of India,
especially in the north-east. A number of these have also
received their training in Tibet at the hand of Chinese
military officers. There is now a growing suspicion of
China’s involvement in the troubled state of Punjab and the
West Bengal district of Darjeeling. A large cache of AK-47
Chinese assault riffles and other Chinese – made arms and
ammunition have been unearthed from people involved in the
anti-national movements currently going in these places.
Concern about the terrorists use of AK-47 Chinese assault
riffles have been also expressed in parliament in the recent
past.
Learning from History
India evidently has a lot to learn from its past history and
misfortunes in dealing with China. From Maoism to present
day Dengism the Chinese policy of military and territorial
expansionism is unchanged. Therefore, the current Indian
move to placate China is bound to backfire. The people of
India obviously have a lot of reservations about China. But
the Indian government displays a lack of confidence in
facing the challenges variously posed by China, although it
is ready to hit out at Pakistan at the slightest
opportunity. This is a most unfortunate and unprincipled
stand – something akin to India’s open support to the cause
of the peoples of South Africa, Namibia and Palestine, but
indifference to the plight of the people of neighbouring
Tibet.
It needs no saying that inspite of some recent changes,
there has been a widening gap between the nation’s
sentiments and the government’s China policy vis-à-vis the
complex border issue. All the moves by the government and
its agents seem to be predominated by regional, factional
and personal factors. No democratic government can afford
to ignore the people, more so on an issue which requires an
all-out effort and complete national consensus and unity.
The time has come for parliamentarians and other
representatives of the people to judge the historical and
strategic importance as well as the present reality of the
border dispute between India and China (Tibet) so as to
safeguard India’s long-term national interests and security,
and also to ensure peace in the Asian continent.
PART – II
China’s Military Build-up a Threat to World Peace
China’s rapid militarization and nuclear weapons build-up to
catch up with the US-Soviet level is a dangerous trend which
threatens the balance of forces in the world. China is not
only feverishly modernising her military arsenal but also
exports these deadly weapons to Third World countries,
helping to destabilise the peace in these regions.
At present China’s armoured forces are among the world’s
largest in terms of the number of tanks, and have powerful
fire and attack capabilities. Though China reduced its
armed forces to 4.1 million personnel in 1984, it still
ranks second only to the USSR. The armoured forces were
equipped with 20 varieties of vehicles, including amphibious
tanks, light tanks, designed for operations in mountainous
areas, command tanks, armoured carriers, bridging tanks,
mine sweeping tanks, repair vehicles and self-propelled
anti-aircraft guns.
It also has self-propelled rocket launchers, anti-tank
vehicles, communication command vehicles, rescue and
traction vehicles, repair vehicles and tank carriers. To
modernise and build up their military forces, China bought
US military equipment worth $50s million in 1987.
Although the Chinese leaders repeatedly claim that their
nuclear industry today is almost completely involved in a
wide range of research and development projects for the
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Observers have no doubt
that China’s efforts are exclusively directed towards the
accomplishment of its military objectives. According to
Soviet experts, China ranks third among the nuclear powers
and its advanced missile force will have global strategic
significance, giving it the capability to respond to any
kind of nuclear strike.
Over the past three decades, China has conducted 34 nuclear
explosive tests. Testing procedures have utilised tower
devices, aircraft-drop, guided missiles and underground
facilities. Analysis of variously reported weapon-grade
nuclear material production and order of battle estimates
for missiles, aircraft and submarine launch platforms,
suggests that China would presently have an inventory of
about 1,245 fission and fusion weapons. These weapons can
be variously deployed by a series of launch platforms.
Warhead boosters include short range, medium range,
intermediate range and intercontinental range – limited,
full and extended, submarine launch – ballistic missile
system. Of particular interest are the newly operational
three stage CSS-5 extended range multiple independent
re-entry vehicle (MIRV), ICBM capable of reaching
Antarctica; the single stage, solid fuel, MIRV, Mod-CSS-2
IRBM and the liquid fuelled CSS-2/3 IRBM/ICBM systems, and
the CSS-N-3 two-stage solid fuel SLBM.
Arms Merchant
China is marching firmly ahead as the newest and the most
aggressive of the world’s arms merchants. In recent years,
Beijing has sold an array of weapons to Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, North Korea, Pakistan, Thailand and the
Afghan guerrillas. From 1984-1987 the Chinese wrote the
orders for an estimated $5.2 billion in arms sale to the
Third World. Now China has become the fourth largest
supplier of arms to the Third World.
In the Middle East, ballistic missiles such as the M-9 sold
by China are particularly destabilising weapons, easily
capable of being re-fitted to carry poisonous gas or, given
the technological know-how, nuclear warheads.
China also sells its version of the soviet-designed T-59,
the T-69, complete with an Israeli-supplied 105 mm gun.
China’s Silkworm missile shipment to Iran and sale of DF-3
missiles, which have a range of 2,700 kilometres, to Saudi
Arabia is too grave a matter to be ignored. China is also
selling CSS-2 class surface-to-surface missiles in their
most advanced form with a range of about 2200 miles to Saudi
Arabia.
Recently the US Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, has
criticised China for building and selling the same missiles
which Washington and Moscow have agreed to destroy. He
said, “There is an irony in that. Just as we are
eliminating nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in the range of
500 to 5000 km., the Chinese are producing exactly those
weapons”.
So great is the level of international concern over such
weapons that last year the Western powers and Japan agreed
to embargo sales of ballistic-missile technologies – an idea
the Soviet Union endorsed for the first time at the Moscow
summit in May.
Arms sales have proven a lucrative trade for China. The
proceeds from these sales have been a wind-fall for the
generals and admirals charged with modernising the PLA’s
huge arsenal. The profits of the arms sales are being used
to revamp their own arsenal and to create a mobile,
high-tech, professionally led force. But with each new
missile sale the Chinese make the world a riskier place.
Quest for Regional Power
China’s arms dealings also further its geopolitical
ambitions in a number of ways. The sales help to offset
Soviet and US influence in the Third World, especially in
the Middle East. China’s ultimate ambition is to become a
regional power and eventually a superpower. At a time when
US power seems to be ebbing, the Chinese are gearing
themselves up to fill whatever vacuum may occur in Asia.
China’s leaders remain convinced that a better army will
enable them to achieve regional pre-eminence. It may have
been a sign of things to come when China intruded into the
Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh last year and when
the Chinese navy sank three Vietnamese freighters and built
permanent installations in the disputed Spratly Archipelego
in the south China Sea last March.
Sino-Pak Axis
Sino-Pak military axis has been a serious concern to India.
Sino-Pak alliance goes back to 1963, when Pakistan and China
signed a border agreement, by means of which Islamabad
bartered away 2,100 square miles of illegally occupied
Indian territory in Kashmir.
The 640-km long all-weather Karakoram highway, connecting
China’s Sinkiang province with Gilgit, through the Kunjerab
Pass, is a product of Sino-Pak friendship. Since then
Chinese arms began to flow into Pakistan and later the two
countries decided on nuclear co-operation.
China’s own nuclear development owe much to Pakistan. Their
distrust of the Soviet Union make them natural allies. From
Pakistan china has received modern Soviet tanks, helicopters
and other hardware captured in Afghanistan. Western arms
traders in Beijing believe that Pakistan has also provided
the PLA with several of its air Force French-made Exocet
guided missiles which the Chinese engineers have been able
to copy. In addition, the Pakistan connection also give the
PLA access to Western technology.
Pakistan on the other hand is acquiring 150 Chinese built
F-7M fighter aircraft fitted with new Western-made engines
and American avionics. Moreover, considerable progress has
been made towards co-production of advanced trained aircraft
in collaboration with China. It is also to be noted with
grave concern that if China can sell its Silkworm missiles
to Iran and CSS-2 class surface-to-surface missiles to Saudi
Arabia, there is no reason why China cannot transfer these
missiles to Pakistan also.
Another important security concern to India is that Pakistan
has been building up her nuclear capability with the help of
the Chinese. According to US intelligence in 1984-1985,
China gave Pakistan its design of the nuclear warhead which
it had used in its fourth test and there were reasons to
suspect that the Chinese conducted one of the Pakistan
nuclear tests at their Lop Nor site.
Heobic Smith, in New York Times of March 6, 1988, wrote
“American experts believe that Pakistanis do not need to
test an actual bomb. Sometimes during the early 1980’s,
they say, two Chinese gave the Pakistanis a reliable, tested
bomb design, in exchange for Pakistan’s sharing its modern
uranium enriching technology. During the last several year,
Chinese scientists have reportedly visited or worked off and
on at Pakistan’s Kahuta facility. The Chinese design,
American officials say, enables Pakistan to produce a much
more sophisticated atomic bomb than the crude five-ton
dropped on Hiroshima”.
China’s Military Build-up in Tibet
Militarisation of Tibet by China has a direct bearing on
India’s security. The Chinese have stationed half a million
of its troops in Tibet. Sizeable garrisons exist in each
military district together with concentration of troops on
the border areas with a network of military roads. The
Chinese now have nine military airfields, about fifteen
radar stations and three nuclear bases in Tibet. Until
1950, the 3200 km. long Indo-Tibetan border had the
occasional border policemen. Now it teems with hundreds of
thousands of troops on both sides as India had to respond to
Chinese presence.
What causes alarm is that China has finalised elaborate
plans to deploy more nuclear missiles in Amdo and Gomo in
addition to more than 100 nuclear-tipped missiles with range
between 800-1750 miles already stationed in different parts
of Tibet. A Hong Kong newspaper, Shin Bao reported that
China had deployed 80 MRBMs (with range upto 800 miles) and
20 IRBMs (with range between 1500-1750 miles) at Nagchu, 320
km. north of Lhasa Jane’s Weapons systems, the authoritative
British publication, reported that the Chinese MRBMs
deployed in Tibet have a range of upto 2,485 kilometres.
The Nagchu base is being further modernised in order to
facilitate deployment of more sophisticated nuclear missiles
which would be able to bring within their range more cities
and vital targets in India and also in other countries of
South and South-East Asia. China had also developed some
scores of ballistic missiles, both of medium and
intermediate range, in the mountainous caves and valleys of
Tibet.
Improvement of Sino-US relations has also helped China to
buy more sophisticated modern weapons from the US. For the
last few years the Chinese have been using American-made
Sikorsky helicopters for the transportation of military
supplies into Tibet.
China is a belligerent expansionist power that will not
hesitate to use any means at its disposal to threaten its
enemies, especially those in its immediate neighbourhood.
In order to threaten India, the Chinese need only activate
the land-based missiles presently based in Tibet.
Should Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visit China?
In view of the historical, military and political background
as so far understood, one may well ask what purpose is to be
served by the visit of a Prime Minister of India to the
capital of a country which holds vast portions of Indian
territory under its illegal occupation. There has been a
thaw in Sino-India relations for some time, trade has
increased, cultural and academic exchanges have taken place
and continue to do so, politicians and journalists freely
visit the Forbidden City. Eight rounds of border talks have
taken place, and even though in fructuous, they are evidence
of a willingness on both sides to solve their disputes
amicably – although the Sumdorong Chu intrusion was not so
amicable. South Block has given no hint that the talks have
improved to such an extent that all is ready for the final
and summit meeting between heads of states. Rather one gets
the impression that all is still at square one, in which
case it is against the norms of all international diplomacy
as hitherto practised, for Prime Ministers to start
bargaining with one another where their bureaucrats have
failed. Even up-gradation from bureaucratic to political
talks does not entail the Prime Ministers at first go: there
are various categories of political leaders, both inside and
outside the government, inside and outside the Foreign
Ministry, who can be utilised for this work.
Rajiv Gandhi unfortunately seems determined to go, as per
the statements he has given in Spain and other foreign
countries. Our Prime Minister unfortunately has an accord-monis.
Some of his hastily cobbled together accords, to serve some
immediate political goal, have proved disastrous in the
not-so long run, and there is no evidence that the Beijing
visit is preceded by enough homework. When Kissinger made
his first dramatic entry into China, he arrived with twenty
possible alternate scenarios. From what the public can see,
in our case, it is only Beijing which is dictating the
scenarios.
Chinese emphasis on “mutual understanding and mutual
accommodation” as the basis for a settlement, which is so
fervently quoted in this country as evidence of new spirit
of conciliation is misleading. Mr. Zhao Ziyang used exactly
the same words in 1983 without any softening of China’s
position at the negotiating table. “Mutual understanding
and mutual accommodation” to the Chinese only means
territorial concessions on the part of India.
There is certainly need for a bold initiative to improve
understanding between India and China but not at the cot of
national interest. Before the Prime Minister’s visit to
China a proper atmosphere should be created for fruitful
talks. The holding of more than 40,000 sq. miles of Indian
territory, non acceptance of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh as
part of India and recognition of Kashmir as a separate
region by China are the main obstacles that should be
tackled first. India should make these issues
pro-conditions for a summit.
When Mikhal Gorbachev proposed a summit the Chinese
leadership bluntly replied that it would be “unrealistic to
hold such talks whilst the obstacles remain”. They demanded
the withdrawal of soviet troops from Afghanistan and
Mongolia and Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea as
pre-conditions. None of these territories form part of
China. Why should India hesitate with regard to her own
territories?
In 1983 Zhao Ziyang told the National People’s Congress that
the border problem “should not stand in the way of improving
relations”. But when India granted statehood to Arunachal
Pradesh and the prime Minister subsequently visited the
state China strongly protested. When India objected to the
Chinese intrusion into the Sumdorong chu Valley, the Chinese
denounced it as being “not conducive to successful talks”.
Heads I win, tails you lose!
The Chinese have also created confusion on upgrading the
talks to political level. The government of India has made
us believe that the request for raising the level came from
the Chinese, but Chitta Basu and the all India Forward Bloc
delegation were told that Beijing would agree to raise the
talks to “a higher political level” only if the government
of India made a specific suggestion to that effect”. The
implication is that India is desperate in solving the border
dispute than China.
Given therefore this highly unsatisfactory background, one
can only come to the conclusion that either in response to
the Chinese military position in Tibet, its nuclear
superiority, or in view of short-term gains for the party in
power due to an ‘international accord’, or due to succumbing
to international pressure to ‘make up with China’ which is
not inconsiderable, or probably as a mixture of all three
combined with the personal ambitions of individual
bureaucrats, the Prime Minister of India is about to
undertake as craven and abject a journey to a foreign
capital as Prime Minister Chamberlain did to Hitler in
Munich. It was after Munich that the international
community realised that appeasement was not only a dirty
word, but dangerous policy. As defined by the Fontana
Dictionary of Modern Thoughts, “the word (appeasement) was
applied to the (unsuccessful) policy pursued by the British
and French governments of trying to avoid war with Germany
by injudicious, frequently dishonourable, and inevitably
unrequited concessions, weakening to those who made them and
often made at the expense of third parties.”
Hitler was better armed than her European neighbours – they
could not buy him off with peace accords but were driven
into one of the bloodiest wars of the twentieth century. At
the moment China although in a superior position with regard
to nuclear armaments, is still not so with regard to
conventional warfare. Her advantageous position at the
height is more than offset by the rebellious and unreliable
Tibetan population in her hinterland, no longer cowed down
by Chinese brutality, and encouraged by worldwide concern
for human rights violations in their lands. India has time
on her side while the Chinese are caught in the Tibetan
imbroglio to improve her military and diplomatic positions.
An over-hasty accord at this stage would unnecessarily
foreclose all our options.
There may indeed come a stage at some future date when the
Prime Ministers of both countries may need to meet. We can
learn a few lessons from the superpowers. They had endless
rounds of preparatory talks before the leaders started
meeting with prescribed agendas in third countries – and
only when a sufficient atmosphere of trust had been created,
did they risk visits to one another’s capitals. India and
china are nowhere near that stage.
Finally, the present prime minister is handicapped in a
particular way from acting as a bargaining representative
for India where such momentous issues are involved. When
Nixon was under the cloud of Watergate, serious objection
was raised in sections of American public opinion as to his
ability to represent the USA abroad – a man under a cloud is
vulnerable to blackmail. It would be folly and
irresponsibility of the highest order to place Rajiv Gandhi
in the trap of the ruthless Chinese.
Tibet – India’s Diplomatic Trump Card
Pandit Nehru believed that friendship with China would
guarantee India’s security. Nehru signed the treaty of 1954
with China on Tibet without securing anything for India.
China meanwhile started pouring tremendous arms and
ammunition into Tibet. In 1959, the Chinese Premier Chou
en-Lai questioned the entire India-China boundary. He
rejected the McMahon Line and laid claims to 90,000 sq. km.
of Indian territory in NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) as also to
Aksai Chin in Ladakh. Events ultimately led to the Chinese
aggression in October 1962. Since then no substantial
progress has been made in Sino-Indian relations.
Outright appeasement and sacrificing the interests of the
Tibetan people have not bought peace and tranquillity in the
Himalayas for the last thirty years or so. India’s
conciliatory attitude has made China more aggressive and
demanding. To negotiate with China from a position of
strength India can play the Tibet card – support the
legitimate rights of theTibetean people and press China to
accept the Dalai Lama’s proposal to make Tibet “a
self-governing democratic entity” in association with China
as one of the pre-conditions for a summit.
This will not amount to India’s interference in China’s
internal affairs. The British and successor Indian
Governments initially declared their willingness to
recognise China’s suzerainty over Tibet on the condition
that China agreed to the terms of the Simla Convention: most
specifically, that she recognise and respect Tibet’s full
autonomy. Moreover, India’s policy was, to a large extent,
formulated on the basis of assurances which the Government
of China gave the government of India regarding the
maintenance of Tibet’s autonomy and the peaceful resolution
of differences.
The Chinese have acted in complete contravention of those
assurances, they have violated the autonomy of Tibet,
causing untold harm and suffering to the Tibetan people and
resulting in the death of 1.2 million Tibetans and
destruction of almost all their cultural and religious
heritage.
Although some improvements in the economic situation of
theTibetans in Tibet has taken place since 1978, it has
become apparent that the Chinese Government has no intention
of restoring any meaningful measure of autonomy to Tibet or
otherwise resolve the question of Tibet to the satisfaction
of the Tibetan people. A massive Chinese population
transfer into Tibet has already reduced the Tibetans to a
minority in their own country.
The recent demonstrations in Tibet and brutal repression by
the Chinese clearly show that all is not well on the roof of
the world. Moreover, the blunt rejection of the Dalai
Lama’s conciliatory peace plan by the Chinese shows that
they have no intention of modifying their stand on the
question of the status of Tibet.
The Government of India, after showing restraint and
patience for over thirty years, with the hope of achieving a
peaceful and just resolution of the Tibetan question, should
now realise that over-accommodation to Chinese interest
conflicts with her own. India is entitled to withdraw her
recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, for this
recognition was conditional on China’s respect for Tibetan
autonomy and adherence to the assurances given to the
Government of India.
The Government would also not be acting in violation of
treaty obligations with China. The 1954 Sino-Indian
agreement on trade and commercial relations, which referred
to Tibet as a “region of China” and which recognised China’s
responsibility for Tibet’s foreign relations, expired in
June 1962. Furthermore, China violated the agreement
including the fundamental principle of Peaceful Co-existence
embodied in the Preamble. By attacking India in 1962, china
violated all agreements, understandings, and assurances
which formed the basis of Sino-Indian relations, and by not
returning the illegally acquired territories to India, the
government of China is persisting in its violation of
India’s territorial integrity and independence.
Given China’s vulnerable political presence in Tibet, and
her extreme sensitivity to international public opinion on
that score, India’s support for the cause of the Tibetan
people might well pressure the Chinese to come to terms with
the Tibetans and also with India over the boundary
question. Relations with China have not improved in any way
in the past by India’s attitude of appeasement at the
expense of Tibet’s rights. The only way those relations
will improve, is if the Tibetan question is resolved to the
satisfaction of the Tibetan and Indian people.
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