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SAARC Parliament and the pursuit of
Stable peace in South Asia
By
M.L. Sondhi and Shrikant Paranjpe
From Conflict
to Cooperation in the South Asian Region
The point of
departure for this study is the recognition that the
legislative dimension is an important but neglected
framework condition for regional dynamism in South Asia. The
First Conference of the Association of SAARC Speakers and
Parliamentarians in July 1995 in New Delhi could be the
beginning of a workable strategy to utilise legislative
tools for moving the Subcontinent away from adversarial
framework conditions to conflict resolution and creative
problem solving. The Presiding Officers of the legislatures
of the SAARC countries can help to sensitise public opinion
in the region to the common ground of their legislative
agendas which lies in ensuring that governments are
accountable for their actions to the respective publics in
terms of basic human needs. By setting high standards in
the domestic arenas for debate and public policy decisions
in legislatures and by faithful adherence to norms for the
effective use of the democratic process and rejecting the
use of violence as a means to pursue political aspirations,
the Speakers of the SAARC legislatures will help to break
down stereotypes created by the volatile political
environment and nationalistic and ethnic-communal
frictions. The Association of Speakers and Members of
Parliament of SAARC has the potential to become the vehicle
for confidence building and for overcoming systemic
constraints which have hitherto prevented SAARC from
promoting the synergy between common security, economic
liberalisation, enhancement of human rights and resolution
of social conflicts.
The
difficulties in reaching consensual decisions in South Asia
are aggravated by the lack of inputs from individuals and
organisations (including business organisations) which could
help create an atmosphere of credibility and confidence.
Strategies adopted by the executive organs have failed to
reflect the overall homogeneity of South Asia and have
accentuated “quick fixes” which have come in the way of
pan-South Asian unification. In a brilliant study Joseph S.
Nye has highlighted aspects which deserve attention in any
creative undertaking for regional integration:
-
functional
linkages of tasks
-
increasing
transactions
-
deliberate
linkages and coalitions
-
formation
of groups at the regional level
-
involvement
of external actors
-
regional
ideology and intensification of regional identity
-
elite
socialisation
A regional
parliament, but its very nature may offer new types of
political interactions which would be an important condition
for increasing transactions, linkages and coalitions. The
involvement of the highest level elites would be essential
to the success of the SAARC Parliament. The professional, as
opposed to political expertise, which the SAARC framework
utilises, cannot relate it to the growing number of interest
and influential groups in the subcontinent, and this comes
in the way of building both a regional ideology and a
regional identity. One of the anticipated and central roles
of a SAARC Parliament would be to combine political
expertise with the variety of skills outside government
departments and agencies which are available in the South
Asian countries under conditions of social pluralism and
liberalised market economies. Thus it would not be burdened
by the mind-sets which have been imposed by the existing and
relatively closed circles of decision-making within which
the SAARC machinery has been permitted to operate so far.
By going beyond the bureaucratic-technical parameters of the
SAARC system and introducing political, moral and cultural
dimensions of regionalism, the regional parliament would be
well placed to provide a flexible and progressive political
ambience, which in turn would produce a more supportive
environment for “neo-nationalisms motivated by economic
aspirations to replace old nationalisms dependent on
militarism and confrontation.”
Regionalism,
Regional State System and South Asian Regional Cooperation
Regionalism has always remained an elusive force in Asian
history. Pandit Nehru had attempted to channelise the
‘reawakening of Asia’ through the Asian Relations Conference
(Delhi, 1947), to be followed up with the conference on
Indonesia (Delhi 1949), the Colombo Conference (1954) and
the Bandung Conference (1955), Regionalism appeared to have
taken root and spread into Afro-Asian unity at Bandung.
Bandung however, was also to become the last Afro-Asian
Conference to be held. A futile attempt to revive the
spirit of Bandung in the 1960s with a conference in West
Asia or North Africa clearly indicated the withering away of
the idea of regionalism which had taken birth in the
immediate post-war period.
Regionalism in the late forties and early fifties was based
on three cardinal principles: independence in the
formulation of a world view, a peace approach to
international conflict and anti-colonialism. These
principles had in fact been developed in course of the
Indian independence struggle. They had found expression in
a number of meetings of the Indian National Congress and
also in the writings of Pandit Nehru. He articulated the
essence of these thoughts in a speech on the All India Radio
on the 7th September 1946.
The
independent approach to foreign policy was a concept that
was firmly rooted in the nationalist struggle. At one level
it represented the affirmation of sovereignty by a nation
and at another deeper level it was the will to carve out its
own destiny in the new world. This latter meaning carried
an additional significance in the peculiar world order of
the post war period that had divided the world into two
blocs. Of equal relevance was the meaning that in this
truly global world order Eurocentric world views would not
be accepted by the emergent civilizations. Nehru’s approach
at the Asian Relations Conference carried this conviction of
a new Asian identity that was to emerge as an independent
world view. Built into this concept of independence was the
idea of non-intervention by extra-regional powers. This
idea was articulated more clearly in subsequent years when
Asia started to experience the spillover effect of the Cold
War in the form of alliance formations. It was basically an
affirmation of the principle of responsibility by the
regional powers of the will and the capability to manage
their own affairs. It negates the power vacuum theory that
seeks to undermine this very capability of ‘small’ powers to
manage their affairs. This approach confronts the concept
of ‘responsibility of great powers’ that had come to be
accepted as the only approach to world order. It seeks to
supplement it with a regional order at a politico-security
and perhaps economic level.
A
peace approach to international affairs joined hands with
the concept of an independent understanding of world affairs
to develop a better philosophical base for broadening the
range of choices regarding problems of global peace and
security. At one level it sought to undercut the entire
basis of the Cold War as the governing image of the post-war
world. In doing so it evoked the classical usage of a
diplomacy of mediation, of neutrality, of dialogue and the
like. Indian mediation in Korea is one such example. Here,
the attempt was to project emergent Afro-Asia as an
independent identity that could, by virtue of its
geo-political distance from the core of the cold war,
project an entirely new concept and vision for the approach
to peace and security. It sought to show that security
concepts based on the principle of the triumph of one
socio-political system over the other were intrinsically
flawed. Herein operated the other level of meaning.
Bordering almost on the idealist model, but at the same time
retaining a realist view, the peace approach sought to
identify peace and security with the problems of development
in the world. It therefore emerged as a critique of the
arms race and consequent conflict. It sought to identify
the problems of socio-economic development as critical to
the human race. It did not give up the concept of
nationalism, yet it sought to cooperate across frontiers to
evolve a common approach to peace and security.
Anti-colonialism was in a sense an offshoot of these
approaches, and sought to project a political programme to
tackle the then remaining colonial situation in parts of
Africa and Asia, but it gradually become less relevant to
the Asia of the sixties. Nevertheless, in the formative
years of Asian independence it served as a rallying point of
regionalism.
The
process initiated at Bandung, of broadening the field of
regionalism, did not receive much support. The years from
Bandung to Belgrade (1961) are years of a gradual shift from
regionalism based on peace approach and independence to
nonalignment that used the same fundamental pillars for its
world view. The roots of this change lay in the heyday of
regionalism. One was the fact that the traditional role of
organised violence continued to hold ground and two,
extra-regional powers developed entrenched interests in
Asia.
Regional State
System
A
regional state system normally comprises four sets of actors
(a) the hegemon or aspiring hegemon, (b) bargainers or
aspiring partners, (c) peripheral dependents and (d)
external challengers. Regional hegemons are states which
possess power sufficient to dominate a regional system. A
bargainer is a state which possesses enough power to bargain
effectively with the hegemon, but by itself cannot
substitute for the hegemon. The periphery powers are
essentially small powers. They hold a ‘nuisance value to
the core (hegemon) power in that they can bargain in times
of a crisis. Finally, all regional systems are influenced
by the interests of extra-regional powers.
In
the present conflictual framework of international relations
regional state systems would have to rely on the creation of
a stable pattern or order in their interactions both within
and without the region for their ‘success’. A “peace order”
would imply the absence of overt and covert conflict,
stability and a cooperative development effort. The focus
here is on the Third World Periphery powers and not on the
European model of the EEC.
The
above analysis of order in the regional state system is
based on the traditional realistic interpretation of the
geopolitical situation that presumes the existence of a
sovereign nation-state system and the components that go
with it.
The
new alternative can be visualised at two levels. One is the
shift of focus from national policy, State, Government and
such institutions of the Westphalia system to human interest
and people at large. Such an approach would focus on human
needs and foster concepts of socio-economic justice. The
basic value would be fulfilment of human needs, the means of
value-realisation would be expanding the non-military
sector, and the beneficiaries would be the people at large.
The
second level is the world order approach. The focus now
shifts beyond the nation-state or the region to issues of
survival, problems of violence and morality. The
geopolitical focus is the global community; problems are
seen as inter-related structural or systemic issues and
their analysis is value-oriented. The primary sectors would
range from individuals to functional international
organisations. This projected human world community (that
goes beyond the concept of world government) would ensure a
high performance in implementing such values as peace,
economic well being, social justice, and ecological balance.
The
understanding of the South Asian system in the present study
would revolve around the following tenets: South Asia as
identified through the SAARC is a compact area of
geographically proximate states interacting with each other
and sharing certain common bonds of history, culture, etc.
India, by virtue of its geographic dimension and economic
and military strength occupies the central position in the
region. Indian aspirations to leadership are born out of
this feature. South Asia, minus India, has two types of
powers, of which Pakistan is one major power that can limit
Indian aspirations. Pakistan’s own limitations come from
geographic location and economic-military development.
Pakistan geographically has been on the periphery of South
Asia. Economically and militarily it has not been able to
outrun India. After 1971 when East Pakistan became a new
independent country (Bangladesh), Pakistan’s major power
status was further reduced. But Pakistan with the help of
outside powers has been able to check Indian aspirations.
Given various limitations, Pakistan plays the role of a
‘major partner’ for India in South Asia. The other types of
South Asian powers including countries of Nepal, Bhutan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives, are small powers in size
but not without significance. These small states constitute
a ‘nuisance value’ to the core states in that they have a
bargaining power in times of crisis. Such a bargain is
possible in both cases of by use of an extra-regional power
or by use of other regional powers.
Yet
another dimension of South Asian politics is the role played
by extra-regional powers. This role can be viewed in a
variety of situations: the Cold War period had seen the
evolution of alliances as institutional solutions to
security; the intervention in regional conflicts to aid one
regional power against the other; the use of a variety of
methods to extend the sphere of influence in the region, and
so on. In the present context there is need to understand
the dynamics of the interests of the United States, the
Soviet Union (now Russia) and China in South Asia, and the
extent to which the countries concerned have been ‘used’.
Looking back into the history of South Asia, one can
identify two important “models” sponsored by India for
building regional order in South Asia. The first was the
1947 model that based itself on the inherent advantages of
the birth of South Asia in 1947, and the second, the 1971-72
model based on the status achieved from a war. By the very
virtue of its size and consequent potential power India had
gained the status of a regional power in South Asia in
1947. However, this status, based essentially on potential
and not real power, came to be challenged in the aftermath
of the Indian defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
The
period 1969 to 1971 was a period of major upheaval for South
Asia. Three important trends led to the climax of the
events of 1971-72. The American interest in Asia was being
reassessed in the form of the Guam Doctrine. American
disenchantment in Vietnam, the need to restrict Soviet entry
in this area and the opening of a dialogue with China are
all elements that had their impact on South Asia. Pakistan
played a major role in the Sino-American breakthrough,
creating the spectre of an anti-India tie up of
Washington-Beijing-Islamabad. The second trend was the
resulting drift towards each other of the Soviet Union and
India. The Soviet Union, for its global compulsions of
countering the Chinese, now aided by the US, was willing to
invest heavily in its Indian relationship.
The
1971-72 model is based on the recognition of India as a
regional power. Pakistan’s acceptance of this position came
at the Simla Conference (1972) held to solve the problems
created by the war. By accepting the principle of bilateral
diplomacy in all future interactions, Pakistan accepted
India’s long standing demand. The 1971-72 model was
nevertheless, based on two important assumptions. One was
the nature of the legitimacy India was to be accorded for
this position from outside powers. Both the US and the
Soviet Union appear to have granted this legitimacy to
India. India’s success in opening up a dialogue with China
indicates a similar legitimacy from China. Such a granting
of legitimacy also meant that they would not interfere in
South Asia in a manner that would threaten Indian
interests. In other words, Indian success in keeping its
position would really depend upon keeping this region free
of extra-regional intervention. The second assumption flows
from the first. India as a regional power would take upon
itself the responsibility of installing a feeling of
security in the nations of south Asia.
South Asian
Regional Co-operation
In
November 1980 President Zia ur Rehman of Bangladesh sent to
different countries of South Asia a ‘Working Paper on
Regional Cooperation in South Asia’. This document
represented the first comprehensive attempt made by a
country other than India, to establish an alternative
governing image for South Asia of the eighties. Its
importance lies in the manner in which the whole proposal
has been evolved. The successful establishment of the South
Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) structure in 1983
indicates a new developing trend in South Asia.
The
Bangladesh Working Paper was clear about the objectives of
the forum to be evolved in South Asia. The institutional
framework suggested was in conformity with the participating
states’ commitment to nonalignment. The paper showed an
adequate awareness of pressing bilateral disputes in South
Asia and suggested that the areas selected for cooperation
be those which would mutually benefit all the countries,
irrespective of their existing economic disparities. The
areas identified for cooperation include:
Telecommunications, Meteorology, Transport, Shipping,
Tourism, Agricultural/Rural Sector, Joint Ventures, Market
Promotion of Select Commodities, Scientific and
Technological, Educational and Technical and Cultural.
Further clarification of the working paper was also done in
a communication sent by the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry to
the South Asian Governments. This communication, following
closely on the heels of the original paper, examined in
detail the framework of the proposal. The following points
were made about the original proposal:
i)
The core issue was the political implications of the
proposal. On the one hand, there existed natural
apprehensions of the smaller nations that the concept of
South Asian regionalism would formalize / institutionalize
leadership of the dominant neighbour in the region, given
the asymmetry of the power distribution in South Asia.
India could then become first among equals. On the other
hand, such a move is conceived as a concentration of the
smaller powers, a ganging up to apply pressure or to isolate
India. The Bangladesh objective is to recognize the
realities of the situation and to find a via media in which
all states could live without being vassals or in a
permanent state of confrontation. It was in fact a historic
effort to build a relationship among equals.
ii)
The idea is not an attempt to regionalise bilateral issues
but to seek to identify those areas of cooperation that are
truly regional in character.
iii)
No rigid terms of reference or specific time frame within
which the idea should mature have been fixed.
iv)
Bangladesh welcomed ideas and views on the proposal. This
initiative was a nucleus from which a beginning could be
made.
v)
The key word governing evaluation of cooperation is mutual
benefit.
vi)
Decisions would obviously be based on consensus. Bangladesh
believed that once a climate of trust and cooperation was
created it would be easier to resolve bilateral problems
bilaterally, as demonstrated by ASEAN.
In the Charter
of SAARC adopted at the Dhaka Summit (1985), the Heads of
State / Government expressed their desire to promote “peace,
stability, amity and progress in the region through strict
adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and
Non-alignment”. Particular stress was laid on the “respect
for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial
integrity, national independence, non-use of force and
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and
peaceful settlement of disputes”. The summit participants
felt that the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice
and economic prosperity were best achieved in the South
Asian region by fostering mutual understanding, good
neighbourly relations and meaningful co-operation among the
member States. The Heads of State / Government expressed
their conviction that regional co-operation was mutually
beneficial, desirable and necessary for promoting the
welfare and improving the quality of life of the people of
the region. They also felt that economic, social and
technical co-operation among the countries of South Asia
would contribute significantly to national and collective
self-reliance.
The Charter
contains ten Articles, and covers within its ambit
objectives, principles, institutional and financial
arrangements and general provisions.
The SAARC declaration reveals the recognition of some important
constraints on the cooperation possible in South Asia. Many
of these constraints had been given expression to in the
original Bangladesh Working Paper and the supplementary
paper also issued by Bangladesh. There was thus the need to
restrain India from regaining the first among equals
position and consequently the call for equality and
unanimity in decision making. On the other hand the fear of
the forum becoming a platform for ganging up of small states
against India was also to be avoided. For this and other
reasons bilateral issues were kept away from the SAARC. All
this is not to underestimate the importance of SAARC. It
implied two things for South Asia: one, that there existed a
concrete alternative to the 1971-72 model of the India –
sponsored order for South Asia. This model was essentially
based on the premise President Zia had taken pains to make
clear: the weak are not exploited and the strong do not
dominate. The attempt at democratising order in South Asia
was thus given an institutional setting. Two, by keeping
bilateral (and contentious) issues outside the scope of
SAARC recognition appears to have been given to the Indian
demand of bilateral diplomacy. In either case, it is
important to note that SAARC has thrust on South Asia an
alternative governing image for the 1980s. It is equally
important to note that the success or failure of this effort
would depend heavily on Indian responses to this effort.
SAARC without Indian cooperation would collapse into being
what Bangladesh itself described as a ‘ganging up of smaller
powers’.
SAARC had adopted the Nordic model of cooperation, wherein
the political sovereignty of cooperating states is not
disturbed in the process of integration. SAARC sought to be
a platform for the establishment of cooperative
relationships in South Asia. Given the political
antagonisms in the region, SAARC adopted an incrementalist
approach of keeping contentious politico-security issues
outside the scope of SAARC, and, a focus on economic,
cultural, social and other areas.
The
first summit meeting of Dhaka (1985) that established the
organisation also confirmed the broad areas in which to
consolidate cooperation. These included agriculture, rural
development, telecommunications, meteorology, health and
population, transport, scientific and technological areas,
postal services, sports, arts and culture. SAARC countries
made relatively encouraging progress through the Bangalore
(1986), Kathmandu (1987) and Islamabad (1988) Summits. The
Kathmandu summit created the Regional Convention on
Suppression of Terrorism. This subject borders on the
politico-security area. Yet it was well received by the
member countries.
SAARC went through some uncertain years when the Colombo
summit had to be postponed due to the Sri Lankan reluctance
to hold the Summit. The Sri Lankan attempt to involve a
bilateral matter like the implementation of the India-Sri
Lanka agreement and the subsequent dispatch of the IPKF
represented a setback to the spirit of SAARC. This
uncertainty was reflected at the Male (1990) and the Colombo
(1991) Summits. The postponement of the Dhaka Summit of
1982 by a year was caused by the spillover of disturbances
in South Asia after the Ayodhya incident.
It
is in the post Cold-War period that SAARC presents new
perceptions and understanding of the problems of
cooperation. The Dhaka summit reaffirms the need to
liberalise trade as early as possible in a manner that would
be mutually beneficial and in this context, has established
SAPTA.
The
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
finalised the south Asia Preferential Trading Arrangement
(SAPTA) at its Seventh Summit meeting in 1993 at Dhaka.
SAPTA was the first step taken towards formalisation of
economic cooperation in South Asia. It represented the
political willingness on part of the South Asian leadership
to proceed towards the economic integration of the region.
The
creation of SAPTA is the first stage of the process of the
formation of a trade / economic bloc. The agreement is
based on the principle of overall reciprocity and mutuality
of advantages so as to benefit all the SAARC countries,
taking into account their respective levels of economic and
industrial growth. It aims to promote and sustain mutual
trade and economic cooperation. SAPTA is to include all
products, manufactures and commodities in their raw,
semi-processed and processed forms.
SAPTA would include arrangements relating to tariffs, para-
tariffs, non-tarrif measures and direct trade measures.
Contracting states may negotiate on a product-by-product
basis, across-the-board tariff reductions, sectorial basis
or seek direct trade measures. Special consideration is to
be given to requests from Least Developed States of SAARC
for technical assistance and cooperation arrangements.
The
second stage in the development of trade arrangement is in
agreement on free trade. It constitutes opening up of
markets by not levying tariffs for inter-state trade. The
North American Free Trade Arrangement (NAFTA) of Canada,
United States and Mexico can act as an example.
The
ASEAN countries also have established the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) in 1991 for creating a common market in 15
years.
The
third stage in this process represents a shift from
decision-making based on predominantly economic concerns to
political compulsions. The process may begin with such
politico-economic decisions like the creation of a customs
union and then proceed towards the establishment of a common
political perspective. The Benelux countries formed such a
union. The ASEAN refuses entry to countries of dissimilar
political perspectives. The creation of a monetary union is
a further step in this direction. The Maastricht Treaty
(1991) sought a political and monetary union including
common foreign and security policies and a currency union.
The European Community, despite its problems, presents a
model of such a process of integration.
The
Eighth SAARC Summit (New Delhi 1995) resolved to ensure that
the SAPTA is brought into operation be the end of 1995. The
fast changing international economic environment, the
creation of trade blocs, and establishment of World Trade
Organisation have necessitated a more rapid time frame for
economic co-operation in South Asia. The New Delhi summit
provided a positive thrust to the idea of economic
integration of the region.
The Concept of
a SAARC Parliament
The
problem of the break up of the order of the seventies
focused on the problems faced by the core power India in the
South Asian system. Indian effort at retaining the
initiative in the politico-security field in south Asia
forced India to ensure that the SAARC proposal remained
limited in its scope. Rejection of the idea in totality
would bring the accusation of hegemonic behaviour for
India. An enthusiastic acceptance would also spell danger
of erosion of India’s political authority. India tried to
escape this situation by keeping the SAARC out to the
political security network. The question remains as to how
long this can work.
In
the case of Pakistan, India’s problem is more fundamental.
India and Pakistan had tried to evolve a framework of
interaction through the talks at Tashkent in 1966 and later
at Simla in 1972. The No War Pact proposal of Pakistan and
the Peace and Friendship Treaty proposed by India were
further attempts at restructuring a framework in the 1980s.
The problem transcends purely bilateral considerations as
due attention has also to be given to threats to security
from elsewhere – be it Afghanistan for Pakistan or China for
India. The problem thus has to be viewed from a proper
sub-regional perspective. It is this consideration that
brings us to the wider problem of the development of an
order in South Asia. If order is to depend on military
stability the perception of such a stability would depend on
the perceptions held by the individual countries about the
threats to their national security. It would then imply
that such a military stability must operate at two levels,
viz. the immediate sub-region or region and the global
level. The former refers to the acceptance or
non-acceptance of a given intra-regional distribution of
power and the latter to the conflicting interests as and
when they impinge on that particular region. The logical
solution to this would be acceptance of a low level
participation by extra-regional powers. Such participation
would restrain any perceived hegemonic threat from a big
regional power over a smaller one. Yet such participation
does not guarantee elimination of great power conflict in
the region due to mutual conflictual perceptions of
interest. It is with this particular dilemma of the utility
or otherwise of extra regional help that all problems of
regionalism tend to come to a stop.
The
problems India faces in the 1990’s are of restructuring an
order pattern for South Asia so as to go beyond the
questions posed earlier; the attempts to contain the scope
of the SAARC, the counter proposal of a more comprehensive
Peace and Friendship Treaty, the talk of the containing
validity of the Simla Agreement are all efforts that have a
common trend. It appears that India is keen to evolve a
Simla-like politico-security solution independent of SAARC
as a long term solution for South Asia. Such a strategy
would imply that the order pattern in South Asia would
evolve at two levels: the politico-strategic level
where India would be able to continue as a core or pivotal
power and a socio-economic-cultural level where a
‘democratic principle of interaction would operate in the
form of SAARC.
Changes
The
international scene has undergone momentous changes since
the East European revolution and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. Changes that have taken place in the concepts
of power and ideology have a bearing on South Asian
policies.
The
cold war logic that the military was the ultimate source of
power has given way to economic factors. The concept of
power itself has now become relative in nature. There has
also been a revival of theories of interdependence. Joseph
Nye writing on “Soft Power” or James Rosenau’s work on
“Turbulence in World Politics” is representative of this
change. Issues like slower growth rates, structural
problems that confront some of the competitive economic
systems, mounting deficit, etc. are emerging as dominant
concerns today.
These changes have also transformed the traditional alliance
patterns. At one level such regional organisations like
European Community, ASEAN, and NAFTA demand attention in a
world that is shifting towards a spectre of trade wars. At
another level nongovernmental organisations focusing on
human issues like environment, ecology and human rights are
taking centre stage.
The
emerging new world order spells problems for the Third World
in two issue areas: problems related to development and
changing security concerns.
The
lack of financial resources and the need for new
technologies constitutes the crux of developmental problems
of the Third World. Developing countries cannot borrow from
commercial sources and hence the need for foreign
investment. The key infrastructural areas like power,
transport, communication, banking and market facilities need
to be developed at a globally competitive level to attract
foreign investment. In the case of India direct foreign
investment in the core sector from August 1991 to July 1993
came to about 87% of the total investment. But on the other
hand there is likely to be a significant decrease in the
total quantum of aid available globally. It was calculated
that between 1986 and 1990 of the total investment done
globally, South and South East Asia received about 20% at an
annual average. In the post-1990 era the claimants to
investment have multiplied. NAFTA may direct American aid
to Mexico and Central and South America: East Europe and
Commonwealth of Independent States have opened up for
investment; South Africa in its post-apartheid phase has an
attractive image and China is viewed as a major investment
area. The new result is likely to be a lesser quantum of
money available for South Asia. Implicit in this is the
need to be more competitive to attract this scarce aid.
The
drama involved in the Indo-Russian deal on the cryogenic
engine purchase is an indicator of the curbs on new
technologies that the developed world is likely to impose.
India had a similar experience with the United States in the
super-computer deal. This is an age where almost all new
technologies in the areas of electronics, space, nuclear and
materials sciences are likely to be classified as those of
“dual use”. The Third World developing countries are likely
to face stiff opposition due to the perceived threats of
proliferation of technologies and their possible ill-uses.
In
the area of security concerns, internal security has emerged
as one of the key threats to security in the developing
world. In South Asia, for example, problems labelled as
insurgency, low intensity conflicts and terrorism are far
more serious than the possibilities of a border war. These
problems have their roots in socio-cultural, economic and
political causes that are usually located within one’s
political system. Consequently, the primary responsibility
for these problems remains one’s own. Regional conflicts
can only aggravate these problems and in the long run be
mutually harmful to both the conflicting parties.
It
is these dilemmas of the problems of development and
security in the post-cold war period that need to be the
focus of the SAARC debate in the years to come. The
rationale for cooperation in SAARC was based on the
technique of incrementalism. It had avoided contentious
issues to ensure that a dialogue begins between the states
of the region. Except the foray into cooperation for
tackling terrorism SAARC has avoided politico-security
issues. The Dhaka summit of 1993 is significant because it
represents the first deliberate effort on the part of the
leadership in South Asia to chart out a definite path of
action that is both a requirement of the times and presents
a logical direction for cooperation. SAPTA cannot remain an
adhoc effort to tackle the oncoming global economic crisis.
It has to be the first step towards the eventual integration
of South Asia at the economic and subsequently, political
level. The debate may be on the time schedule of this
process, it cannot be on the content of the issue.
The
eventual development or order in South Asia would have to
keep the following considerations in mind:
1.
Any proposed order pattern cannot be based exclusively on
military considerations: political understanding between the
nations is an important determinant. A military agreement
for security solutions in South Asia may be conceivable but
is not feasible. Collective defence agreements cannot be
created due to lack of a cogently perceived threat, common
to all countries. Thus the order pattern would have to be
worked out in areas beyond security in the military sense
and thus focus on essentially political perceptions of the
countries concerned.
2.
The order pattern need not erode, but should in fact restore
the principle of sovereignty. One of the important inducers
to regionalism has been the need of small nations to project
their independent identity. In the context of South Asia, a
regional order pattern would thus have to take care that the
smaller states in the order do not suffer under bigger
regional powers. In other words, this signifies that the
independent identity of the smaller nations can and should
be channelled through a regional order pattern and that the
order itself takes the responsibility of preserving their
identity.
3.
As a step towards political understanding, efforts should be
made to create a congenial atmosphere through economic and
socio-cultural contacts. This can be implemented through
greater intra-regional trade, and increased and easy flow of
communications, information and travel. SAARC’s efforts in
this direction are based on the policy that the spirit of
mutual understanding and cooperation generated through
regional cooperation would eventually pave the way for
solving bilateral problems.
4.
The effect of the global environment on regional problems
should not be ignored. The existent danger of
politico-military intervention by Great Powers also cannot
be ignored. Channels to either which reduce or divert such
a competition in non-lethal fields could be tried. In this
context a good case can be made for a low, non-military,
non-political participation by Great Powers in this region.
Such participation can enable them to play a supporting role
in economic development and modernisation. Such a concept
of low intensity participation would require freezing of
nuclear potentials, freezing and gradual reduction of armed
deployment, increased free trade, more joint ventures,
multiplicity of international organisations, etc.
5.
Any regional structure cannot eliminate problems of its own
structural distribution of power. The core / pivotal power
in this region would have to play a responsible role based
on a mature understanding of rights and duties. The
privileges of Great Power status would have to be adequately
tied with responsibilities towards maintenance of harmony in
the order.
Blueprint for a
Regional Legislature
At
the level of South Asia, India would have to evolve a new
political framework of interaction with the states of South
Asia. The new governing image would have to overcome the
earlier reluctance towards a political dialogue at a
multilateral level within South Asia. SAARC today offers a
unique forum for India to channelise the building up a new
order in South Asia. Such an order need not go to the
extent of denying India a dominant position, but it can
remain short of becoming hegemonic.
A
broad-based popular parliamentary forum for South Asia can
be formulated on the following principles:
1) that it is
not dominated by any single nation-state in South Asia, (2)
that it promotes the shared management of economic,
technological, developmental, and environmental problems on
an equitable basis; (3) that in dealing with political and
security issues the operational norms of partnership and
common security are adhered to; (4) that political trust and
cooperation are fostered by legislative conflict resolution;
and (5) that it unreservedly recognises the right to
identity at local, national and regional levels and will
foster solution of social conflicts through mutual
understanding and non-violent means.
This section attempts to construct a tentative model of a SAARC Parliament. This draws on the European experience
that helped to harmonise the moral and political aspirations
of different groups. But this model remains South Asian in
that it seeks to incorporate the fundamental principle of
“unity in diversity” that has remained the key to national
integration and harmony in India. It recognises the unique
social cultural and ethnic identity of diverse peoples of
South Asia and yet seeks a thread of unity in that
diversity.
The SAARC Parliament model envisages a two stage development.
The first stage is a transition stage where government
influence over the organization will be high. The second
stage is the final phase where popular participation will
increase. Two fundamental concerns have been kept in mind
in the institutionalisation of the political compulsions and
economic imperatives. The former would include the apathy
or reluctance of governments to part with power and
authority to what may appear a supra-national authority in
the organization. The latter refers to the urgent need to
restructure the economies of these countries into a
cooperative rather than competitive framework. A look at
the trade pattern figures would reveal the disparities and
the need to shift expenditure patterns from defence-related
expenditure to development-related expenditure.
The SAARC Parliament may be structured as follows:
Secretary-General:
This office would be held for a designated period of 5 or 6
years by a distinguished political personality. The method
of appointment would essentially remain the same as at
present. This would be a consensus appointment and care
would be taken to ensure that all countries get due
representation.
Speaker of the
SAARC Parliament:
The Parliament would be presided over by the Speaker elected
by the members of the Parliament. The Parliament would also
be assisted by a Secretariat that can co-ordinate the
activities of the Parliament. The relationship between the
Parliament as a primary deliberative body and the Council of
Ministers as a basic executive / decision making body needs
to be deliberated upon. The position of the Secretary
General would be that of the head of the SAARC. His
position vis-à-vis the Parliament may be comparable with
that of a President in a Parliamentary system. Here he
would also be the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
Since the Parliament is a deliberative body, its resolutions
would be recommendatory and would be sent to the Council of
Ministers for further action.
Council of
Ministers:
The composition would be of seven members, one from each
country. Decisions would be taken on basis of unanimity and
consensus. This would be the executive body having the
powers to make policy decisions. In the first stage the
members of the Council should be appointed by each
government. This sets at rest apprehension of the countries
about their policies being implemented or otherwise. During
the first stage the Council may not be kept bound by the
decisions of the Parliament which can act mainly as a
deliberative body. In the second stage, however, the
Council would have to evolve a sense of political autonomy
and not be totally dependent on the home government for
policy directions. This can be done by electing the Council
members from the Parliament. A new balance would also have
to be struck whereby deliberations of the parliament would
have to be taken note of by the Council. The above
structure represents only a preliminary outline of the SAARC
Parliament. It is, however, a deliberate attempt to project
structural dimensions of the new proposed system within the
political perspectives that demand attention today.
SECRETARY
GENERAL
____________________________________
Council of Ministers
Parliament
(recommendations) 1. Speaker
(with Secretariat)
2. Committees (functional Committees
and the Security Co-ordination,
Common Foreign Policy and
Economic Affairs Committees)
Parliament:
Unlike Europe, South Asia presents a peculiar geopolitical
feature of having one large country and other small
countries. This precludes equality of representation at the
numerical level. Secondly diverse ethnic groups exist in
almost all countries. This further entails the need to make
representation as broad based as possible. A third
significant problem is the differences in level of political
modernization and democratisation in these countries.
If
cooperation is to be enhanced in the regional legislature,
the physical composition must be determined in a way that
equally eschews Indian paternalism and intransigence on the
part of Pakistan or Bangladesh. The precondition of
whole-hearted participation in building a regional community
would be a membership pattern which provides an adequate
political role by all the member states in the SAARC
Parliament. In this context the following requirements
suggest themselves:
1.
India will be a willing participant in building the regional
community if it is not denied an opportunity to orient its
national interest towards wider regional concerns. The fact
that it does not have a co-equal in SAARC does not justify
blackmailing India into undermining her interests in the
regional legislature.
2.
India has to avoid one-sided approaches which would
aggravate the feelings of other member stages that they are
unequal partners in a common region. The SAARC Parliament
cannot equalise all these countries but its membership can
be weighted in a manner which facilitates stable political
solutions.
3.
The social, economic and political elites of South Asia have
not gained their legitimate place in the international
community chiefly on account of their failure to develop
adequate cooperative activities of their own in the South
Asian region. Cultural relations and dialogue in the
Subcontinent do not reflect the rich heritage of the
region. A fairly large membership of the regional
parliament is necessary if it is to have an impact on the
internal situation in member countries and the MSPs (Members
of the SAARC Parliament) are to achieve self-esteem. The
SAARC Parliament’s potential for entirely new forms of
political expression requires the underpinnings of a new
system of political socialisation and circulation of elites.
The fixing of
membership quotas for the SAARC Parliament will undoubtedly
be a highly contentious issue with far reaching consequences
for the future of the regional legislature. However
problematic, the following allocation is suggested primarily
in view of its practical rationale:
Proposed
Membership of SAARC Parliament
India
150
Bangladesh
75
Pakistan
75
Nepal
50
Sri Lanka
50
Bhutan
20
Maldives
20
Total
440
The existing
situation necessitates a two or three stage development of
the proposed SAARC Parliament. In the first stage the
Parliament would be composed of members elected / selected
by respective governments or their parliaments. In the
second stage the members would have to come from a more
representative electorate. In countries like India and
Pakistan the stage legislative may send representatives
while in other countries their local bodies may elect
members. The methodology of representation would have to be
the decision of the country concerned.
The
Parliament would be essentially a deliberative body. Its
primary function would be to open issues for discussion. It
may be an excellent forum for regional / ethnic voices.
Legitimate aspirations for regional identity or greater
fiscal autonomy that tend to get crushed under
centralisation tendencies would not carry the label of “anti
national” if they are voiced in a regional parliament. In
Kashmir, for example, there is a serious handicap that the
Islamabad and the New Delhi governments have to overcome.
Both are trapped in their perceptions of a final solution
for Kashmir. It is precisely in such a context that SAARC
legislature could recognise and accommodate Kashmir’s
interest within the cohesive regional unity and break the
present vicious circle, without infringing legal claims.
It
is from this primary function that other functions take
shape. The Parliament would have the following powers:
a)
Informational: it would have the right to be informed about
developments in South Asia.
b)
Perhaps in the initial stage security-related information
may be withheld. But as the process of integration takes on
a better shape and as cooperation in defence gets under way
the scope of information may include security areas.
c)
Representational, grievance ventilation, educational and
advisory role; A Parliament is essentially a popular
institution. It is a forum through which people can seek to
realise their aspirations, urges, expectations, ventilate
their grievances and difficulties. Ventilation of
grievances, can be the best mechanism for reducing
tensions. The human dimension of the problems of South Asia
have a basic similarity. A debate on those problems, of
political or other nature, would enable one to appreciate
the views not only of the respective governments but also of
peoples. Problems like Kashmir, Punjab, the Tamils of Sri
Lanka, Chakmas of Bangladesh, Gorkhas can be debated in the
SAARC Parliament from a variety of angles, without prejudice
to existing territorial sovereignties.
d)
Crisis resolution: The emergence of Parliament as a potent
conflict resolution mechanism and a leading mediating force
in rational politics has been well accepted. Debates and
discussions bring out underlying tensions and resentment in
society. Parliament can emerge as a legitimate area for
power struggles for crystallization of political activity or
for acting out conflicting roles and interest.
e)
Developmental: South Asia experiences a diversity in the
patterns of social, economic, industrial, political,
cultural and other areas of development. Here the
Parliament can act as an agency for ensuring that the
impetus stays and also as a channel for communication that
would ensure free flow of information across the
subcontinent. The facility to get authentic information is
crucial to development and social change.
Committees:
the present technical committees would continue as ten
functional committees. They would include the following
areas: (a) Agriculture (b) Health and Population Activities
(c) Meteorology (d) Postal Services (e) Prevention of Drug
Trafficking and Abuse (f) Rural Development (g) Sports, Art
and Culture (h) Science and Technology (i)
Telecommunications (j) Transport (k) Women in Development.
All
these committees are already active in their areas. The
membership would have to be restructured to include members
of Parliament and experts in equal number. Besides these
committees the following two committees may be created; (a)
Security Coordination Committee and (b) Economic Affairs
Committee. The Security Coordination Committee would be
entrusted with the coordination of internal and external
threat related issues. Items under the Convention on
Terrorism would be included in the activity of this
committee. The committee can also plan for
confidence–building measures in the defence sector. These
may include grater exchange of information, on-site
inspection and joint exercises. This would have to be a
high powered committee, with membership drawn from all
countries.
The
Economic Affairs Committee: The Male Summit focused on
economic affairs. It took the decision to extend
cooperation to some economic areas and prepare a strategy to
mobilise regional resources. This committee would have to
look at the economic agenda from a more cooperative
framework and prepare strategies for regional development.
It would be almost like a planning commission for the
region.
The SAARC
Parliament and Foreign Policy
The
global countdown for the formation of trade blocs has
started. The Maastricht Treaty started the process in
Europe. NAFTA, created in 1993 has the target date for free
trade set for 2009. Its first phase has already started in
1994. Other American groupings like Mercosur and the Andean
Pact have targeted 1995, and APEC has set the date as 2020.
It is for SAARC to hasten the process of SAPTA to achieve
greater economic cooperation and formulate timetables that
can be adhered to.
International economic integration has a rather short
history. In the 1950s the term had come to mean a process
of combination of separate economies in larger economic
regions. Today the term has come to mean the formation of
regional blocs.
Integration appears to be the inevitable course for regional
organisations today. The political implications of economic
integration would mean the loss of sovereignty for national
governments. Economic integration with a harmonised
monetary policy will encompass all aspects of commerce and
public welfare, it will also dilute national sovereignty.
Therefore economic integration will only be possible if
political willingness exists. The SAARC New Delhi Summit
appears to have accepted this goal.
The
process of European integration gave us two lessons: one
that popular participation in this process is a primary
requirement and two, the need to address the question of
minority rights. In Europe popular acceptance for the
process of integration came in the phase of
post-materialism. In South Asia, the question will not be
material prosperity as in post modernist Europe, but the
question of the very survival of the state system. Here the
popular acceptance for co-operation would have to be based
on the advantages of economies of scale that the process can
offer so as to enable the nations of the region to address
the problems of poverty and deprivation. Herein would come
the developmental approach to the problem at hand.
It
has been observed that the greater the degree of integration
the greater the alienation amongst the minorities. It is
here that South Asia would have to address itself to the
concept of territorial democracy. The international
dimension of territorial democracy focuses on the
democratisation of interstate relations. In the context of
South Asia India would have to ensure that in the SAARC
format India does not emerge as a hegemonic power but a
power that accommodates legitimate interests / concerns of
the participative states (in a democratic norm
pattern).
Conceptual and empirical evidence suggest that there is a
common social morality in South Asia which can help in
containing instability and conflict if ideological and
political impediments are lowered and there is a freer flow
of ideas and information across the subcontinent. The SAARC
Parliament can help bring into prominence regional problems
and also give voice to different interests which feel
stifled in the existing circumstances of centralised
political control. A regional legislature has greater
settlement of social and ethnic conflicts since it can take
advantage of a larger vision that encompasses chauvinism,
which devalues objective criteria when explosive national
impulses are evoked on the floor of a national legislature.
The
political implications of South Asian regionalism provide an
opportunity for regional peace and security which must not
be lost. The setting up of a SAARC Parliament will
contribute to the building of regional confidence and would
help political elites in South Asian Countries to adapt the
Helsinki process in Europe to regional requirements for the
sub-continent.
The
use of confidence building measures as a technique for
crisis resolution needs to be further studied. Modern day
communications technology can be used with effectiveness to
break barriers and establish popular level contact to ensure
reduction of tensions.
The
setting up of a SAARC Parliament may not register immediate
success against nationalist and divisive appeals. It will,
however, add prestige and leverage to efforts to strengthen
the foundations of South Asia as a peaceful community. A
strategy of integration requires norms of regional behaviour
and regular and continuous interactions of members of the
South Asian Parliament will help in the institutionalising
of legislative norms which in turn will help strengthen
SAARC’s viability in the long run.
It
remains a question whether the SAARC Parliament will be
capable of promoting concrete measures for regional peace
and security. It is, however, more likely to be outward
looking than the existing national legislatures.
Finally, the SAARC Parliament should help to fortify
regionalism and multilateralism and through rational and
open discourse work for the reduction of military budgets so
that military expenditures can be reallocated for the
purposes of socio-economic development.
In
the long run the countries of South Asia would have to
search for these common concerns to forge a common approach
to the process of modernisation and development.
Cooperation is inevitable for the alternatives threaten the
very survival of the system.
It
is rather difficult to find a way out of the situation in
which the South Asian countries are placed in view of the
concerns relating to military security, and other negative
aspects of systemic antagonisms which have intensified in
the last four decades. In spite of many shared attitudes,
the governments of the Subcontinent are little predisposed
to foreign policy coordination which could give the region
some semblance of cohesion in the eyes of the international
community. India and Pakistan especially remain very
suspicious and disdainful of each other even through there
is the ominous nuclear factor in the politico-military
environment conditioning their relationship.
A
high priority effort is needed in the region to address the
root causes of instability and to work simultaneously for
the prevention of domestic conflicts spreading across
borders and for restraining inter-state conflicts. Archaic
conceptualisations of security can only worsen the prospects
for peace, while inter-state competition would be
complicated by a deadly combination of ethnic fragmentation
and militarism.
A
regional parliament is a mechanism which can domesticise and
internalize some activities which have hitherto been in
strictly foreign policy parameters. Thus although the
European Parliament’s powers in international relations are
by and large “declaratory”, the framework of the regional
legislature and the political behaviour of the MEPs (Members
of the European Parliament) reflects a stake in increasingly
cooperative policies. On issues like Terrorism the European
Parliament has undoubtedly helped to galvanise the social
consensus and articulate and organise the political space in
a way that would not be possible in a centralised
nation-state legislature. The cross-fertilisation in the
SAARC Parliament would hopefully develop catalytic roles for
influential individuals, political groups and parties for
common security thinking, for measures similar to the single
European Act of 1987 and concepts corresponding to the
European Economic Space “1992”.
Will debate in the SAARC Parliament strengthen the scope for
the realisation of “civil power” in regional peace-building
and conflict resolution? Would a new political discourse
encourage constructive interactions for reducing high
defence budgets? Would the agenda setting in the SAARC
Parliament encourage environmental organisations, business
corporations and ethnic groups to adopt integrative
approaches to conflict management?
It
is sensible to be sceptical about dogmatic answers to these
questions, but there are good reasons for optimism for the
success of a SAARC Parliament, properly designed,
introducing a cooperative psychological environment and
balancing mechanisms to mitigate rivalry and hostility which
has characterised South Asia in the foreign policy sphere.
An
agenda for the future in the foreign policy domain should
include some of the dilemmas which are causing grave concern
in South Asia. The SAARC Parliament can ensure a high
profile to the following issues to begin with by
constituting committees on the following five subjects:
1.
Nuclearisation: The SAARC Parliament can help in
developing alternative conceptual frameworks which build on
Pakistan and India’s accord not to attack each other’s
nuclear installations, and help to develop guiding
principles for controlling the nuclear danger, including
nuclear terrorism.
2.
Confidence Building Measures: the regional
legislature could use its cooperative legislative power to
encourage regional consensus development of common security,
non-offensive defence and regional peacekeeping.
3.
Environmental protection: The role and responsibility
for ecological security of the region cannot be discharged
through verbal battles. A regional feeling for ecological
security cannot be created except through open discussion
and a desire to share the burden of common concerns. One of
the most important contributions of the SAARC Parliament
would be to manage and conciliate tensions and conflicts
over environmental issues which are leading to confrontation
and violence in South Asia.
4.
Humanitarian Issues: Several factors affect the
ability of states to promote human rights and other
humanitarian issues. One of the functions of a regional
parliament is to be ever vigilant on human rights issues and
to establish and propagate the goal of humanitarian
cooperation at all levels in the region.
5.
Globalisation of the international economy: The
problems faced by each country in its policy making process
over the participation in the world market economy have
created acute problems of declining autonomy over economic
policy. The regional parliament needs to focus on the ways
in which new regional economic orientations can be
institutionalised.
The
setting up of the SAARC Parliament will be a bold breakaway
from the current dismal pattern of deeply protracted
conflicts in South Asia. Needless to say in the sphere of
external relations, the SAARC Parliament will help to
identify those policy areas in which new choices can be
exercised. It will constitute a unique basis for feedback
and reference for South Asia’s international relations and
security questions, and over the years should contribute to
economic progress and political stability in the region.
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