MEA Culpa: Do not blame it on Vajpayee

 By
M.L.Sondhi & Ashok Kapur
The Asian Age, August 7, 2001

Part II

It should be recognised clearly, the sooner the better, at MEA officers however well trained and professional they may be, are not experts in coercive diplomacy.  So the location of the Indo-Pakistan political settlement file should be at the level of the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat where strategic and political considerations are always in play and the agenda is more national and international than parochial and bureaucratic.

This is a crucial moment, a turning point, to establish a new Indian policy towards Pakistan.  The need is to avoid faulty premises in decision making.  The Nehru-Gandhi dynastic policy line should be discarded and the Pakistan question should be considered on a realistic basis.  The Nehruvian view was that peace could be achieved by goodwill and diplomatic talk, rather than by coercive diplomacy.  The MEA is ill-suited to the conduct of political discourse because it is based on Indian coercive diplomacy which makes Vajpayee, his Cabinet, and the armed forces the principals in the negotiations.  MEA is the talk shop and just as the Pakistani Foreign Office has functioned under the supervision of the Pakistan military since the days of President Zia-ul-Haq, it is time to place the MEA under strict political supervision, and the armed forces must be given a bigger voice at the negotiating table.  It should be recognised clearly, the sooner the better, at MEA officers however well trained and professional they may be, are not experts in coercive diplomacy.  So the location of the Indo-Pakistan political settlement file should be at the level of the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat where strategic and political considerations are always in play and the agenda is more national and international than parochial and bureaucratic.  Instead of the Nehruvian line the Vajpayee line has been to fight when necessary (Kargil), extend the ceasefires to test the other side’s response, and seek a political settlement when circumstances appear right.  The Nehruvian focus was on unilateral self-restraint with the faulty premise that it gave India the (moral) high ground.  In fact, however, it only made India appear weak.  Restraint is the skilled non-use of available means; a eunuch is not credited with restraint!  So the Vajpayee line has been to involve the other side in a process of developing negotiated restraints.  This is what Agra was about.  Negotiated restraints are based on realpolitik, not views about past history and sentiments.  They are based on interests and assessment of the situation in Asia and America today.  These are the areas which count for India.

Secondly, the Nehruvian view held, again mistakenly, that the major powers would not dare invade India. Foreign powers need not invade India to contain it and its future potential because they can develop international and local alliances which corner and encircle India by diplomatic, military and economic means.  Dumping cheap Chinese goods into the Indian market is an example of the latter.  It is in India’s interest now to loosen the Sino-Pakistani link, to bring Pakistan into the sub-continental mainstream, to bring the world investments and diplomatic support to India and Pakistan, and to create synergy which enables a projection of positive Indo-Pakistani influences into Central Asia and the subcontinent.  To induce Pakistani interest in peace-making, carrots, and not old fashioned hardline party resolutions, are needed.  The aim should be to develop a network of agreements on a variety of topics however small, which creates constituencies to respect the agreements and to broaden their scope.  This is not the time to argue the case history of Partition or that of Kashmir.  That is water under the bridge.  This is not the time to make the case for MEA’s greater involvement in the peace process.  Left to people like us the case for minimising MEA’s involvement in the Indo-Pakistani peace process is actually quite strong on practical grounds.  If in doubt, the reader should examine the case histories of breakthroughs and reconciliation between nations in conflict.  The political leadership, not the bureaucracy, provided the ice breaking talent.

Since the Nehru days, Indian practitioners have acquired a history of navel-gazing and an enthusiasm for joining internal power struggles which cancel each others’ influence or offer limited gain till the next winning coalition gains ground and marginalises the earlier winning coalition.  This is a high volume, low impact and high energy consuming activity which does nothing to create a strategic focus for the country the leaders and bureaucrats are pledged to serve.  The post-Agra challenge is to shape the Asian balance of power and India’s place in it, to tidy up the sub-continental neighbourhood through an Indo-Pakistan interest can be projected into the Asian and the international agendas.  Now is the time to foster stability and growth in the Indo-Pakistan landscape.  Now is not the time to engage in internal power politics which only facilitates divide and rule for outside malign forces.

The big divide in Indian politics and strategy on the Pakistan question is between the hardliners (China, BJP elements, MEA Pakistan-China hands and some Delhi commentators) and those who seek bridge building and negotiated settlement (PMO, the US and a silent majority).  The first is a strategy to divide and to rule; the second is to take the two countries into the 21^st century.  National strategy is the art of knowing when to fight and when to negotiate.  These are the two legs of strategy.  Vajpayee knew when to fight in Kargil and he did so despite the intelligence failures of the entire Indian bureaucracy – MEA included.

Now it is time to negotiate and from available signs Musharraf and the Corp Commanders Committee are ready.  The opportunity must not be lost.  Pokharan II which Vajpayee authored was to lay the foundation for Indian repositioning with the major powers in Asia and the world.  It was not an end by itself.  There was a “beyond” i.e. to build a strategic dialogue with America and others.  This process is underway and Vajpayee pushed it.  The MEA was indeed involved in the talks but the basis of their confidence was the fact that India was a nuclear weapons power, a development which incidentally the Nehruvians in the MEA had opposed.  (Nuclear option – yes, but nuclear weapons – no, was the MEA policy on this question.)  Then came the Lahore bus diplomacy.  This was premature because the Pakistani military mind still sought a military solution in Kashmir and revenge for 1971.  Agra was meant to take the Indo-Pakistan relationship beyond Kargil.  This is a strategy with a plan; it is not a knee jerk reaction.  It is pro-active and it has a constructive agenda.  The mishandling was by the spoilers, not by Vajpayee, and it is time to call a spade a spade.