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LOSING
BALANCE?
By
M.L. Sondhi and Ashok Kapur
The military
campaign of the United States of America against Saddam
Hussein's Iraq is the first major step in a new American
plan to develop a road map for Iraq, the West Asian region
and the world. It is an ambitious plan and it is built on a
philosophy of liberation, not containment of threats as was
the case during the Cold War. It is meant to deal with, on
the one hand, the great powers like Russia, China, the
continental Europeans, and India, and on the other, the
rogue states and rogue forces like Iraq, North Korea and the
al Qaida.
The radically
new approach is based on the view that countries which are
not integrated into the forces of globalization in its
economic, cultural and strategic sense are sources of terror
and insecurity. So the new American worldview divides the
world into three categories - first, those who are
integrated into globalization; North America, Europe and
India, and are not going to be objects of American military
intervention. The second, those who are not tied to
globalization and require various forms of American
intervention. While the globalized world constitutes the
core, the second is the periphery unconnected with the
thought processes and institutional arrangements of the core
world of globalization. This chasm is the basis of the
fundamental cultural and economic divide between the two
worlds. The second world extends from the Caribbean, through
much of Africa, the Balkans, Caucasus, central Asia,
southeast Asia, and much of west Asia (except Israel,
considered a much needed bully in a dangerous neighbourhood)
and North Africa.
The third
category consists of countries which straddle the line
between the core and the periphery. The list includes North
Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, possibly South Africa, Greece
and Thailand. In recent history many of these countries -
like Indonesia and Philippines - were connected to the core
world but slipped to the third category.
Fear is the
element which shapes the policies of the key members of the
three worlds but its nature varies. For the US, it is a fear
the second world may gain ground and reduce its power and
authority. For the autocratic, monarchical and
unrepresentative regimes of west Asia and the other regions
of the second world, it is the fear of losing power and
money to the angry masses. The fear is as real to the Saudis
as it is to the Egyptians and Syrians. The fear of
unpleasant change is thus the context of the US military
strategy.
Although the US
military campaign is likely to succeed against Saddam
Hussein, the fallout will be significant. The movement of
the peoples from the war zone has started and this will
strain Iraq's resources. The United Nations and Japan have
already begun humanitarian aid, and Turkey wants to move
militarily into northern Iraq to guard its interests with
the Kurds. Second, Iraq is deeply divided between Shias,
Sunnis and Kurds and it has no democratic tradition. So US
plans to introduce democracy will require a prolonged
presence in the country. Third, many thrones in west Asia,
including American allies like Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi
Arabia will be thinking about the operation's effect on
their power and wealth.
Fourth,
democracy is likely to produce a backlash from
fundamentalists and produce more al Qaidas. Finally,
although the campaign is directed against Saddam's rogue
regime, the Bush administration's diplomacy has been rough
and challenges the regional interests of Russia, China,
France and Germany. Long term American military presence in
Iraq would be a source of much discomfort for them. Vladimir
Putin has already declared publicly that the American
invasion is a sign of the UN's quest for world domination.
The issue now is not one of Iraqi disarmament, but about
regional and global geo-politics.
What is the
likely fallout for India? It needs to look at two
directions: China and the US. Although Pakistan is in the
third category in American calculation, it has several
advantages. First, the Pakistanis are skilled in using
American fears to their advantage and also understand the
American military mind. Second, Pakistan is an ally in the
US's campaign against terrorism. Third, the US fears that
Pakistan may slip into Islamic fundamentalism. The election
of Islamist leaders in the North West Frontier Province and
Baluchistan is already worrying it. Finally, Pakistan has a
cozy relationship with Beijing which it likes because that
helps it keep up the pressure on India.
One should
expect that Beijing will use the volatility of the Iraq war
to step up its nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan and
to further tighten its grip of Tibet. Beijing will also try
to get closer to Russia, France and Germany, citing the
problem with American hegemony.
But should
India adopt a defeatist stance in this scenario? Certainly
not, because having successfully completed five years in
office as the leader of a coalition government, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee and his colleagues have shown that if they avoid
washing their dirty linen in public and manage to grasp the
meaning of the new American strategy, India can play an
important role in world affairs. Between west Asia and
southeast Asia, India dominates the military and cultural
communications and can further build its ties with Russia
and France as also the neighbours in the Gulf and southeast
Asia.
Indian
practitioners may also keep in mind that the Pakistan
military does not control much of Pakistan's military and
ideological space. The political space is shared with the
Islamists and al Qaida operators in the frontier regions.
Its diplomatic space is controlled by the US government
which places its anti-terrorism requirements on Pervez
Musharraf in return for lifting sanctions and providing
financial aid. Its nuclear and missile programme is managed
by the Chinese who would not like their ordinance with
Chinese markings to reach American hands. In another way,
its nuclear power is also compromised by the fact that the
Americans will take control over Pakistan's missile
capabilities in case of a danger of losing it to terrorists.
Finally, India
has to realize that China has several fundamental problems.
Under the façade, China is running many internal campaigns
which are confusing. Its economic reforms have the potential
of creating unemployment and social unrest. Its new leaders
are young but still believe in the old socialist processes.
And its expertise in foreign matters is limited. For
instance, China has very few experts on India in its
academies and government. The Chinese communist party is
still corrupt and lives off the masses although it has the
decision-making power. The Chinese military has lost its
position as the people's army and is now preoccupied with
fighting a high technology war with the US over Taiwan. It
is deceiving itself by thinking that stealth and deception
can enable the inferior Chinese forces to defeat the strong
American forces. As India competes with China in the
political, economic and military areas it will discover that
its competitor has major weaknesses.
To take advantage of the prevailing balance of power, India
needs to not only analyse diplomatic gambits but develop a
new strategy of comprehensive engagement in line with its
basic values and long-term interests. |
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