The Return of Tibet to World Politics
By
M.L. Sondhi
Tibetan Review, October 1989
Political opportunism and the theme of Tibet as a lost cause
The Government of India’s action in stiffing
discussing of Tibet in the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1950 had the result of swinging the political
pendulum against any serious resistance to Chinese
encroachment and expansionism. New Delhi’s opposition to
the inscription of the Tibetan item on the agenda of the
General Assembly was a short-sighted and opportunistic
posture, which under the guise of seeking a peaceful
solution strengthened the inclination to sweep the matter
under the carpet. There are many dimensions to the
marginalisation of the Tibetan issue in international
politics, but there can hardly be any doubt that India’s
abdication of its role, in respect of a country with which
its strategic interests were intimately connected, was
highly anachronistic. The British who had a greater
understanding of the history and culture of Tibet than any
other western country lacked the leverage to accomplish
anything meaningful once they had decided to downplay the
potential hegemonic tendencies in Communist China.
Britain’s opportunism was expressed by gearing its tactical
moves on Tibet to the contours of Indian compromises and by
its refusal to make a constructive and imaginative
contribution towards strengthening the legitimacy of basic
Tibetan interests in the comity of nations. While New Delhi
and London both prevented each other from adopting more
assertive policies on Tibet, the distinctive characteristics
of their respective political opportunisms fused into a
common central thesis that Tibet was a lost cause. The
Indo-British policy of backing China in denigrating Tibetan
freedom led to the most serious international consequences.
It effectively prevented the rest of the world from seeing
Beijing’s policy towards Tibet as imperialist. It prevented
the Tibetans from finding common ground with other countries
which rejected the simplistic attribution of “liberation” to
Chinese imperialist actions in Tibet.
Apart from the abdication of responsibility
by India and Britain, there were other trends in
international politics which came in the way of the Tibetans
achieving their political goals in cooperation with the
international community:
1.
The illusion of the “success” of the Chinese revolution.
The flaws in the revolutionary strategies of the Chinese
Communists are only beginning to be understood. For
instance, it is becoming clear that there were deep seated
differences in perspective about regional and minority
problems, and the Maoist regime did not enjoy more than a
fragile policy consensus. The inherent contradictions of
the Chinese revolution were, however, generally ignored by a
world which was prepared to overlook the anti-democratic and
inhumane actions of a regime which appeared to control the
political space of a newly-emergent nation which had broken
the shackles of the old colonialist order. There was little
or no serious debate on the costs and consequences for the
immediate victims of Chinese Communist aggression and
violence. The incentive to ignore Tibet was strong.
2.
Interventionism of the superpowers.
In the midst of the Cold War when worst-case scenarios
prevailed and both the Soviets and the Americans renewed
their geopolitical interest in interventionism, there was an
underlying reluctance to focus sharply on Chinese misconduct
in Tibet.
3.
Underestimation of the strategic significance of Tibet. The strategic questions which were given special
urgency during the Cold War did not point towards Tibet.
With the new approach to coexistence through schemes of
disengagement, Tibet’s significance for arms control and
disarmament becomes crucial, but it was not a core issue in
the maintenance of global equilibrium among the superpowers
under confrontationist pressures. It will certainly be a
core issue under a comprehensive concept of international
security.
4.
The erosion of human rights in Asia. The worsening of the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe and in South Africa led the international
community to press for radical steps to cope with the
situation. This is demonstrated by proposals to deal with
human rights violations in these areas. The contribution of
the international community to the maintenance of human
rights in Asia remains a modest one. The violation of human
rights in Tibet and the Chinese version of apartheid has
been disregarded by governments which have been politically
more self-confident in dealing with Moscow or Pretoria.
5.
The normative connotation of Tibetan non-violent resistance. The lack of a violent strategy by the
Tibetan leadership in exile resulted in a political vacuum
in the mind of the international community which is
accustomed to dealing with violence and military
preparations by exile organisations like the PLO. Unless a
new mentality favouring non-violence is generally accepted
in international relations, the Dalai Lama with his
persistent desire to practice Buddhist non-violence is at a
disadvantage in advocating Tibetan freedom in the context of
contemporary realities in which he found himself after his
gaining asylum in India in 1959.
Taking into account the variety of causes which made
the international community unwilling to accommodate the
Tibetan viewpoint, it would be right to say that the Dalai
Lama gave demonstration of his “new thinking” when he
continued to challenge the questionable assumptions of the
“lost cause” thesis in the light of universal goals.
Change in the international system: Taking Tibet seriously
From its inception, the Dalai Lama’s
diplomacy in exile has stressed the interdependence of
national interests and universal human goals in accordance
with the Buddhistic rejection of militarised systematic
conflicts. The Dalai Lama’s “new thinking” has long
reflected some of the serious concerns which Gorbachev has
made popular since the assumption of office as Secretary
General in 1985. He oriented his conduct in foreign affairs
by stressing the interdependent nature of the world. He did
not accept the wisdom of the nuclearised bi-polar world and
identified Tibetan ethos with improvements in global and
regional security through a demilitarised and de-nuclearised
status for Tibet. His readiness to search for agreed
solutions even with China, which had indulged in horrendous
repressive and destructive activities against the Tibetans,
signified a rare intellectual awareness of the need to
improve the political climate of the world in the interests
of human survival.
With the two Superpowers now moving away
from confrontation to a normalisation of relations in a
number of fields, their proposals for global cooperation
provide Tibet a unique opportunity to become once again an
inalienable component of an interdependent world. The
Tibetan leadership in exile must be taken seriously since it
was among the first in the world to reject a zero-sum
conceptualisation of international relations. It is not
unreasonable to hope that Tibet may play a constructive part
in environmental and humanitarian issues which now need
special and urgent attention by the UN.
Diminishing returns to Chinese imperialism in Tibet. In discussing the possible futures which Asia might
confront, Owen Lattimore was among the earliest to underline
the fact that Tibet would provide diminishing returns to any
imperialism. It is only through coercive power that China
is able to maintain what little semblance of political
stability she can claim. The Tibetans continue to
stubbornly resist Chinese overlordship and apart from a
handful of collaborators the vast majority of the Tibetan
population regard themselves as implacable enemies of the
Han Chinese. This is likely to remain the behavioural
pattern in any prognosis of the future of Tibet under
Chinese occupation. The Tibetan people, as they share
common frustrations and sufferings, have become ever more
united in their loyalty to the Dalai Lama and show no
receptivity whatsoever to the indoctrination by the
Chinese. Even a stance of moderation will not lead to a
sophisticated political policy in the absence of a modus
vivendi between the Chinese and the Dalai Lama. The Chinese
thesis of “national liberation” has prevented Beijing from
developing political imagination to achieve realistic
objectives in Tibet. They have brought neither freedom nor
economic prosperity to the Tibetans. They have failed to
convince the outside world that the PLA had not used
national liberation as a pretext for the enslavement of
another nation. The denial of political participation to
the Tibetans and their appalling economic situation have
shown that Chinese policy is oriented towards colonialism
and lacks a genuine peace strategy.
Choices on Tibet
Much of the conventional analysis of the
international setting in which Tibet finds itself is
unfounded. The simple picture of Tibet which can no longer
realistically sever its ties with the Chinese is not
justified by facts. There are newly emerging constraints on
Chinese policy which need to be carefully analysed. A
gradual shift is occurring in the interests and perceptions
of other countries in response to the criticism of
legislators and concerned citizens of Chinese behaviour in
Tibet. An important development is the increasing
realisation in India that its strategic interests cannot be
served by risks involved in the continued military
occupation of Tibet by China. In the absence of confidence
building measures which would actively involve the Tibetans,
India is not prepared to freeze the status quo which the
Chinese would like to do. A south Asian détente could
produce options favourable to Tibet on the part of most of
the AARC countries. Congressional initiatives in the United
States have laid the ground work for a change in US attitude
to Tibet’s identity and existence. Gorbachev has, it is
true, refrained from developing a dialogue with the Dalai
Lama. There are, however, many contacts between Soviet and
Tibetan officials and there are meaningful allusions in
Soviet “new thinking” which can be used to further the
relationship between Russians and Tibetans. The prospective
trends in Europe and Japan favour Tibet.
A. The pivotal importance of Tibet for Indian
national security.
The roots of Indian anxiety about national
security are related to the Chinese military occupation of
Tibet. Despite indications of a more flexible attitude
towards India, China’s military posture in Tibet is a
continuing threat which is fraught with grave danger. When
the Chinese military units crossed into Vietnam on 17
February 1979, to teach Hanoi a lesson the action reminded
Indians of the 1962 crisis. With its strengthened military
capabilities India’s changed military posture imposes a
modicum of restraint on the Chinese. But if India is not to
reap a bitter harvest of recurrent conflict with China, the
following elements must be given importance by India’s
national security planners: create a momentum for the
reduction and eventual elimination of Chinese military
forces in Tibet; actively support the demand for removal of
nuclear installations and nuclear weapons from Tibet;
restore Tibet as a zone of disengagement between India and
China; and refrain from according further legitimacy to the
Chinese presence in Tibet and work for the restoration of a
politically viable regime in Tibet under the leadership of
the Dalai Lama.
The proposition that Indians and Chinese can achieve a
border settlement over the heads of the Tibetans is
fallacious. The most meaningful steps towards
achieving peace between India and China lie in ending
militarism and repression in Tibet.
B. Patterns of Tibet policy in the other SAARC
countries: Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri
Lanka.
Pakistan:
Pakistan has strong reasons to support China and distance
itself from Tibet as long as it is preoccupied with the
Indian threat. Power relations will, however, be
drastically revised if there is a genuine South Asian
regional détente. Tibet is of importance to the interests
of Pakistan as much as it is to those of India. Pakistan
has a regional interest in resolving the problem of Tibet
and this will inevitably surface as Indo-Pakistan rivalry
becomes less virulent. Pakistan can see the parallels
between the aggressive soviet and Chinese behaviour in
Afghanistan and Tibet respectively. There are undoubtedly
complicated military, nuclear, political and economic
factors which govern the Sino-Pakistan relationship. But it
would be sound and prudent for Pakistan not to be ruled by
the logic of Chinese weaponry in Tibet and to indulge in a
frightful waste of its resources in conventional and nuclear
confrontation with India. The pressure of new strategic
concepts could help both India and Pakistan to relate each
other’s cognitive structures towards a possible convergence
of the buffer status of both Tibet and Afghanistan.
Nepal:
No power in the SAARC area has shown a grater interest in
building a peace order than Nepal, which has identified its
foreign policy with the peace zone concept. From India’s
point of view, with its traumas about the 1962 confrontation
with China, there are no foolproof answers to the existing
Chinese infringement of India’s national sovereignty. India
is, therefore, unwilling to lose its strategic assets under
the earlier Treaty arrangement with Nepal and has adopted an
increasingly conservative policy on the peace zone concept.
Nonetheless both Nepal and India have ample opportunity to
relate their security requirements to the new operative
framework which would come into being if the peace zone
concept were extended to Tibet. The potential coincidence
of interests between Nepal and Tibet might start to unravel
in the not too distant future. Indian decision-makers who
have created a crisis of confidence in Nepal over the
question of transit rights need to develop a more
sophisticated understanding of multilateral and pluralistic
tendencies in the interests of a better world order.
Bangladesh:
The general impression gained after the emergence of
Bangladesh from Pakistani tutelage was that the country
would view its own independence as a historic event in
decolonisation. Dacca could have been expected to become a
consistent supporter of Tibetans and other enslaved
nations. To increase its room for political manoeuvrability
Dacca has been friendly to China and has sought to be a
consistent supporter of regional cooperation having
originally formulated the SAARC concept. If intra-SAARC
relations should improve and move towards multilateralism,
Bangladesh’s overwhelming interest in meeting the threats
posed by environmental degradation and in harnessing the
water resources generally and those of the Brahmaputra in
particular, would motivate it towards playing a positive
role on the Tibetan issue.
Bhutan:
Among the SAARC countries, Bhutan is culturally and
linguistically closest to Tibet. This has not prevented a
certain amount of antagonism creeping into the relations
between Thimpu and the Tibetan exiles. But as Bhutan
attains mature diplomatic skill it is likely to put more
emphasis on the idea of increased cooperation with a Tibet
which could re-enter international life rather than pursue
the provincialisation of its political life.
Sri Lanka:
Colombo’s decision-making is greatly changed since it laid
the course of its policy towards China. It has passed
through moods of anxiety over its ethnic conflict and the
induction of the Peace Keeping Force. If India adheres to
the moral and wise course of rejecting a “Cyprus solution”
and the Sri Lankan leadership is able to prevail over the
ruinous ethnic and factional struggles, Colombo would surely
have gained enhanced confidence to place Tibet clearly on
the agenda.
C. The United States and Tibet: the significance
of the new Congressional initiative.
Washington remained averse to developing viable political
option on Tibet, till 22 December 1987 when President Reagan
endorsed the Congressional initiative to include in
legislation the following provision: “the Government of the
People’s Republic of China should respect internationally
recognised human rights violations against Tibetans…. and
should actively reciprocate the Dalai Lama’s efforts to
establish a constructive dialogue on the future of Tibet.”
Subsequently the US Senate passed a resolution supporting
the Dalai Lama’s peace diplomacy. The important effect of
these and subsequent Congressional initiatives on Tibet has
been to start a process in which the foreign policy elite
and American foreign policy makers can identify major
alternative courses of action in direct response to the
Dalai Lama’s efforts to mobilise world public opinion. What
this means essentially is that now the uncritical
interpretation of the Chinese intentions in Tibet will be
increasingly challenged and Tibetans will have the
opportunity to influence the analysis and advice available
to the US policy-making system. In place of ad-hoc
pressures, Tibetans can use the breakthrough to put across
to the Americans their political aspirations and relate them
to a broader base of shared objectives.
D. The Soviet Union and Tibet: the conceptual
frame of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” versus the Sino-Soviet
détente.
The diagnoses and prescriptions of Gorbachev based on the
proposition that every country’s interests should find a
reasonable reflection in international politics yields a
scenario which would provide a genuine alternative for
Tibet’s future. For the Russians to say this directly would
be disruptive of their plans for a Sino-Soviet détente. By
deliberately building up cultural and semi-official contacts
with the Tibetan exiles and by encouraging Mongolia and East
European countries to maintain contacts with the Tibetan
government in exile, Moscow has indicated that its interest
in Tibet is not tangential. In private conversations Soviet
diplomats concede that they find Chinese statements on the
situation inside Tibet both ambiguous and controversial. It
is interesting to note that Soviet and East European
specialists on Tibet do not share the Chinese propensities
to exaggerate the notion of the Han and the Tibetans
belonging to the same family. They are increasingly
providing accurate descriptions of the underlying causes of
hostility between the Chinese and the Tibetans. With these
facts in mind it should be clear that there are objective
conditions for dialogue between the Soviets and the Tibetans
in exile and Tibetan demands are likely to gain increased
attention in Moscow.
E. Europe and Tibet: towards a common strategy
A cursory examination of the events relating to Tibet in
Europe in recent years reveals the extent of beneficial
interaction between Tibet and Europe. The Dalai Lama’s
address to members of the European Parliament at Strasbourg
on 15 June 1988 attracted attention all over the world. Its
language, free from threats, was specially comprehensible to
détente-minded Europeans. The resolution on human rights in
Tibet adopted by the European Parliament on 16 April 1989
and the statements of different parliamentary committees and
groups in several European countries drew attention to the
common interest that Europeans have in the Tibet issue. The
struggle for a new conceptualisation of the Tibet problem
was made clearly visible at the Bonn Hearings on 20 and 21
April 1989 at the initiative of Petra Kelly, German
Parliamentarian and leader of the green Party. The Bonn
Hearings hit the headlines in spite of the disruptive
efforts by the Chinese and their supporters in Europe. The
declaration adopted after the Hearings struck the right
balance and asserted the main principles for a Tibet
strategy with consistency and firmness.
Proceeding from the premises of the Bonn
declaration it is natural to visualise a more central role
for Europe in convincing other publics of the need for
active solidarity with Tibet.
F. Japan and Tibet: from caution to an
affirmative agenda
The ultra cautious approach of Japan in world affairs is
giving way to a policy outlook in which Tokyo is using its
potential for economic assistance to promote political
results. A positive and coherent policy towards Tibet has
yet to emerge, although it is clear that the Japanese would
like Tibet to be more open to the world system. Serious
attention has been paid by Japan to the prospects of a peace
settlement in Cambodia. Japan’s approach to Burma has shown
innovativeness to meet the needs of a fluid situation.
Tokyo interrupted its aid to protest against repression in
Rangoon and other places. The resumption of full scale aid
has been made conditional to a new government being
elected. With its growing role in international affairs
Japan is likely to favour a liquidation of the colonialist
situation created by China in Tibet. One should also
consider the possibility that Japan may be prepared to
mediate a peace-settlement in Asia which could enable it to
gain unprecedented influence in the regional and
international order. Tibet may soon find a pre-eminent
place on Japan’s agenda.
Structural factors and processes in the international
system: the scope for dismantling Chinese hegemony in Tibet
The Chinese perception that Tibet is their
bilateral concern is part of their persistent effort to
maintain their hegemonistic position. The truth is that the
structural factors and processes in the international system
do not encourage the preservation of this hegemonic role.
The Chinese would be a little wiser if they accept the
number of shifts all over the globe in favour of
multilateralism. Having used their military capacity for an
illegal armed intervention against Tibet, the Chinese take a
less sanguine view of the limits of hegemonic integration.
They are also reluctant to introduce political changes in
their domestic system and have in a specific and
particularly inhumane way used their military capacity
against their own citizens. Tibetan interests can be
pursued more energetically in the current transitional stage
of the political organisation of the international system.
The dismantling of the Chinese hegemony in Tibet will not be
the result of manipulation from outside. The Chinese have
driven themselves into a rigid position in which they oppose
Tibetan autonomy and refuse to recognise the internal causes
of social and political change in Tibet. Chinese
expansionism has come up against not only the interests of
the people of Tibet but has sought to preserve a hegemonic
role which is inconsistent with the rules of the
international game.
The future for Tibet: Challenges and responses
We will now focus our discussion on some
questions to which the right answers should be found if the
influence and leadership of Tibet is to be asserted in world
politics against the idiosyncratic characteristics of
Chinese hegemonism.
1. Can there be a sufficiently strong movement
against “apartheid” in Tibet?
Unfortunately, the issue of racial discrimination in Tibet
has been so far relegated to unimportance. Yet this is an
area which will yield high returns for the Tibetan cause.
Powerful forces are working in the United Nations, the
Commonwealth and other international institutions to build
pressure against apartheid in South Africa. If these
pressures succeed, the next area for action by the
international community could be Tibet. It would be
profitable to start working on this now and create
mechanisms for constructive engagement and making apartheid
in Tibet a matter of paramount concern to the world
community.
2. Can the Tibet issue become a major aspect of
the peace movement mobilisation in the world?
The Peace Movement has challenged existing security policies
and channelized the widespread concern about the nuclear
arms race. The success of the Dalai Lama in projecting
Tibet as a peace issue can be enhanced if the full range of
activities and organisation forms of those supporting the
Tibetan cause can be linked to a network of institutional
alliances for ensuring human survival.
3. Can the world community help to save Tibet’s
ecological system?
The campaigns around the world in defence of ecology and
environment have not yet been extended to Tibet. What would
be the equivalent of a Rainbow Warrior to highlight the
mission to save the roof of the world from further
ecological degradation at the hands of the Chinese?
4. Can the Tibetan Government-in-exile be
recognised by a sizeable number of governments?
It is not surprising that since the Indian government has
not afforded recognition to the Tibetan government-in-exile,
other states have not openly demonstrated their support for
Tibet. The remarkable thing is that India has lent
legitimacy to the political authority of the PLO through
recognition while showing no sensitivity to the case of
Tibet whose status in international law is far more clear.
Recognition is an important legitimising resource and it
seems axiomatic that the Tibetan message can be communicated
with maximum effectiveness only if the process of
recognition gets under way.
5. Can the important and essential issues
concerning Tibet be voiced in the UN forums?
The initial interest of the UN in the Tibet question
lapsed. The present time is propitious when both the Super
powers have decided to make a constructive use of the world
body. Having gained her place in the UN Communist China can
now be compelled to explain her national behaviour in
respect of matters on the UN agenda. A properly coordinated
UN strategy will not be ineffective if the diplomatic
instruments at the disposal of the Tibetans are used with
maturity and wisdom.
6. Can the Tibet question be related to the
basic aims and objectives of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM)?
It should be apparent that once the issue of Tibet is seen
as a question of decolonisation and human rights, it can
fall in place in the patterns of Nonaligned policy. In any
event the effort to work out a relationship the NAM should
help the Tibetans to explain the essential components of
Chinese expansionism and the risks it poses to the
developing world.
7. Can the Peace Zone concept be made part of a
grand strategy for the future of global relations?
There cannot be any doubt that the Dalai Lama’s 5-point
peace plan introduces a new perspective for a stable peace
in the world. Substantive progress could be made if de
facto situations which can eliminate the vestiges of
colonialism and ethnic violence through the peace zone
concept could be interrelated.
8. What kind of effort can be made to close the
information gap on the Tibet issue?
Radio and TV are undoubtedly key assets which can help Tibet
overcome the isolationism imposed by the Chinese. The Dalai
Lama has been projected effectively in the international
media, but this is no substitute for a Free Tibet Radio
Station.
9. Can the concept of “the Vatican status” for
the Dalai Lama help in the assessment of common Buddhist
inters and make for a sounder basis of policy with other
religious organisations?
The Vatican can provide precedents for diplomacy and
statecraft which Tibet needs to design in order to cope with
the harsh realities of the world and utilise the full
dimensions of inter-religious dialogue.
10 Can Tibet become the fulcrum of an Asian peace
order?
It would be an act of foresight if Lhasa could be made the
headquarters of the UN in Asia and Tibet could be provided
with a peace identity through which the systemic
transformation towards an Asian Peace Order could be
achieved.
The relevance of the Dalai Lama’s peace strategy
At the beginning of this essay we drew attention to the
political opportunism of India and Britain, whose direct
consequence was the marginalisation of the Tibet issue in
world politics. The international system of the 1990s
provides an opportunity to mend the shortcomings of the
earlier approaches to the Tibet issue. Moreover, the Dalai
Lama’s peace strategy is harmonious with other efforts to
stabilise international relations.
The proposals of the Dalai Lama cannot be regarded as
utopian: they challenges the role of Chinese hegemonic power
through the joint efforts of the international community in
a multilateral diplomatic process. The continuing crisis in
Tibet is in direct opposition to the peaceful developments
which have been initiated by the Eat-West efforts to end the
“New Cold War”. The Dalai Lama has provided a coherent
concept for real measures towards a more independent Tibetan
position at a time when the hegemonic position of the two
Super powers is in decline and the conflict potential in the
Chinese system needs to be contained within the structures
and processes of the international system. While the
Chinese continue to violate the rules of détente by their
domestic and foreign policy actions, the Dalai Lama has used
his international experience and Buddhist insights to
address the central problems related to the new character of
international relations. |