M. L. Sondhi
International Studies Journal
Vol. 9, No. 2, October 1967

The need to discuss and clarify the many-sided implications of nuclear weapons for the foreign policies of nations is now more urgent than ever before. The Seminar on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy held during 6-12 November 1966 by the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, was in fulfilment of this urgent need. The significance of the Seminar lies in the fact that for the first time in India about forty-five experts from various fields of specialization like the physical sciences, administration, and other social disciplines met together, undertook a detailed examination of the available data, and attempted an assessment of national, regional, and global perspectives of the problem of nuclear weapons. It was attended by members of Parliament, specialists in military science and the physical sciences, prominent journalists, and scholars from the School, the Indian Council of World Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, and the Bombay, Delhi, and i, and i, and Jadavpur universities. Professor M.S. Rajan, Director of the Seminar, and Mr. M.L. Sondhi, Head of the Department of International Politics and Organization at the School, functioned as its Secretary. The Seminar was conducted on an academic and research level. Its main aim was not so much to prescribe definite policies as to provide knowledge, understanding, and insight into the political requirements of different nations and of the world community in the face of new developments in mankind’s experience with nuclear energy. The discussion in the Seminar was primarily focussed on three broad subjects selected for this purpose: (i) World Nuclear Situation; (ii) Asian Military Balance and Stability; and (iii) Nuclear Policy for India. The Seminar also devoted its attention to the co-ordination of research in Government research institutions and universities.

In his inaugural address, Dr. Zakir Hussain, then Vice-President of India, referred to the background and objectives of India’s thinking in the field of foreign policy and particularly on the question of disarmament, with special reference to the problems of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He stressed that the issue of India’s nuclear policy, a question of fundamental national importance,

should be the subject of enlightened and considered discussion if only to ensure that public opinion in this country was developed on an informed basis. He reminded the Seminar that as far back as 1957 Jawaharlal Nehru had declared on behalf of the Government of India that nuclear energy would be utilized exclusively for peaceful purposes. He pointed out at the outset that successive Prime Ministers, in spite of increasing pressure upon them to revise this policy in view of the growing Chinese nuclear threat, had reiterated their determination to adhere to a peaceful nuclear programme although we had the ability to put nuclear energy to military use. The national decision, i.e. whether to make nuclear weapons or not, should be decided by the touchstone of national interest. The debate should not be confused with an international commitment to abstain from the manufacture of nuclear weapons, under the provisions of a non-proliferation treaty. He regarded non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as the most urgent problem in the field of disarmament today. He recalled that after nine years of patient and persistent negotiations the efforts initiated by Nehru in 1954 bore fruit when, in 1963, the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded. He expressed India’s earnest hope that the nuclear Powers would display a sense of statesmanship and responsibility and would agree to the immediate suspension of all nuclear tests. However, he regretted the tendency of the Great Powers to view the problem of non-proliferation as being exclusively concerned with the prevention of horizontal proliferation by freezing the existing number of nuclear Powers and to over look vertical proliferation so that there was an ever-increasing stockpile of nuclear weapons with “over-kill” capacity in the arsenals of the super Powers. He explained that world public opinion was firmly of the view that a non-proliferation treaty was not an end in itself but only a means to the achievement of general and complete disarmament and more particularly of nuclear disarmament. He cited the historic resolution1 adopted by an overwhelming majority in the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which clearly laid down that a non-proliferation treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. He pointed out that by implication this resolution declared that the international community had recognized that the nuclear Powers must undertake certain responsibilities to halt and reverse the arms race if they expected non-nuclear Powers to deny themselves nuclear weapons for all time. He stated that the Government of India was making strenuous efforts to secure universal acceptance of this thesis. He underlined the consensus among the non-nuclear Powers that their security could never be assured by any form of nuclear guarantee or protection except by the elimination of the threat itself through nuclear disarmament. He paid glowing tributes to scientists like the late Dr. H.J. Bhabha and Dr. Vikram A. Sarabhai, who, through their participation in the Pugwash conferences and other international meetings, contributed to the efforts all over the world to evolve an intellectual consensus among scientists and thinkers. He wished that the discussions in the Seminar would be carried out in the true academic spirit and as an educational effort in the widest sense of the term.


The three sessions on “World Nuclear Situation” were presided over by Professor M.S. Rajan. The working papers for these sessions were prepared by Mr. M.L. Sondhi (on “World Nuclear Situation”), Dr. R. Vaidyanath (on “Problems and Prospects of a Soviet Nuclear Guarantee”), Dr. R.P. Anand (on “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Powers”), Mr. Gonsalves (on “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Powers”), Dr. Mahendra Kumar (on “Certain Scientific Aspects of Monitoring for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”), and Mr. V.C. Trivedi (on “Negotiations for Nuclear Disarmament”). Dr. B.R.C. Babu and Dr. Mahendra Kumar worked as rapporteurs.

Some of the participants felt that the US nuclear programme had been developing at a very fast rate especially since 1963 and that the Americans were convinced of their nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union which permitted them to adopt a posture of confidence. They also pointed out that with the emphasis on small but sophisticated nuclear weapons, the whole nuclear programme of the Americans was governed by considerations of survivability, reliability, and ability of penetration. The belief of American superiority was found to be overoptimistic, especially in views of the absence of accurate and reliable figures on the Soviet side.

It was noted that the Chinese nuclear programme had been in progress for more than a decade and that each new test launched by the Chinese had been an advance over the earlier test. It was stated that the United States could not be unaware of the fact that China was bound to emerge as a first-rate nuclear Power within the next five years in view of its determined pursuit of its nuclear development programme.

There was considerable discussion on the French nuclear strength, and it was generally recognized that both France and China were soon going to be mighty nuclear Powers. Some scientists participating in the Seminar observed that the “cleanliness” of the Chinese bomb was much higher than that of the French bomb and that, therefore, China was technically ahead of France.

There was some effort in the Seminar to understand the nature of the triangular nuclear balance that was likely to emerge in future between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.

It was felt that the basic objective of China was to obtain Great-Power status and that the fulfilment of this objective made it necessary for it to upset the existing nuclear status quo. It was also felt that the Chinese proposals for a world disarmament conference and for an undertaking by the super Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons were insincere because it was patent even to the Chinese that their proposals would not be accepted and the proposals in effect helped China to go ahead with its nuclear development programme and to maintain at the same time a posture of support for disarmament and arms control.

The consensus in the Seminar was that the French nuclear power was developing as definitely as the Chinese nuclear power. While the French nuclear programme was considered on the whole to have contributed to the economic prosperity of France, the question was raised whether nuclear development led to economic prosperity in the case of any and every country that decided to embark upon a nuclear programme. However, there was no agreed opinion in the Seminar on this matter.

As to the likely impact of the Chinese and the French nuclear power on the non-nuclear Powers, it was felt that some countries which had the potentialities to manufacture nuclear weapons might follow the example of France and China in developing their own nuclear weapons. West Germany, India, Israel, the United Arab Republic, Sweden, and Japan were mentioned in this context.

Then the Seminar turned to the question whether there was a need for a new terminology to describe the present world nuclear situation, and a lively discussion took place. While some members of the Seminar pointed out that concepts like “balance of power” “balance of terror”, and “nth country problem” were becoming obsolete in the changed setting of international politics, other members argued vigorously that what was becoming obsolete was the existing balance of power, but not the concept of balance of power which was valid as the basis of world politics even in the present nuclear age.

As for the nature of the nuclear guarantee it was generally felt that theoretically the guarantee could be given either by the United States or by the Soviet Union individually, or by both of them jointly. Neither the single-nation guarantee nor the two-nation guarantee was considered to be sufficiently credible, though the latter was regarded as relatively credible. The nuclear guarantee could not be credible to the non-aligned countries, at least to the extent to which it could be to the members of the military alliances. A note of warning was struck that a joint nuclear guarantee might as well lead to the establishment of some sort of a condominium of the super Powers over the rest of the world. It was generally admitted that self-reliance in matters of security would be preferable to any nuclear guarantee, however reliable and effective it might be.

The attitude of the Government of India to the question of non-proliferation was also discussed at some length. It was explained that non-proliferation was viewed by India as a step towards disarmament and not as an end in itself. The draft treaty of non-proliferation sponsored jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union was not found to be acceptable to India since the draft treaty took non-proliferation as the ultimate goal. This treaty was described as a calculated effort to prevent potential nuclear Powers from developing nuclear weapons and did not purport to put any check on the existing nuclear stockpiles of the super Powers. From India’s point of view even a treaty providing against both horizontal and vertical proliferations of nuclear weapons should be time-bound.

The opinion that non-proliferation had nothing to do with disarmament was expressed, and some members of the Seminar refuted the argument advanced by others that the emergence of more nuclear Powers would upset world stability. The assumption that the existing nuclear Powers alone were “responsible” in their international conduct was described as the most insulting aspect of the premises of non-proliferation. A plea was made that each nation should exercise its nuclear choice in accordance with the demands of its national interest and considerations of security, without being influenced by the Great Powers.

While the single-nation guarantee was thought to be absolutely non-credible except in the case of aligned countries, a multilateral guarantee was considered to be not sufficiently acceptable to non-aligned countries since, it was felt, such a guarantee would not become operative for non-aligned countries without prior staff consultations and without targets being determined well in advance. A multilateral guarantee under the United Nations was generally found to be acceptable, but doubts were expressed as to its feasibility in the near future.

The idea of “nuclear brinkmanship” – a state of permanent readiness to manufacture nuclear weapons – was suggested as a possible alternative for potential non-aligned nuclear Powers unwilling to accept nuclear guarantee offered by the super Powers, and the view was expressed that a discussion on the problem of non-proliferation could not be divorced from the problem of security.

A section of the Seminar expressed concern that the Government of India might allow others to decide for it in a crucial matter like security by agreeing to sign the non-proliferation treaty after certain conditions were fulfilled. While India’s view that a non-proliferation treaty should also provide for a cut in the nuclear stockpiles of the Great Powers was highly appreciated, the ability of the potential nuclear Powers to resist the pressure of the Great Powers and refuse to sign the non-proliferation treaty in its present form was found to be doubtful. It was observed in this context that India’s bargaining position in the matter of non-proliferation was growing weaker in view of its increasing dependence on the super Powers for economic aid and that it would not be able to sustain its opposition to the non-proliferation treaty for long.

The Seminar was of the view that general and complete disarmament – a goal set by the United Nations – was unattainable, and that in the present setting of the world, nuclear disarmament alone was attainable, however formidable the difficulties in its way might be. The Seminar was reminded of the fact that non-aligned countries had pleaded at Geneva that scientific knowledge and information should be made available to all countries. Brief references were also made to the Swedish proposal for international co-operation in nuclear energy. The Seminar also broached the idea of nuclear-free zones as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Rapacki Plan came in for special mention.

Greater attention was paid by the Seminar to the prospects of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It was felt that the super Powers would agree to a comprehensive test ban treaty only when it suited their interests. The partial test ban treaty of 1963 was a means to postpone the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries, and if the Great Powers agreed to this treaty, it was only because they had finished all their projected tests and further testing would be a futile exercise. At that stage, they only needed underground tests.

A senior scientist participating in the Seminar described the various methods of test detection for the benefit of other participants.

He explained that correct detection depended upon the size of the bomb exploded and that a country which exploded atomic bombs was likely to develop a more reliable detection system than a country which did not. Although the existence of a large number of recording stations was thought to be necessary for successful detection, it was also explained that no fool-proof detection system had yet been invented and that an atomic test might be concealed if it was conducted in outer space, or in artificially built cavities deep below the surface of the earth. Though frightfully expensive, tests in these cavities could be so arranged as to bluff the world into mistaking them for earthquakes.


Four sessions were held on “Asian Military Balance and Stability” and were presided over by Major General Y.S. Paranjpe (Retd.), Director, Department of Military Studies, University of Poona. The working papers for these sessions were prepared by Mr. B.M. Chakravarty (on “Political and Strategic Consequences of Chinese Nuclear Power”), Dr. Harish Kapur (on “Strategic Interests of the USSR in the Context of Asia’s Military Balance and Stability”), Dr. B.R.C. Babu (on “Nuclear Proliferation and Military Stability in Asia”), and Dr. P.A.N.Murthy (on “Asian Military Balance and Stability – Potential Nuclear Powers in Asia : Japan”). Dr. R.P. Anand and Mr. K.R. Singh worked as rapporteurs.

There was a general consensus in the Seminar that the recent Chinese explosions of nuclear weapons had created great imbalance of power in this part of the world and a threat to the security of Asian countries. Although the overall balance of power between the super Powers was not seriously affected by the rise of minor nuclear Powers like China and France, it had considerably disturbed the regional balance. Some of the Great Powers were found to be eager to develop closer relations with China though they seemed to condemn the Chinese possession of the nuclear bomb.

It was felt by several participants that the Chinese bomb had already made its impact on several countries in Asia. North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cambodia were already within the Chinese sphere of influence. Japan, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, and Malaysia had expressed concern over the Chinese nuclear threat. A great admiration for the Chinese nuclear explosions was noticed in Pakistan since it regarded that the Chinese nuclear bomb would be to its advantage in its rivalry with India. There was, however, no such obsession with India in Nepal, Burma, or Ceylon.

The West Asian countries were observed to be less affected by the Chinese bomb and there was no serious criticism of the Chinese explosions in the Arab countries. On the other hand, the Arab countries seemed to welcome the Chinese bomb as a protection against a possible threat from Israel. Several participants of the Seminar expressed the view that India must strengthen its position both economically and militarily in order to counter effectively the growing danger posed by the Chinese nuclear threat. It was suggested that India should not hesitate to enter into alliances with like-minded neighbouring states for common defence against China, and it was regretted that no serious effort had so far been made by India to come to an understanding with other Asian countries.

There was general agreement that China’s power was inhibited to a great extent by the American commitments and Soviet interests in Asia. It was observed that relaxation of tension in Europe permitted the super Powers to play a more active role in Asia, at least for a few years to come. The West European countries too welcomed the emergence of China as a nuclear Power, since it would keep the Soviet Union busy on its own Asian border in its dispute with China. Even the United States was found to favour the Chinese nuclear bomb, though in a limited way, since it might result in some thaw in the Cold-War confrontation.

The strategic position of the United States was assessed to be stronger in Asia today, thanks to Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian, and Sino-Indonesian rifts. Though there was some criticism of the American involvement in the conflict in Vietnam, American prestige and interests in South-East Asia were found to be unaffected. The Manila Conference and the enthusiastic welcome given to President Lyndon B. Johnson during his recent visit to some of the capitals of south-East Asia convinced the Americans that they could ward off the aggressive designs of China so long as they demonstrated their willingness to use their tremendous power to honour their commitments.

It was felt that US interest in India was limited and that the United States did not relish the idea of India becoming an independent, strong force. It was pointed out that the United States had not even accepted India’s border with China as final (except in a limited area), and had refused to admit China as an aggressor in the recent Sino-Indian border dispute. It was also noted with surprise that some informed circles in the United States had felt that the Chinese nuclear bomb was really no danger to India and had put tremendous pressure on India not to go nuclear.

Some members of the Seminar considered the strategic interest of the Soviet Union in Asia as that of a central land Power towards “rimland states” and its desire to keep them free from the political and military influences of a hostile naval Power such as the United States. Not only did the United States successfully organize these rimland states in its own military bloc, but another land Power, China, emerged in this area challenging Soviet supremacy. On the one hand the Soviet Union seemed to be interested in keeping as many countries as possible out of the American bloc and on the other hand it might like the rise of numerous small Powers to counter the growing Chinese menace. It would, therefore, be in its own interest to help India become a stable and strong state and act as a counter force against China. The view was generally expressed in the Seminar that India must depend upon itself, muster its own resources, and develop its economic and military potential, so that it could play a significant role in world affairs.


The three sessions on “Nuclear Policy for India” were presided over by Professor M.S. Rajan. The working papers for these sessions were prepared by Captain A.F. Colaco (on “The Nuclear Maritime Threat”), Dr. P.S. Gill (on “Organization and Development of Nuclear Science in India”), Mr. Sisir Gupta (on “India and Nuclear Weapons: Some Relevant Political Considerations”), Major General Y.S. Paranjpe (on “Nuclear Policy for India : Chinese Nuclear Threat to India and India’s Nuclear Policy”), Dr. B.D. Nag Chaudhuri (on “Dilemma of Enlightened Self-Interest”), Mr. K.R. Malkani (on “Asian Military Balance and Stability”), and Dr. V.P. Dutt (on “China, India, and the Atom Bomb”). Professor Bimla Prasad and Dr. P.A.N. Murty worked as rapporteurs.

Though China’s possession of the nuclear bomb did not give it any decisive advantage in its strategic position, it was felt that it had definitely helped it to secure immunity from aggression. In its effort to expand into neighbouring areas, China would resort to skirmishes through conventional means—one of those “frontless” wars—and not use nuclear weapons. It was explained that India’s strategy being basically defensive, it had to rely mainly on conventional weapons. It was also pointed out that our defence strategy would depend upon the nature of attack—conventional or nuclear—to be resisted.

The “power gap” between India and China was noted, and the difficulties involved in bridging this gap and attaining parity were discussed in detail. Some kind of deterrence was favoured since it would discourage an enemy from attacking India and at the same time, lessen the possibilities of India’s involvement in small wars.

Then the political considerations involved in an Indian nuclear policy were taken up for discussion. Acceptance of a guarantee and alignment with one of the Power blocs were considered to be the likely consequences of India’s deciding not to go nuclear. However, inasmuch as a guarantee was one-sided and its credibility doubtful, it would be suicidal for India to accept a guarantee from any Power. Alignment was out of the question since no super Power was willing to let us align ourselves with it.

It was felt that if India decided to make the bomb, it would not merely heighten the morale of the nation but also transform the attitude of its hostile neighbours. It was asserted that there would be no economic breakdown. It was conceded that the Great Powers might feel displeased, but it was felt that they might not, in the present circumstances, choose to show it.

While India’s decision to make the bomb might annoy the Great Powers, it would certainly find support among medium countries like West Germany, Japan, and Israel, which were dissatisfied with the status quo, and the view was expressed that India had not exploited well the split in the Communist world. It was suggested that India should enter into a dialogue with those East European countries which had begun to look away from Moscow and derive some advantage from the growing diversity within the Communist bloc. Then even some Communist countries might support India. As a concrete solution, a joint resistance by India and other medium Powers to the non-proliferation pact was proposed. The very proclamation of India’s intention to become a nuclear Power would lead other countries to take India more seriously and contribute significantly to its internal stability.

It was asserted that development and defence were not contradictory and that resources could be simultaneously devoted to both. It was also contended that the fundamental defect of our economy was that it was consumption-oriented and that what was needed now was a greater emphasis on technology, automation, and computers. A change in the outlook of Indian trade unions was regarded as highly helpful in this regard.

It was suggested that instead of finding fault with America, we must play up the Chinese threat, go in for the bomb, and prepare the ground for American acquiescence in India’s making the bomb as a fait accompli. It was felt that the Soviet Union would most probably be restrained in its reaction to our making the bomb because it had important trade connexions with India which could not be snapped simply because India had decided to make the bomb.

India’s influence in the countries of South-East Asia as a great maritime Power in ancient times was explained, and it was suggested that India should strengthen these links by developing its maritime activities further. There was also the need to safeguard a coastline of about 3,500 miles which required a fairly strong navy. Till recently there had been no appreciation of the threat to India’s coastline.

It was pointed out that the naval stations, depots, and shipyards of India were all open and that without a strong naval force they could not be adequately protected. India’s communication lines also could not be secure. In this context the British decision to leave Aden in the West and its possible evacuation of Singapore in the East came in for mention. This would mean that the western and eastern gates of the Indian Ocean would go out of the hands of a strong naval Power. China might seriously compete with India for the control of Aden and Singapore. A canal in the Palk Strait was considered very useful for the quick movement of ships belonging to the Indian navy from Bombay to the Andamans. Since a naval base in the Andamans was coming up, this canal project would be extremely beneficial in linking that base with other bases in the peninsula. It would also make it easy for Indian ships to patrol this area effectively.

The Seminar was assured that the detection system of the Indian Navy was quite efficient to prevent any Chinese submarine from sneaking into our coastal waters. However, it was admitted that there was no way of checking any sneak nuclear attack from Chinese submarines since they could be carried out even from the high seas. Such an attack could be carried out even by a surface ship and not necessarily by a submarine.

The deficiency in India’s defence against naval or naval-air attack was underlined, and it was pointed out that the peninsula was wide open to intrusion from sea and particularly by submarine. Though the United States had assured India against mischief-making submarines in the Indian Ocean, it wanted to leave the primary responsibility in this area to Britain.

It was again stressed that for a country like India which relied on defensive strategy it was conventional armament that was more important. This view was further strengthened by the observation that since a nuclear attack against India was improbable, priority should be given to conventional armament. It was stated that at the moment China did not have tactical weapons and there was no information as to how far it had progressed in miniaturing nuclear weapons.

It was estimated that China might not actually use nuclear weapons against India, but the very possession of these weapons would give it an advantage with which it could always create border skirmishes and leave India permanently on the defensive unless India also developed capacity for nuclear retaliation. It was wrong to assume that our possessing nuclear weapons would eat into conventional armament. India, on the other hand, would definitely improve its position to deter a hostile Power like China from escalating any skirmish into a larger conflict or creating endless trouble on the border.

It was pointed out that a defensive strategy had the great disadvantage of leaving the initiative permanently in the hands of the enemy and that our possessing nuclear weapons could infuse a certain degree of self-confidence in the nation. A minor nuclear Power was considered more dangerous than a major one. Nuclear weapons could rightly be described as “political” weapons since by merely possessing them one could achieve one’s purpose. There was no need to use them at all.

A smaller capability was found to be as useful as a bigger capability in preventing a nuclear attack. India should be able not only to sustain small defeats but also to achieve small victories for which the possession of nuclear weapons would be a prerequisite. It was suggested that India’s nuclear energy programme may be accelerated without neglecting the development of its conventional forces, and a balanced growth of both nuclear and conventional weapons was considered as the most profitable objective for the defence of India. In the ultimate analysis, India’s political and military strength would depend upon its technological progress.

The proceedings of the Seminar ended with an address by Mr. Swaran Singh, then Minister for External Affairs. He characterized as outmoded the conception that disarmament was the exclusive concern of the Great Powers. He strongly advocated the view that non-nuclear Powers had a vested interest in disarmament in view of their growing determination to rid the world of arms and wars and to ensure that the vast resources released by disarmament were diverted to their economic advancement. He highlighted the growing importance of the problem of nuclear weapons in the purely national context since China first demonstrated its determination to develop an offensive nuclear weapons capability. He centred his argument on the recognition of India’s technological capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons and the understandable concern in the public mind for the adoption of effective measures to safeguard the security of the country.

He pointed out that India had extensive uranium deposits and the largest deposits of thorium-rich minerals in the world and that its reactor, which became critical in 1954, was the first to be constructed in Asia. He declared that India’s technical expertise for advanced nuclear research was acknowledged all over the world, but that India had decided from the very outset to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes as a matter of deliberate policy. He stated that although there was an increasing demand for a revision or at least a review of that policy following China’s demonstration of its developing nuclear capability, successive Prime Ministers had reiterated their determination to adhere to the policy of a peaceful nuclear programme and that India’s sense of disciplined self-restraint had greatly contributed to the decision by other potential nuclear Powers not to exercise their nuclear option.

He explained that the problem of non-proliferation had two aspects which were organically linked each to the other and which must, therefore, be considered simultaneously. The dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons would arise not only from further proliferation created by the emergence of a larger number of nuclear Powers, but even more so by the further proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers, which continued to increase their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

He felt that as long as superior status and prestige were associated with the possession of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear Powers and more particularly the potential nuclear Powers would find it difficult, in spite of all their disciplined self-restraint, to resign themselves to what was believed to be an inferior status for all time. He regretted the reluctance of the nuclear Powers to disarm themselves and expressed the view that most non-nuclear Powers considered the elimination of the threat itself as the only lasting and effective guarantee for their security.

He strongly recommended the implementation of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1965, which stipulated that a non-proliferation treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. He reiterated that the international community could not endorse a plan which, while dealing with proliferation in relation to non-nuclear Powers, permitted and sanctified continued vertical proliferation by the nuclear Powers to augment their nuclear stockpiles. He assured that India would resist all efforts to blind non-nuclear Powers unilaterally in a simple non-proliferation treaty leaving the nuclear Powers free to increase their stockpiles and perfect their delivery systems.

March 1967

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